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INTRODUCTION
In 1947, the People's Republic of China ("China") was an original
signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),
a revolutionary new model of international economic liberalization.'
Since that time, however, China's foreign economic policy has been
characterized by severe restrictions on foreign trade and investment
and a strongly protectionist economic ideology with its roots in
China's socialist political philosophy.' Nevertheless, on September
17, 2001, the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), which
administers the GATT and other liberal economic agreements,
concluded negotiations on China's terms of membership,3 paving the
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 224-25, repealed by Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Apr.
15, 1994, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 1,33 I.L.M. 1144, 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT].
2. See Sang Bin Xue & George D. Wilson, Capital and Technology: China
Rejoins the Modern Business World An Analysis of China's Equity Joint Venture
Law, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 511, 514 (1991) (describing China's economic reform in
light of its ideology and history).
3. See Press Release, World Trade Organization ("WTO"), WTO Successfully
Concludes Negotiations on China's Entry (Sept. 17, 2001) [hereinafter WTO
Negotiations] (discussing parallels to China's accession process to both the GATT
and the WTO), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres0Ie/pr243-e.htm (last visited Oct. 2,
2002). China's accession into the GATT and WTO has been continually conducted
through a specialized Working Party, established in 1987, consisting of
representatives from all interested GATT/WTO Member governments. Id. The
initial GATT Working Party was only interested in China's trade policies for
goods. Id. When the Working Party was incorporated into the WTO system in
1995, its agenda was broadened to encompass trade in services, new standards on
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way for formal adoption of the Protocol on the Accession of China4
("Protocol") at the November WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha,
Qatar ("Doha Ministerial").5 On November 10, 2001, the Doha
Ministerial approved the text of the agreement for China's entry into
the WTO ("Accession Agreement"),6 which China then signed and
ratified on November 11, 2001.7 As a result, on December 11, 2001,
non-tariff measures, and rules dealing with intellectual property rights. Id. The
WTO Working Party was charged with completing two tasks prior to China's
accession: (1) to create a report based on deliberations; and (2) to devise a Protocol
on China's Accession. Id. The Protocol is supplemented by the annexes, which
have been at the center of Working Party negotiations, and are intended to signal
China's commitment to reform to other WTO Members and serve as a timetable
for China to bring its trade regime into full compliance with the WTO's policies.
Id. The annexes account for most of the nearly nine hundred pages of text that was
reviewed for approval at the Doha Ministerial. Id.; see also WTO, Working Party
on the Accession of China, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China,
annexes 1A-9, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Working Party
Report] (setting forth the negotiation processes that China underwent in becoming
a member of the WTO), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/acce/completeacc-e.htm (last visited Oct.
20, 2002).
4. See Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, Nov. 10,
2001, WT/L/432 [hereinafter Protocol] (noting the steps that China must take to
accede to the WTO), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/acce/completeacc-e.htm (last visited Oct.
20, 2002).
5. See WTO Negotiations, supra note 3 (providing a brief description on the
Working Party conclusions, explaining the negotiation process, and listing the
commitments undertaken by China).
6. See Press Release, WTO, WTO Ministerial Conference Approve China's
Accession, (Nov. 10, 2001) (discussing the documents pertinent to China's
accession and noting the impact that WTO membership will have on China's
economy), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres0l-e/pr252_e.htm
(last visited Oct. 20, 2002). The Accession Agreement encompasses: (1) the report
of the Working Party for the Accession of China, (2) the Protocol of Accession
with annexes, and (3) the schedule of China's commitments on market access for
goods and services. Id.; see also Press Release, WTO, China to Join on 11
December: Chinese Tapei's Membership Also Approved (Nov. 11, 2001)
[hereinafter Chinese Tapei Approval] (indicating that the entire membership
agreement is approximately thirteen kilograms in weight and 1,500 pages in
length), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min0l_e/minOl_1 lnov-e.htm (last
visited Oct. 20, 2002).
7. See Chinese Tapei Approval, supra note 6 (describing the formalities that
led to the ratification of China's WTO membership).
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after nearly fifteen years of negotiations,8 China formally became the
WTO's 143rd Member, and turned once again to the liberal
economic goals that it had embraced nearly fifty-five years prior. 9
While still ostensibly aspiring to achieve a state of "socialism with
Chinese characteristics," the China of today is best described as a
nation driven above all by economic development.'" At least one
commentator has suggested that "the success of economic reforms
has led many Chinese to lose what little faith they may have had in
the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought.""
Although some historic Chinese political motivations still exist,
including fears of disunity and a preoccupation with national
security, China's overriding modern objective is the acquisition of
global power through economic strength. 2 Within such a political
framework, democratic initiatives, civil rights, and civil liberties are
of little concern to the Chinese government. 3
8. See WTO Negotiations, supra note 3 (explaining that China's negotiation
process for WTO membership lasted approximately fifteen years). Negotiations
began in 1986 when China formally notified the GATT of its intention to again
become a signatory. Id.
9. See Evelyn Iritani, China's WTO Challenge: Accord Reached, Now Firms
Face Tests, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at Cl, CIO (discussing the impact that
China's WTO membership will have on corporations); see also WTO
Negotiations, supra note 3 (noting that China agreed to open and liberalize its trade
policy).
10. See James A. R. Nafziger, A Comparison of Processes for Reforming
Migration Laws in Transitional States: China, Kazakhstan, and Albania, 70
WASH. L. REV. 757, 777 (1995) (comparing the migration laws of China,
Kazakhstan, and Albania and discussing the impact of such laws on economic
systems in these countries).
11. See Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty
Years, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383, 404 (2002); see also Nicholas R. Lardy,
Issue in China's WTO Accession: The U.S.-China Security Review Commission,
(May 9, 2001) (stating that appeals to ideology, although so endemic to the Mao
era, are "long gone"), available at
http://www.brook.edu/views/testimony/lardy/200l0509.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2002).
12. See Lardy, supra note II (placing emphasis on China's overriding
economic strength and the role such strength will have due to China's WTO
membership).
13. See JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, CHINA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM: MODERNIZATION
AND TRADITION 232 (Paragon House, lst ed. 1993) (suggesting that the Chinese
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OUT OF CONFORMITY
China has identified WTO membership as one key to fulfilling its
global economic policy objectives.14 The shear volume of legislation
that China has generated in an effort to build the market-oriented
substantive law essential for WTO participation is a testament to this
supposition. 5 As a result of this vigorous legislative activity, China
now has an enormous body of legal rules. 6 Whether this body of
rules translates into a functional legal system, however, is subject to
international debate.I
Global uneasiness over the state of China's legal system is a larger
reflection of the WTO's mild apprehension regarding China's
accession to membership. 8 Just as with the WTO's predecessor, the
GATT, the challenges of integrating new sovereign members within
government infringed on civil liberties by authorizing torture and tampering with
the judicial system where highly political issues were involved).
14. See Meeting of the Working Party on the Accession of China: Statement by
H.E. Vice Minister Long Yongtu, Head of the Chinese Delegation, at the
Eighteenth Session of the Working Party on China, WTO NEWS, Sept. 17, 2001
(assuring that WTO accession was key to China's economic growth), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news0 le/wpchina-longstat 17sept01 e.htm
(last visited Oct. 12, 2002). Although the head of the Chinese Delegation to the
WTO, Vice Minister Long Yongtu, has stated that recent reforms are continuations
of what hasbeen China's goal of "establishing socialist market economic system,"
he noted that "the efforts made by China for its WTO accession have greatly
accelerated the reform and opening-up process in China." Id.; see also Lardy,
supra note 11 (setting forth the argument that WTO membership may provide a
permanent impetus for economic reform, enhance national prestige and influence
through participation in multilateral negotiations, maximize external demand for a
Member's products, and attract more foreign investment); Zhen Kun Wang, Join
the Club, WORLD TODAY, Oct. ], 2001, at 26-27 (asserting that China's
commitment to WTO membership is not in dispute).
15. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 386 (discussing China's sweeping
legislative actions and explaining that new laws have been modeled after Western
models to reflect the market-oriented approach behind the WTO's liberal economic
policies).
16. See id. at 387 (discussing the large amount of legislation China now has).
17. See id. (suggesting that China's legislation may not serve as an actual legal
system).
18. See David Blumental, "Reform" or "Opening"? Reform of China's State-
Owned Enterprises and WTO Accession: The Dilemma of Applying GATT to
Marketizing Economies, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 198, 200 (1998) (describing
the difficulties associated with maintaining free trade ideals when the WTO admits
new members).
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a multilateral trading structure looms large.' 9 The WTO, however,
has a broader scope, contemplates more diverse functions, contains a
more cogent dispute resolution process, and enjoys a stronger
institutional identity than the GATT.20 As a result, the WTO must
face the challenge of preserving its free trade ideology.while
simultaneously managing to continue to integrate new Members.2
China's accession, in particular, presents significant problems for
the WTO in terms of compliance.2 As a large and developing
country, China's failure to comply with basic WTO requirements
could have a de-stabilizing effect on the already tenuous balance
struck between the WTO's developed and developing Members. 23 In
addition, despite China's legislative efforts to the contrary, China's
economy still contains many non-market components.24 The
integration of countries with non-market economies, which, like
China, have yet to fully implement the basic ideals of the WTO such
as transparency, reciprocity, and the rule of law, leaves open the
possibility for conflict concerning a Member state's sovereign right
19. See id. (asserting that the WTO will face challenges as new members join
the WTO).
20. See id. (comparing and contrasting the role of the WTO to the that of the
GATT).
21. Id. The seriousness of the WTO's ability to successfully integrate new
members without sacrificing overall compliance with the liberal economic rules
from which the WTO derives its influence cannot be understated. Id. As Blumental
predicts, the WTO's ability to maintain compliance and order as its membership
grows "will have a profound impact on the future of the WTO as a respected and
effective world institution." Id.
22. See id. at 201-05 (discussing the balance between Chinese reform and
compliance in light of China's accession to the WTO).
23. See Renato Ruggiero, Remarks at Beijing University (Apr. 21, 1997)
(discussing the disproportionate number of WTO developing Member countries),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sprr_e/chinae.htm (last visited
Oct. 12, 2002). As of 1997, of the 130 WTO Members, eighty percent were
considered by WTO officials as developing countries or economies in transition.
Id.
24. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 389 (arguing that China faces several
obstacles to complying with its new legislative commitments).
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to implement its own domestic law if that law directly or indirectly
conflicts with the states' WTO commitments.
25
China's status as a developing country with a significantly non-
market economic structure raises a difficult question regarding the
process of accession and potential compliance: should accession be
withheld until a country demonstrates its implementation of basic
WTO premises, or should the dispute resolution system itself be used
to secure compliance with these requirements?26 While the European
Union signaled its support for the latter proposition early in China's
accession negotiations, the United States has been less comfortable
with such an arrangement and has displayed more interest in
obtaining greater substantive compliance prior to accession. 27 The
U.S. position has likely been supported by fears regarding the
massive burden that frequent disputes concerning China's laws could
place upon the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB").28 These
U.S. concerns have recently been alleviated, however, as
demonstrated by the China-U.S. Agreement on Chinese Accession
("China-U.S. Accession Agreement"), 29 reached on June 11, 2001.3o
25. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 200 (discussing the conflict between
adhering to WTO commitments and the spirit of a state's sovereign fight to create
law).
26. See id. at 201 (listing questions that reflect differing views on China's
WTO membership).
27. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 417-18 (setting forth the U.S. concerns and
demands with respect to China's commitments).
28. See id. (commenting that the U.S. fears that questions regarding China's
compliance with WTO policies could potentially overload the dispute settlement
process).
29. See China Legal Change, New China-US WTO Agreement, CHINA L.
BRIEFS (2001) (listing the issues resolved between the U.S. and China prior to
China's accession into the WTO), available at
http://www.chinalegalchange.com/archivOI/CO112040.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2002).
30. See Press Release, WTO, Moore Welcomes China-U.S. Agreement on
Chinese Accession (June 11, 2001) (expressing concern regarding the acceleration
of China's accession and the settling of differences during the negotiation process),
available at http://www.wto.org./english/news-e/pres0l-e/pr230-e.htm (last
visited Oct. 20, 2002). WTO Director-General Mike Moore was impressed with
the "focus and determination" shown by the United States and China. Id. Mr.
Moore suggested that: "China's clear commitment to a rapid accession as well as
its unequivocal support for launching a new round of multilateral trade
2002] 407
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The U.S. decision to go forward with China's accession in spite of
significant questions over potential compliance reflects the modem
international belief that participation in international institutions
itself functions to enhance the incentives and capacity for
compliance in the participating country.3 Given China's greater
interaction with and engagement of the international community over
the past decade and a half, and the marked effects that greater
international involvement has had on Chinese legislation32 and
institutional behavior,33 there is cause to believe that, in terms of
China's entry into the WTO, such a theory will hold true.
As noted above, the WTO mechanism through which China's non-
compliance will be identified, and through which China will be
compelled to remedy its non-conformity, is the WTO dispute
settlement system." The dispute settlement system is the central
means by which the WTO monitors and controls compliance35 for
two reasons. First, the system fosters the independent identification
of major deficiencies by fellow WTO Members, which generally
have relatively substantial resources, rather than the WTO itself,
which has scant resources.36 Second, the dispute settlement system
negotiations bodes extremely well for the Doha Ministerial Conference and the
future of the WTO." Id. He also reportedly recognized the declared intention of
European Union Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy to resolve outstanding EU
issues with China. Id. In spite of its early support for China's accession, the
European Union may have been waiting for the United States to complete an
agreement prior to its own negotiations.
31. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 256-57 (arguing that China will likely
comply with WTO commitments in hopes of avoiding retaliatory acts from other
WTO Members).
32. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (discussing Western
influence on recent Chinese legislation).
33. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 256-57 (asserting the notion that a high
probability exists that China will comply with WTO rules and obligations).
34. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 1, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1126 (1994) [hereinafter DSU] (describing the functions of
the WTO dispute settlement body).
35. See id. art. 2 (establishing the Dispute Settlement Body as the system that
will monitor compliance with.WTO policies).
36. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 200-01 (opining that GATT regulations
have influenced domestic Chinese legal reforms over the past twenty years).
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contains powerful remedies, which ensure a high level of overall
compliance.37 Since virtually no Member, and particularly no new
Member, is always in complete conformity with the WTO, the
dispute settlement system provides the best means to ensure
compliance by focusing only on important areas of non-
compliance.38 In light of these factors and the WTO's broad and
ever-broadening scope of obligations, the ability of individual
Member states to bring their domestic laws into conformity with a
specific DSB decision, either through withdrawal or modification of
the offending measure or practice,39 is the truest gauge of a Member
country's effective compliance with WTO rules.
This article operates under the assumption that because
compliance with WTO DSB decisions is the most meaningful aspect
of WTO membership, the capacity to comply4° with such decisions
through legislative or administrative action is the most important trait
for a Member country to possess. 41 The focus is on compliance with
37. See Jonathan C. Spierer, Dispute Settlement Understanding: Developing a
Firm Foundation for Implementation of the World Trade Organization, 22
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 63, 96-7 (1998) (comparing the GATT and WTO
enforcement mechanisms). GATT did not have the "teeth" necessary to enforce its
rulings, whereas the WTO DSU gives Members greater incentive to comply with
its decision. Id.
38. Countries generally do not enter the WTO in complete conformity. But see
infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text (noting the strength of the DSB's
enforcement mechanism due to the variety of options that violating Members may
pursue in order to bring their laws into compliance with WTO regulations).
39. See infra note 199 and accompanying text (stating that violating Members
may bring their laws into compliance with a DSB decision by modifying or
withdrawing the offending provisions).
40. See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia,
WTDS58/AB/RW, para. 85 (Oct 22, 2001) [hereinafter U.S.-Shrimp Recourse]
(stating the factors that the DSU panel must consider in determining compliance
under Article 21.5), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispu-status-e.htm (last visited Oct.
20, 2002). In determining compliance, the panel notes the distinction between
Member laws that are found to be invalid on their face, versus as applied. Id. para.
98. For the purposes of this article, "comply" and "compliance," when used in
relation to DSB decisions, connote a Member's ability to conform or adapt its laws
or regulations in accordance with a DSB decision.
41. See discussion infra Part ll.D (commenting about China's ability to comply
with WTO decisions through administrative and legislative action); see also Peter
2002] 409
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individual DSB decisions rather than overall compliance with WTO
rules. Part I of this article examines China's present legislative and
administrative systems42 and the substantive DSB provisions that
require such an implementation apparatus.43 This article determines
that these systems are not an effective means by which to structurally
withdraw or modify laws and regulations.44 Part II discusses WTO
dispute settlement requirements and processes and establishes that
the WTO dispute settlement body, unlike its predecessor the GATT,
requires strict compliance with its decisions through the "automatic"
adoption of its decisions, ihe use of specified time limitations, and
the allowance of potent remedies for non-compliance with its
decisions.45 Part III reviews the Protocol on the Accession of China
and its potential role in securing China's capacity to implement
WTO DSB decisions, and determines that the Protocol fails to ensure
that such a capacity exists pre-accession.46 This section explores
China's capacity for compliance with DSB decisions and the steps
that have been taken to ensure that such a capacity exists prior to
accession. Part IV explores the specific difficulties that may render
Chinese legislative and administrative systems unable to comply
with WTO DSB decisions and ascertains that, after accession, China
will likely meet many and varied WTO DSB dispute challenges to
which it is unable to effectively respond through compliance.47 Part
V concludes that China's inability to conform its laws to WTO
Howard Come, Lateral Movements: Legal Flexibility and Foreign Investment
Regulation in China, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 247 (1995) (discussing China's
legal system, including its legislative and administrative processes).
42. See discussion infra Part I (referring to the legislative and administrative
systems through which China will implement DSB decisions).
43. For the purposes of this article, "implement" and "implementation" when
used in conjunction with DSB decisions,'connote the action by which a Member
carries out or gives practical effect to a DSB decision.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 51-172 (discussing China's use of
political policy as a legislative tool).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 173-269 (discussing the role of the
WTO DSB).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 269-400 (analyzing whether China will
be able to implement DSB decisions).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 401-480 (discussing the effect of
China's legislative and administrative bodies on its ability to implement DSB
decisions).
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obligations after a DSB decision will have negative effects on both
China and the WTO, and it suggests methods by which to limit these
effects.48 Finally, this article provides options in the event that
China's post-accession inability to implement a DSB decision
renders it out of conformity 9 with its obligations under the WTO.5 0
I. CHINA'S LEGISLATIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS
A. BASIC PRINCIPLES
1. Political Policy as Legal Instrumentality
The recent development of legislation in pursuit of economic
growth underscores China's modem use of law as a means for
advancing policy." Under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong,
the Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") directed state action solely
through the use of policy. 2 The CCP used legislation "only
formalistically to declare such policy."53 In spite of the adoption of a
48. See infra text accompanying notes 482-579.
49. For the purposes of this article, "conform" and "conformity" when used in
relation to DSB decisions, connote the general act by which a country brings its
laws or practices into agreement or harmony with WTO standards after a, DSB
decision is made.
50. See discussion infra Part V (contemplating solutions to China's potential
inability to implement WTO decisions).
51. This article focuses exclusively on China's legislative and administrative
systems. China's judicial system and its role in China's compliance with WTO
DSB decisions are beyond the scope of this article.
52. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 384 (explaining that the policies under Mao
were "imprecise, exhortational, tentative, and subject to unlegislated revision").
The CCP's use of law to support policy is most likely a modem reflection of
Imperial China's centuries-old practice of using the local and broad practices to
advance Imperial ideals throughout China. See id. at 399, 405-06 (asserting that the
use of policy over formal lawmaking and adjudication is not only a mainstay of the
CCP but also has its roots in the historical Chinese practice of resolving disputes
by informal rather than formal means).
53. See id. (emphasizing further that China's policies under Mao were
inadequate).
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Constitution, Xianfa, in 1982 ("1982 Constitution") 4 and the recent
increase in legislation, reforms have been slow to loosen the CCP's
grip on dictating governmental activity.5 Although at least one
scholar has argued that recent Chinese reforms have brought about a
"fundamental new orientation in China" in which formal legislation
has become the major framework for the organization and operation
of the Chinese government,56 as even the Preamble to the 1982
Constitution reiterates, the CCP remains above the law. 7
The supremacy of the CCP has resulted in a fragmented polity, a
separation of internal discipline from legality, vaguely drafted laws,
and inconsistent administrative enforcement.58 As a result, in spite of
the CCP's motivations toward economic modernization through
market socialism, implementation of this policy directive through
legislation and administration has been largely ineffectual.5 9 There is
54. See XIANFA, art. 57-92 (1982) (depicting the structure of the Chinese State
whereby appropriate legislative bodies enacted laws intended for defining and
implementing policy, although the actual implementation of the legislation is still
greatly dependent upon the CCP), available at
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/chO0000_.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
55. See Perry Keller, Legislation in the People's Republic of China, 23 U.
BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 653, 655 (1989) (articulating China's preservation of CCP's
historical role as leader of state society); see also Ta-Kuang Chang, The Making of
the Chinese Bankruptcy Law: A Study in the Chinese Legislative Process, 28
HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 336-37 (1987) (discussing the power that the NPC has over
the Chinese legislative process). See generally Erik Eckholm, In Drive on
Dissidents, China Gives 4th Severe Sentence in Week, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1998,
at A9 (reporting the sentence of a labor activist to ten years in prison for giving an
interview to a radio station about farmer protests, and the conviction and
sentencing to terms of eleven to thirteen years for subversion of three other men
who attempted to organize a new political party). The trial relating to this
sentencing illustrated the CCP's continued use of law as an instrument to maintain
and carry out specific CCP policies.
56. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 384 (expressing the viewpoint that China
has taken a more active role in formalizing legislation).
57. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 235 (explaining the CCP's position of
supremacy articulated in the Preamble's Four Basic Principles of Chinese
Philosophy).
58. See id. at 236-37 (asserting that the CCP's supremacy undermines the role
and authority of the rule of law).
59. See Robb La Kritz, Book Review, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 267, 267-68
(1997) (reviewing PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM (1997)) (explaining that Come discusses the law
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reason to believe that China's implementation of WTO DSB
decisions will achieve even less success.60 Thus, although China's
modem policy of reform and political opening (gaige kaifang) has
promoted the development of a legal system (fazhi jianshe), the use
of law as an instrumentality of policy probably will limit China's
position as a conforming Member of the WTO.61
2. Unitary Form of Government
In support of CCP state control, China's government is organized
in a unitary fashion, with supreme power resting in the central
government.62 Furthermore, the organization of the bureaucratic
apparatus represents a pyramid format.63 Under this system, the
central government delegates power to top officials within each tier
of the state administration.64 Thus, China's government has never
placed significance on the division of power between the central
government and localities, or the legislative and executive branches
of government.
in today's China as purposefully "malleable, flexible, and pragmatic" in order to
serve the interests of market socialism).
60. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 254-57 (arguing that due to the sheer scale
of the undertaking and entrenched resistance, it will be difficult for Premier Zhu to
quickly implement decisions).
61. See id. at 237 (believing that although reforms are vital for Chinese
business to compete globally, they are only one step towards "full compliance with
WTO/GATT requirements").
62. See Li Yahong, The Lawmaking Law: A Solution to the Problems in the
Chinese Legislative System? 30 HONG KONG L.J. 120, 124 (2000) (explaining that
China has a centralized government that retains the majority of the power).
63. See id. (discussing the pyramid-like governmental structure that China has).
64. See id. at 124-25 (noting that "only three of the 135 articles in the Chinese
Constitution are relevant to this issue").
65. See id. (asserting that China has no concept of federalism despite its
pyramid-like government).
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B. STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENTAL BODIES
1. Legislative Bodies
In China, both legislative and administrative governmental bodies
have the power to fashion "legislative" enactments.66 The 1982
Constitution established an essentially five-tier system to adopt
legislation:67 the National People's Congress ("NPC"), the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress ("SCNPC"), the State
Council, local governments, and the Local People's Congresses.68
However, the NPC and the SCNPC are China's central legislators.6 9
Formally, under the 1982 Constitution, the NPC has powers to
amend the Constitution and to enact and amend basic laws governing
criminal offences, civil affairs, the state organs, and other matters.70
The SCNPC has powers to enact and amend other laws and to
partially supplement and amend laws enacted by the NPC when the
66. See Come, supra note 41, at 252 (addressing the variety of "laws"
formulated by the legislative and administrative bodies in China). This article often
examines both processes together in order to best demonstrate China's
promulgation of measures that may be later challenged before the WTO DSB.
67. See XIANFA, art. 57, 85, 95 (1982) (discussing the hierarchy of the Chinese
government); see also Elizabeth A. R. Yee, Comment, Hong Kong and China in
1997: an Examination of Possible Legal and Economic Implications for United
States Businesses, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 595, 607 (1996) (providing insight
about the power and the role of the NPC).
68. See Yee, supra note 67, at 607 n. 126 (describing the distinctions between
the power that the NPC has and the limited power that Local People's Congresses
have).
69. See XIANFA, art. 58 (1982) (vesting "the legislative power of the state" in
these two bodies); see also Come, supra note 41, at 252 (explaining the different
entities that comprise China's national legislature and the relationship of such
entities to the NPC); Edward J. Epstein, China and Hong Kong: Law, Ideology,
and the Future Interaction of the Legal Systems, in THE FUTURE OF THE LAW IN
HONG KONG 37, 58 n. 63 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1989) (placing emphasis on the
size of cities and the role cities have in government because of their size). See
generally Nafziger, supra note 10, at 762-63 (discussing the NPC's legislative
process).
70. See XIANFA, art. 62, secs. 1, 3 (1982) (enumerating the powers of the
NPC).
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latter is not in session.7' Both the NPC and SCNPC commonly use
administrative bodies to create drafts of basic laws, which they later
modify and enact.72 Additionally, the NPC and the SCNPC review
newly-promulgated administrative rules and regulations to guarantee
their accordance with State policy.73
2. Administrative Bodies
China's main administrative rule-making body is the State
Council, which contains departments, commissions, agencies, and
local offices.74 Although the State Council has some measure of
quasi-legislative power,75 its chief role is to issue administrative
laws, regulations, and rules,7 6 which are subject to review by the
NPC and SCNPC.77 Importantly, the centralized decision-making
characteristic of China's unitary form of government results in a
71. See id. art. 67, secs. 2-3 (discussing the enumerated powers of the Standing
Committee).
72. See Nafziger, supra note 10, at 762 (noting that the 1985 migration law for
aliens was drafted jointly by the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Public Security
and approved by the State Council).
73. See id. (stating that both the NPC and SCNPC always conduct a review of
the law).
74. See Come, supra note 41, at 252 (stating that the comprehensive
administrative structure of China is collectively known as xingzhengjiguan).
75. See id. (explaining that while the State Council is namely an administrative
body, it also has the power to make rules).
76. See Nafziger, supra note 10, at 762 (acknowledging that the NPC and
SCNPC also may require the State Council to draft laws).
77. See id. (explaining that if the NPC is not in session, the SCNPC reviews the
rule); see also Li, supra note 62, at 131 (explaining that administrative regulations
recently became an essential part of China's legislative process). Administrative
regulations now reportedly "represent more than twice the number of laws made
by the NPC and the [SCNPC]," and "the legislative proposals by the State Council
comprise more than seventy percent of total proposals." Id. Although the
expansion of the legislative power of the administrative branches may be a reason
behind China's rapid economic growth, it also caused discrepancies between laws
and regulations, as well as "the overlapping of powers among numerous
departments of the State Council." Id. According to the 1982 Constitution, the
State Council only can enact "administrative regulations to implement existing
national laws," which must be consistent with the Constitution and laws, and
"which must be reported to the [SCNPC]' for documentation. Id.
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system where the CCP's predominance in the State Council grants it
effective control over all national administrative functions."8
C. LEGISLATIVE & REGULATORY PROCESSES
1. Initial Concerns
China's rapid development of a socialist market economy has
exposed the Chinese legislative and administrative process to
international public and political scrutiny not previously experienced
under China's strictly conservative political and economic regimes.7 9
As China has "opened its door" to international economic
involvement, foreigners trying to enter China's market have
experienced unfamiliar limitations and restraints, which they have
been unafraid to complain about publicly. 0 Such criticisms include
not only complaints relating to the formulaic vagueness8' and
uncertainty82 of Chinese laws, but also include objections endemic to
China's systematic structure, such as the lack of transparent
processes,83 abuse of power, and corruption. 4 Acknowledging that
78. See Yee, supra note 67, at 606 (describing the CCP's influence in the State
Council). See generally Nicholas D. Kristof, China Sees 'Market-Leninism' as
Way to Future, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at Al, A4 (examining China's transition
from Communism towards free-market authoritarianism).
79. See Conita S. C. Leung, Chinese Administrative Law Package. Limitations
and Prospects, 28 HONG KONG L.J. 104, 104 (1998) (discussing the measures
taken by China to reform its administrative process).
80. See id. (highlighting how the Chinese leadership recognized the
bureaucracy's failings and thus began implementing reforms).
81. See Come, supra note 41, at 248 (explaining that some complaints relating
to vagueness center around the resultant "vast discretionary power to interpret
conferred on administrative authorities"). Other complaints criticize the law's
changeability, and variations between central and local law and between legal
interpretation and administrative directives issued. Id.
82. See id. (noting that some criticisms are directed towards the uncertainty
revolving around the amendment of laws, regulations, and rules, and the resultant
importance of "internal rules" in regulation).
83. See id. at 248 (stating that complaints related to a lack of transparency and
predictability have focused on administrative decision making, especially in the
conferring of licenses). Problems also include "the confusion and inefficiency
caused by bureaucratic rivalry and the overlapping of departmental jurisdiction,"
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such concerns have the potential to jeopardize China's aspirations of
large-scale economic growth, the Chinese leadership has taken
several recent steps toward reform in these areas.85
2. Legislation: Law-Making in China
a. Unitary Legislative Format
In accordance with China's unitary form of government, all major
legislation in China emanates from the central power organs.86
Unlike power disbursement in a federal system, state governments in
China are entirely subordinate to the central government,87 receiving
their authority solely from the statutory law of the NPC and
SCNPC.88 As a result, the central government may technically
change or withdraw local authority at any time.89 Unfortunately, in
spite of the relatively unified sources of Chinese law, the Chinese
legislative system remains plagued by the international criticism
as well as "protectionism and favouritism in implementation of law, and
interference in management autonomy." Id.
84. See Leung, supra note 79, at 104-05 (discussing the abuse of power and
corruption inherent in the cadre system of the communist party government).
85. See id. at 104 (mentioning that a new administrative law package is part of
the Chinese reform process); see also Come, supra note 41, at 248 n.2
(recognizing Chinese efforts to alleviate legal uncertainty, beginning with its
agreements under The U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding on Market
Access).
86. See Come, supra note 41, at 251 (explaining the hierarchy of China's
legislative authority).
87. See Li, supra note 62, at 125 (discussing the division of the legislative
powers between the central and local governments).
88. See id. (delineating the unitary system's division of powers and explaining
that in contrast, in a federal system the authority of local governments is assured
by a law which is superior to the statutory law of the central government, and
which is also the source of authority of that law, such as a constitution). In other
words, in federal countries like the United States, the federal legislature and state
legislatures consist of two completely separate systems, the latter of which is not
subordinated to the former with inalienable power that has been explicitly granted
in the Constitution. Id.
89. See Come, supra note 41, at 251 (defining the sources of power and
distinguishing between the PRC and a federal system, where in the latter, the
central and local governments have their authorities defined in the Constitution and
is not easily amended).
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mentioned above.9" One scholar has opined that such complaints
remain because the legislature has itself "grown into such a
complicated bureaucracy that it can hardly deal efficiently with
internal issues such as overlapping of powers, confusion of
procedures, [and] inconsistency between laws .... 91
b. Legislative Drafting Process
The Chinese legislative drafting process is relatively simple. 92
First, the Commission of Legislative Affairs prepares a first draft of a
general law, which it submits to the Legal Committee of the NPC. 93
After several drafts, the Legal Committee proposes a final version to
the NPC, and the SCNPC serves the above NPC functions when the
NPC is not in session.94
In order to best serve the broad and changing interests of the CCP,
the committees, commissions, and congresses draft laws
ambiguously to provide a brief summary of the parameters of
regulation without foreclosing on the potential policy objectives
important to the NPC.95 As a result, Chinese legal drafting is
characterized by: "principle-like pronouncements; vagueness and
ambiguity; broadly worded discretions; undefined terms; omissions;
and general catch-all clauses."96 Of greatest concern to commentators
90. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text (pointing out specific
criticisms made regarding the Chinese legislative system).
91. See Li, supra note 62, at 123 (explaining how decentralization has
worsened the problems in the law-making system).
92. See Nafziger, supra note 10, at 763 (discussing the Chinese law making
process).
93. See id. (explaining the first step of the legislative process).
94. See id. (noting that when the NPC is not in session, the SCNPC serves NPC
functions in the legislative drafting process).
95. See Come, supra note 41, at 253 (describing the characteristics of legal
drafting). The ambiguity in legal drafting represents the result of a contradiction in
China between the relative utility of detailed law versus broad laws. Id. at 250.
More detailed laws would assist China's economic development in the long run as
it increases certainty, thus promoting market rational behavior on the part of
entrepreneurs. Id. In the short run, however, detailed law limits the freedom that
the CCP currently enjoys to respond quickly to political and economic change. Id.
96. See id. at 253 (exemplifying the legal flexibility in Chinese law via the
characteristics of legal drafting).
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is the broad discretion granted to administrative authorities through
the use of overtly flexible language. 97 This "flexibility" allows
administrators to alter the meaning of legislative language with the
circumstances," and leaves the door open for personal mischief of all
sorts.
3. Administration: Rule-Making in China
a. Administrative Authority
Chinese administrative law covers the specification,
implementation, and enforcement of central laws by certain state
entities, including those concerning economic policy.99 As merely the
means through which central government legislation takes practical
form, administrative rules in China are theoretically subordinate and
complementary to legislation issued by the NPC and SCNPC. 1°°
However, in light of the broad discretion granted to the State Council
and its lower regulatory offices, this characterization may no longer
be true.
The State Council, which controls the central government's
executive branch, oversees more than sixty departments, ministries,
commissions, administrations, and offices.101 This expansive set of
governmental bodies not only possesses the authority to issue
regulations to implement specific legislation under a grant of power
by a central legislative body, but also possesses authority that stems
from a general rule-making power, inherent in the agencies, and
enables them to issue any rule that is necessary to carry out their
97. See id. at 250 (stating that the fact that these laws are expressed in terms of
general standards renders them useless as a tool for dealing with the practical
problems that occur during implementation).
98. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 391 (discussing the effects of the Chinese
language and phrasing on legislation).
99. See La Kritz, supra note 59, at 268 ("Since all law in China is public law,
administrative law also regulates China's vast economy, as well as the relationship
among its various actors.").
100. See Come, supra note 41, at 253 (noting that all enactments of the
administrative bodies must not be at odds with the Constitution).
101. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 389-90 (describing the allocation of rule-
making authority).
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functions.1 12 In practice, the broad discretion conferred by the NPC
and SCNPC, combined with its administrative authority, has, in
many ways, raised the State Council administrative structure to the
level of a defacto legislative body of substantial size and strength.103
b. Administrative Drafting Process
The Chinese administrative drafting process, similar to the
legislative drafting process, is relatively simple. 04 First, the Legal
Bureau prepares drafts of regulations0 5 for submission to the Legal
Committee of the State Council. 06 After several drafts, the Legal
Committee proposes final versions of the regulations to the State
Council for approval as administrative regulations. 07
The State Council and its lower administrative organs also issue a
variety of less formal "rules" designed to enforce their regulations.0 8
In addition, the State Council and its highest administrative arms
provide "clarification" of earlier statutes or regulations in accordance
with prevailing policy objectives through the use of two
methodologies: "specification" and "administrative interpretation."''0 9
102. See PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 56 (H.K. Univ. Press 1997) (describing the
administrative organs and the process of enacting legislation).
103. See supra notes 75-78 (describing the functions of the State Council).
104. See Nafziger, supra note 10, at 763 (comparing the administrative drafting
process with the legislative drafting process).
105. See Come, supra note 41, at 253 (stating that the State Council ultimately
issues a variety of documents known as "administrative regulations" (xingzheng
fagui)). The organs under the State Council, however, can independently issue
administrative rules (xingzheng guizhang). Id. "Local people's congresses issue
local administrative regulations (difang xingzheng fagui) and local people's
governments of provinces, municipalities, and 'quite big cities' may issue local
administrative rules (difang xingzheng guizhang)." Id.
106. See Nafziger, supra note 10, at 763 (discussing the supervision by the State
Council and noting that China's drafting process is "hermetic").
107. See id. (explaining the series of steps in drafting).
108. See La Kritz, supra note 59, at 272-73 (stating that the enforcement tools
include: "administrative orders (mingling), instructions (zhishi), approvals (pijun),
contracts, rewards, sanctions (xingzheng zhicai), disciplinary sanctions (xingzheng
jilu chufen), and punishments (chufa)").
109. See Come, supra note 41, at 263 (defining specification and administrative
interpretation as applied to administrative regulation).
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High-level administrative bodies practice specification by issuing
internal normative documents to regulate certain technical areas
under their specific jurisdiction, such as foreign investment. " 0 These
same high-level bodies also possess the practical mandate to
"construe law and regulations in a way that may reflect departmental
policy and/or the social reality of the regulated" through
administrative interpretation. "'
c. Disbursement of Administrative Power
During most of the first thirty years of communist rule, the
administration performed in accordance with CCP policies "through
the positioning of selected cadres in the bureaucracy.""' 2 The main
administrative function was simply to supply detail to basic laws in
accordance with current CCP objectives." 3 Administrative acts were
nearly automatic, and close attention to formulaic, CCP-mandated
procedures and forms ensured the legitimacy of such acts, rather than
through popular political pressure. 14 China's current "open door"
policy, however, has somewhat undercut the predictability of China's
regulatory system by reducing the emphasis on traditional CCP
goals." ' Coupled with the State Council's ample size and
110. See id. at 264 (explaining that the documents show prevailing policy and
contain detailed information missing from the higher statutes or regulations and are
only circulated to a small portion of the Chinese bureaucracy). Many of these
internal directives are statutory law interpretations and often contradict relevant
statutes. Id. The past has proven how these have been issued to redefine statutes in
relation to temporary changes in China's economy. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Leung, supra note 79, at 104 (explaining that administrative acts came
at the direction of arbitrary political objectives rather than the law).
113. See id. (discussing Communist government administration historically in
China).
114. See id. at 105 (noting that this characteristic is antagonistic to modern
Western notions of administrative law and public administration where the
administration's legal function is to promote "openness, public participation, and
fairness in decision-making," values which are deemed essential to a "good"
government).
115. China's current openness to foreign influence and massive legislative
undertakings have lessened the CCP's need for a tight administrative grip to carry
out CCP ideals. As a result, administrative agencies have been freed to pursue
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administrative jurisdiction, the stage has been set for a gradual re-
disbursement of power.
This re-disbursement of power has already occurred on several
levels. On one level, the growing number of administrative bodies
necessary to implement market economics has spread power more
evenly across more government agencies.' 16 On another level, the
divergence between the drafting of regulations and their "actual
implementation" has also expanded power over various levels of
government." 7 In addition, local government officials, who are in
charge of drafting, implementing, and enforcing new laws, are "free
to apply provincial norms under the guise of carrying out their
constitutional duties,""' 8 and thereby are free to infuse local
protectionism into central laws.
This final level of power disbursement is the most antagonistic to
China's potential compliance with WTO DSB decisions because it
represents a level of regulatory action that is seemingly beyond the
control of central government influence. The transference of the
central government's power to provincial and local governments,
whose policy interpretations often differ markedly from either the
NPC's or State Council's, has created a law-making and rule-making
structure that is seriously "fragmented."' '9 As a result, even where
other, non-traditional actions. See generally Come, supra note 41 (discussing the
development of Chinese administrative law).
116. See generally id. (discussing the devolution of administrative power).
117. See id. at 249-50 (distinguishing between implementation of the regulations
and rules and lower normative documents and actual implementation); see also
Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 733-34
(1994) (asserting that Chinese administrative agencies have the power to both issue
and interpret their own. rules, and to require that courts enforce them). Another
effect is the ability of administrative agencies to simultaneously protect or increase
the jurisdiction and advance their policies. Lubman, supra note 11, at 390. One
practical effect of this is that administrative bodies and their officials can employ a
personally-altered set of norms under the pretext of implementing the law enacted
by the higher authority. Come, supra note 41, at 249-50.
118. See La Kritz, supra note 59, at 268 (noting that as a result, although
"central laws may seem attractive and familiar, local rules and regulations are
colored by administrative parochialism and local reality"). This, in effect, creates
an accountability vacuum where "corruption, nepotism, and guanxi are poorly
sanctioned and thereby able to flourish." Id.
119. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 385 (pointing out that one scholar believes
that this fragmentation is specifically caused by a monumental increase in "inter-
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China's central government may take appropriate legislative or
administrative action to comply with a DSB decision, incongruence
at China's local administrative level may render actual compliance
impossible.
4. Oversight
a. Identifiable Problems
i. Discrimination
The Chinese government has identified three main areas of
concern regarding legislative and administrative action to which it
has devoted a certain amount of effort towards reform. 2 ' One such
area of concern is the discrimination endemic to a fledgling
economic state aspiring to develop domestic financial viability.
1 21
However, while states possessing developing economies are often
tempted towards protectionist measures, certain characteristics of
China's governmental apparatus make the advent of such measures
more likely, and their adverse effects on foreign economic interests
more acute.
One troublesome characteristic is simply China's socialist
background. In the past, socialist economies have displayed a
tendency to apply one set of laws to domestic businesses, and an
entirely different, and less favorable, set of laws to foreign
businesses and international joint ventures. 12 2 In spite of fundamental
shifts in China's official stance on foreign involvement, the Chinese
bureaucracy, in particular, still harbors a deep mistrust for private
unit" bargaining, which has greatly complicated negotiation and consensus-
building).
120. See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Saga, 15 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 1469, 1526 (2000) (describing the discrimination occurring in
relations with foreign business firms).
121. See id. (explaining how protectionist government measures are used in
China against private companies).
122. See Yee, supra note 67 (citing Anne Carver, Inventing a Legal Tradition, in
ADVANCES IN CHINESE INDUSTRIAL STUDIES 45 (Sally Stewart ed., 1995))
(describing the difference that develops in socialist economies for treatment for
domestic and foreign business).
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companies, which they view as beyond their control or influence.123
This distrust results in a somewhat inhospitable economic climate for
foreign firms, which continually face "discriminatory regulations
implemented by protectionist government ministries."'24
Another aspect of China's governmental structure discriminating
against foreign businesses is the widespread politicizing of what
should theoretically be economic decisions. 2 For example, the
reason that only a few private firms initially floated securities on the
Shanghai stock market, despite an absence of regulations forbidding
their involvement, was that approval depended on local
governments' positive recommendations.'26 This arrangement has not
only inserted a political factor within what should be a purely market
decision (to buy or sell stock), but has also worked to place foreign
companies, lacking significant access to local government officials,
at a decidedly economic disadvantage. 27
ii. Failure to Implement
The failure of Chinese government officials even to implement the
laws promulgated by the central government strikes at the heart of
China's efforts to become a compliant WTO Member.'28 If there is a
question whether basic NPC laws will receive full implementation
123. See Bhala, supra note 120, at 1526 (explaining that these officials resent
the fact that the firms operate outside of the CCP system and are particularly wary
of ownership over important infrastructure, such as water and power plants). This
uneasiness is only heightened in relation to foreign private business interests. Id.
124. See id. (discussing the harsh climate surrounding private enterprises
because of the discriminatory regulations protectionist government ministries
implemented).
125. See id. at 1527 (describing the financial services sector as another example
of where change is needed). As of January 2000, the state controlled all securities
firms. Id.
126. See id. (stating that only a few private firms had floated securities on
exchanges because recommendations from local governments were necessary to
gain approval).
127. See id. at 1527 (criticizing the information and technology sectors in
China).
128. See La Kritz, supra note 59, at 267 (discussing the uncertain legal system
that plagues China); see also Blumental supra note 18, at 237 (contemplating
China's efforts at WTO compliance).
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throughout the Chinese administrative structure, it seems unlikely
that the contentious enactments that may come in response to a WTO
DSB decision will receive appropriate regulatory action.129 As one
commentator in the international investment sphere stated, "[t]he
appearance of Western legal concepts may placate the fears of
foreign investors, but local administrative implementation and
enforcement of such norms is at best disconcerting."' 30 Moreover, the
administration's widespread and autonomous ability to implement
central government laws will likely make any attempts to use
national reforms to remedy the situation fruitless for the same
systematic reason.'31
iii. Corruption
Although the problem of corruption has only a peripheral effect on
China's ability to comply with WTO DSB decisions, its
pervasiveness in the Chinese government makes it too relevant to
overlook.132 As one commentator has opined:
The corruption problem seems only to worsen. So tightly knit are corrupt
practices into the fabric of modem Chinese society that they are almost
invisible. Invoice fraud, diversion of government investment capital,
bribery and misappropriation of central and local government funds all
seem to have become a way of life .... The universal assumption that all
officials and corporate managers are corrupt is probably responsible for
the speed with which disgruntled workers take to the streets; civil protest,
mostly peaceful, is reported almost daily by the foreign (not Chinese)
press in China. 13
3
In addition, some experts have claimed that the same gradual shift
of power to localities that has resulted in many of the problems noted
129. See La Kritz, supra note 59, at 268-69 (reviewing the lawmaking process in
China).
130. Id. at 268.
131. See id. at 268-69 (explaining lawmaking in China and its effects).
132. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 404 (stating that corruption is growing in
China despite efforts to control it).
133. Id. at 404-05 (citing US-China Bus. Council, China's Political
Developments, in US-CHINA Bus. COUNCIL COMP., CHINA OPERATIONS '98, at 5
(1998), which are materials from a China Operations '98 conference).
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above is also a root cause for corruption. 3 4 Under this scenario, local
officials demand that enterprises pay various fees in order to
continue to do business in the particular locality.'35
b. Recent Oversight Reforms
i. Legislative Oversight Reform: The Law-Making Law
China's main reform in the area of legislative oversight is the
Law-Making Law of the People's Republic of China ("Law-Making
Law"), promulgated by the third plenary meeting of the Ninth
National People's Congress on March 15, 2000.136 The Law-Making
Law broadly aims to regulate China's disorderly legislative system'37
and foster legislative uniformity. 38 Specifically, the Law-Making
Law focuses on reforming the procedural and technical aspects of
legislation, in the hopes that a well designed procedure and filing
system might eliminate internal inconsistencies and would eventually
make the legislative process more democratic and scientific.'39 In
134. See STAFF OF HOUSE JOINT ECON. COMM., 102D CONG., CHINA'S
ECONOMIC DILEMMAS IN THE 1990s: THE PROBLEMS OF REFORMS,
MODERNIZATION, AND INTERDEPENDENCE 452 (Comm. Print 1991) (discussing the
factories' complaints and the conditions that lead to corruption).
135. See Donald Clarke, What's Law Got to Do with It? Legal Institutions and
Economic Reform in China, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 37 (1991) (explaining
that thriving businesses are seen as sources of wealth from which governments
require payments). These fees or exactions are known in China as tanpai. Id.; see
also Blumental supra note 18, at 234 (commenting that as localities gain power
from reforms, corrupt officials require enterprises to pay fees).
136. See Li, supra note 62, at 120 (reporting that the legislative process for the
new law began in 1993 and was lengthy, laborious, and resulted in several
different drafts).
137. See Law-Making Law, art. I (P.R.C.); see also Li, supra note 62, at 120
(stating that China's Law-Making Law was promulgated to solve the problems
plaguing the Chinese legislative system).
138. See Law-Making Law, art. 3; see also Li, supra note 62, at 120-22
(indicating that China's Law-Making Law was aimed at solving conflicts in
legislative uniformity). The need for uniformity stems from the problems endemic
to a disorderly legislative system, notably conflicts between laws, legislating
without authority or in violation of procedures, and low quality legislation. Id.
139. See Law-Making Law, arts. 12-41; see also Li, supra note 62, at 136
(discussing the procedures and the goals in reforming the legislative process).
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addition, perhaps in response to the rise in locally-operative
administrative power, the Law-Making Law, for the first time in
China's history, separates central and local legislative powers, 140 and
specifically details the exclusive legislative powers of the central
government. 141
Although the Law-Making Law has received praise for both its
clarification of the hierarchy of Chinese legislative enactments 142 and
its contribution to improved legislative transparency, 43 the Law-
Making Law has also received its share of harsh criticism. Many
critics have found the mere promulgation of the Law-Making Law
140. See Li, supra note 62, at 121 (relaying that for the first time in China's
legislative history, the Law-Making Law divides the legislative powers of central
and local governments).
141. See id. at 126 (listing the central government's exclusive legislative
powers). The list of central government powers includes:
(1) matters concerning national sovereignty;
(2) election, organization and powers of the People's Congresses, People's
Governments, People's Courts and People's Procuratorates at various levels;
(3) the systems of autonomous regions, [Special Administrative Regions] and
self-governance of citizens (jiceng qunzong zizhi) at the basic level;
(4) crime and punishment;
(5) restraining and penalizing citizens' political rights and personal freedoms;
(6) appropriation of non-state-owned property;
(7) the basic civil system;
(8) the basic economic system and the basic systems of finance, taxation,
customs, banking and international trade;
(9) the systems of litigation and arbitration and
(10) other matters that must be legislated by the NPC and its Standing
Committee.
Id. The Law-Making Law does not, however, list specific legislative powers
localities may exercise. Id. at 128. The Law-Making Law provides only the general
guidance that localities may be involved in implementing laws and administrative
regulations and matters related to the special circumstances and local affairs of the
localities. Law-Making Law, art. 64.
142. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 394 (stating that while the new law on
legislation somewhat clarified the enactments hierarchy, it did not develop
institutions or doctrines to deal with the continuing need for legal interpretation).
143. See Li, supra note 62, at 136-39 (praising the new law on legislation for
making the procedures more transparent while also acknowledging the need for
more reforms); see also Law-Making Law, arts. 34, 58 (requiring both public and
expert hearings to be held during the review of a bill).
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inconceivable, because no other country has adopted such a law,1 44 as
well as unnecessary, because China had previously enacted
comprehensive organizational and procedural rules governing
legislative activities. 45 Additionally, the listing of the central
government's exclusive legislative power was met with immediate
disdain by some mainland China scholars, who skeptically viewed
the list as a possible attempt by the central government to restrict
local legislative power. 46 Others complained that the Law-Making
Law contains substantive deficiencies, including insufficient
guarantees on the use of local legislative powers, a lack of legislative
supervision mechanisms, and an unclear delegation of the power to
interpret laws. 4 1
ii. Administrative Oversight Reforms
As China attempts to use legislative action to reinforce Western
economic laws, the belief has arisen that the legitimacy of this
legislation rests on structural administrative reform. 14  Former
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping recognized the inherent problems of
the Chinese bureaucracy in the early 1980s. 149 In his speech entitled
"On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,"' 5 °
144. See Li, supra note 62, at 120-21 (reporting that there is no other country
with a "law-making law").
145. See id. at 121 (contending that many believe that the law is unnecessary
because China had already enacted rules governing legislative activities); see, e.g.,
XIANFA, arts. 62, 64, 67, 89, 91, 100, 116 (1982) (conferring legislative powers on
the NPC, the SCNPC, the State Council, the ministries and commissions of the
State Council, local people's congresses and their Standing Committees, and the
people's congresses of autonomous regions).
146. See Li, supra note 62, at 126-127 (indicating that some mainland scholars
initially disfavored the center's exclusive legislative power, seeing it as an attempt
to further limit local legislative power).
147. See id. at 121 (expressing complaints about the new law).
148. See La Kritz, supra note 59, at 274 (quoting one scholar who opined that,
in the absence of such a reconciliation, "Western legal norms will continue to
brush against local administrative expediency and institutionalized corruption").
149. See Leung, supra note 79, at 104 (highlighting Deng Xiaoping's
recognition of the inherent problems of bureaucracy in the 1980s).
150. See Commentary by World Economic Herald, Rereading Deng Xiaoping's
"On the Reform of Party and State Leadership," 20 CHINESE L. & GOv'T 15, 15-
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Deng noted major deficiencies in the Chinese leadership and the
CCP cadre system, including bureaucratism, over-concentration of
power, patriarchal methods, life tenure in leading posts, and
privileges of various kinds. 5 ' Deng also criticized the Chinese
bureaucracy for fostering widespread abuses of power, inefficient
administration, irresponsible behavior, corruption, despotism, and
nepotism, and called for reform of the bureaucracy, which he deemed
necessary to complement the Open Door Policy and to enhance
administrative efficiency.'52 Remedying these concerns by modifying
the administrative allocation of rule-making power that fostered them
is essential to establishing the rule of law,'53 a commonly understood
prerequisite to compliant WTO membership and thus a primary
Chinese policy objective.
China has adopted five major pieces of legislation in response to
these concerns and in order to reform the oversight of China's
powerful administrative structure.'54  They are: (1) the 1989
Administrative Litigation Law ("ALL");'55  (2) the 1990
20 (1987) (commenting on Deng Xiaoping's speech given at an enlarged meeting
of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP on August 31, 1980).
151. See id. at 15 (reviewing passages from Deng's speech).
152. See id. at 16-17 (discussing the ramifications for the over-concentration and
abuse of power in the Chinese bureaucracy).
153. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 389 (analyzing the Chinese bar and legal
education while reviewing reform); see also Jan Hoogmartens, Taking and
Enforcing Mortgages in China: A Lender's Perspective, 30 HONG KONG L.J. 520,
531-34 (2000) (discussing problems and interferences with enforcement of Court
decisions in China).
154. The intricacy of these laws prevents them from being fully discussed in this
article. See infra notes 137-144 and accompanying text (reviewing the Law-
Making Law broadly).
155. See Law of Administration Litigation Law of the Republic of China, in
CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS: BUSINESS REGULATION No. 4, at 24,551
(CCH Australia Limited 1999) (translating the P.R.C. Administration Litigation
Law ("ALL") of 1989); see also Leung supra note 79, at 106 (discussing the
administrative law package); Lubman supra note 11, at 392-393 (explaining the
rights that the ALL provides). The ALL was lauded as the first piece of
comprehensive legislation directed at providing a full review of administrative
action by judicial organs. In essence, the ALL allows affected people or
organizations the right to sue agencies acting "unlawfully" in the Chinese courts.
Id.
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Administrative Review Regulations ("ARR"); 56 (3) the 1994 State
Compensation Law ("SCL");5 7 (4) the 1996 Administrative Penalty
(Punishment) Law ("APL"); 58 and, (5) the 1997 Administrative
Supervision Law ("ASL"). 15 9 While the ARR, SCL, and APL attempt
to exercise supervision and place a check on the administrative
organs, the scope and frequency of their application remains limited,
156. See Regulations on Administrative Reconsideration ("ARR") (1990)
(amended 1994) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw43.htm
(last visited Oct. 13, 2002) (protecting the administrative groups of the government
to do their duties). The promulgation of the 1990 ARR was intended to standardize
the practice of "internal" review by legislation and to complement the operation of
the ALL, which it is similar to in scope. See also Leung, supra note 79, at 107-108
(stating that Chinese legal scholars hope that the ARR will reform the legal system
in-depth reform and promote the concept of the rule of law).
157. See State Compensation Law of the People's Republic of China (1994)
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter SCL] (allowing remedies for illegal acts of the government),
available at Lehman, Lee, & Xu, Chinese law partnership,
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/lib/library/Laws-regulations/general/state-compensati
on.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002); see also Keith Hand, Watching the Watchdog:
China's State Compensation Law as a remedy for Procuratorial Misconduct, 9
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 95, 137-38 (2000) (criticizing the SCL). Viewed as a law to
supplement the ALL and facilitate its implementation, the SCL was adopted
primarily to strengthen the supervision of the exercise of state powers by
administrative organs. See Leung, supra note 79, at 108-109 (reviewing the SCL).
The SCL defines the situations where governmental agencies may be liable for
injurious consequences of their own official acts. See Lubman, supra note 11,. at
392-93 (discussing what the APL provides). According to Article 33 of the SCL,
foreign nationals and enterprises within Chinese territory can request state
compensation for harms done to them. See SCL, art. 33 (1994).
158. See Administrative Punishment Law (1996) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter APL],
published by Xinhua News Service, Mar. 21, 1996, FBIS, at 96-071 (Apr. 11,
1996) (introducing, for the first time in Chinese socialist legal history, the common
law principles of procedural fairness, including the allowance of hearings to those
who wish to oppose an administrative penalty imposed on them and to controvert
allegations against them), available at http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw46.htm
(last visited Oct. 13, 2002); see also Leung, supra note 79, at 110 (analyzing the
APL). The APL also specifies that laws and regulations must provide the powers to
impose administrative penalties. Id.; see also Lubman, supra note 11, at 392-393
(defining the APL). In addition, the APL defines the types of punishments that
administrative agencies may impose on people and organizations. Id. at 392.
159. See Administrative Supervision Law (1997) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter ASL]
(attempting to promote discipline and efficiency in the administration of the
government by creating groups to supervise the administration), available at
http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw42.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2002); see also
Leung, supra note 79, at 112 (discussing the ASL).
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and, as a result, the effectiveness of these reforms is highly
suspect. 160
In truth, China's administrative structure at accession to the WTO
is practically the same as it was prior to these oversight reforms.' 6'
Most legislation provides only vague instructions to administrative
bodies, resulting in a high degree of administrative discretion and
very little certainty. G2 An increasingly decentralized administration
has resulted in an unbalanced power structure and rapidly changing
levels of policy distortion.63 In short, legislative and administrative
action in China is as unpredictable as it has ever been.164
D. CHINA'S LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY SYSTEMS ARE
INEFFECTIVE
As noted above, the Chinese legislative and administrative
systems are characterized by the promulgation of vague and flexible
laws and the predominance of an administrative body operating
under a high degree of independent discretion. 65 Under the Chinese
legal framework, China's ability to use these systems to comply with
WTO dispute resolution decisions raises several questions. 66
Because administrative interpretation has varied, it is often unclear
which governmental body is ultimately responsible for an individual
law.'67 The lack of a clear separation of powers also potentially
160. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 237 (criticizing the effectiveness of the
reforms).
161. See id. (analyzing China's accession to the WTO); see also Leung, supra
note 79, at 116 (contending that "the rule of law is emerging, but without proper
implementation and enforcement the end result may be the same as before").
162. See Leung, supra note 79, at 104 (describing the problems of arbitrary
administrative acts).
163. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 23 (discussing the inherent problems
stemming from the lack of separation of powers).
164. See id. (lamenting over China's problematic legal system).
165. See supra Part IA (citing the basic principles of the Chinese legal and
administrative systems).
166. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 408-10 (discussing the effects of China's
reforms).
167. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 237 (explaining that the vagueness of the
reforms leads to a high degree of administrative discretion); see also Leung, supra
note 79, at 116 (stating that politics often dictated administrative decisions).
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inhibits China's ability to determine precisely how to modify a law
or regulation with a specific goal in mind.'68 With a lack of
uniformity and incongruence at the local level, it is doubtful that
China could implement effective action within the WTO dispute
resolution required time frames. 16 9 With many different political
levels enforcing varying laws, China will need a substantial amount
of political will to overcome legislative or administrative gridlock. 7 °
In light of these realities, it is unlikely that China has the capacity
to withdraw or modify its laws and regulations upon a national-
much less international-directive. The large amount of recent
legislation by China demonstrates its ability to comply with overall
economic goals.' However, the seemingly chaotic nature of China's
law-making and rule-making processes makes dispute settlement
compliance extremely dubious. 72
II. COMPLIANCE WITH THE WTO DSB
A. ORIGINS OF THE DSB
The Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), 173 unlike most of
the other Multilateral Trade Agreements developed during the
168. See Leung, supra note 79, at 139-40 (commenting on the problems which
arise from the lack of specificity of the reforms); see also Blumental, supra note
18, at 235 (stating that the problematic structure of China's legal system poses a
barrier for legal reform).
169. See Carolyn B. Gleason & Pamela D. Walther, The WTO Dispute
Settlement Implementation Procedures: A System in Need of Reform, 31 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 709, 729 (2000) (noting the challenges behind China's
compliance with WTO decisions).
170. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 235-36 (asserting that, because the
principles of reform place the leadership of the Party superior to the Constitution,
the stature of the law is reduced because the Party remains above the law, and
concluding that this results in legal instrumentalism, not the rule of law).
171. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 384 (noting the extensive recent
accomplishments in Chinese law).
172. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 254 (alluding to issues that may arise
when China gets involved in a DSB decision).
173. See DSU, supra note 34 (providing for WTO dispute settlement
procedures).
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Uruguay Round negotiations, was unfinished until 1993.174 The
drafting process was short because the DSU was essentially a mirror
image of the dispute settlement system originally developed for the
International Trade Organization ("ITO").'75 In order to ensure the
DSU's comprehensive application, acceptance of the DSU was
mandatory to WTO membership.'76
The United States was the main proponent of the DSU. 77 The
United States and other developed countries hoped that the new
procedures for implementing dispute settlement rulings would
significantly improve the enforcement capacity that existed in the
GATT dispute resolution system.'78 Whereas the GATT system
allowed a party to "block" both the formation of a panel and the
acceptance of the decision itself, 179 the DSU made adoption of its
decisions practically automatic, 8 °  and reinforced their
174. See id. (noting 1993 as the date of completion).
175. See Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties to
Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
2275, 2278-88 (1997) (discussing the origins of the WTO).
176. See The Final Act of the Uruguay Round: A Summary, GATT Focus
(WTO, Geneva, Switz.) Dec. 1993, at 5-15 [hereinafter GATT FOCUS] (discussing
the obligations established at the Uruguay Round).
177. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 709 (recalling the United States'
support for the DSU).
178. See Schleyer, supra note 175, at 2286 (contending that the modifications
made by the DSU "show that the new WTO system is a much more powerful and
authoritative tool for resolving disputes than the GATT system").
179. See id. (discussing the increased power of the DSU in the WTO). The
GATT's practice is known as the Rule of Unanimity. See id. at 2283 (describing
the GATT's requirement of full consensus on both panel formation and acceptance
of decisions as effectively giving challenged and losing parties the ability to
"block" such occurrences). The GATT dispute resolution system was itself an
improvement on traditional international dispute resolution systems, such as that
used by the World Intellectual Property Organization, which did not even require
parties to register an appearance. See id. at 2283-84 (observing that the GATT
system was initially successful in obtaining compliance). However, in spite of a
solid track record, the GATT system was criticized for leaving open an "escape
hatch" that could be employed by countries to avoid implementation of the most
contentious decisions. See id. at 2284 (noting criticisms of the GATT system).
180. See id. at 2286-88 (analyzing the six important modifications made to the
system for resolving trade disputes). This was mainly accomplished by replacing
the Rule of Unanimity present in the GATT dispute resolution system with a Rule
of Reverse Consensus. See id. at 2286 (noting that under the WTO system, panel
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implementation through severe remedial measures for non-
compliance.'' The United States, in particular, lauded the DSU as a
superior means of enforcement, which Members could employ to
more legitimately insist on the compliance of other Members
following a successful challenge.'82
B. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS UNDER THE DSU
The DSU, contained in the agreement establishing the WTO,
describes the WTO's system for resolving disputes under its
agreements. 8 3 The DSU identifies the DSB as the exclusive body
overseeing all disputes and provides a procedural framework through
formation and decision implementation could only be stopped by a consensus
against them).
181. See DSU, supra note 34, arts. 21, 22 (discussing compliance and sanctions
for non-compliance with WTO rulings and recommendations); see also GATT
FOCUS, supra note 176, at 14 (discussing how the DSU significantly strengthens
the existing system). Although the GATT dispute settlement system had been
strengthened and streamlined through certain reforms agreed to following the Mid-
Term Review Ministerial Meeting held in Montreal in 1988, the continued ability
to block adoption of decisions at that point limited the system's enforcement
potential. Id.
182. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 709 (noting the pleased reaction
of the U.S. Congress to the Uruguay Round Agreement Acts, which views the
DSB as giving the United States improved leverage). The U.S. Congress noted its
support for the DSB by stating the following during it ratification of the Uruguay
Round:
[C]ountries that bring successful challenges will be authorized to withdraw
Uruguay Round trade benefits from the offending country if, after a
reasonable period following adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report,
the matter cannot be settled in a mutually satisfactory manner. These changes
mean that when the United States brings a successful challenge against
another government under the DSU, the United States will have improved
leverage to insist that the defending government remedy its violation.
1d. at n.l (citing H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1034 (1994)).
183. See Schleyer, supra note 175, at 2276 (noting that the detail and structure
of the DSU lends credence to its expected use as a premier tool of dispute
resolution); Julia Cheng, China's Copyright System: Rising To The Spirit of TRIPs
Requires an Internal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1941,
2003 (1998) (stating that the DSU includes a "settlement system for resolving
international trade disputes"). These qualities differentiate the DSU from GATT
dispute procedures, which have been criticized for being largely ad hoc, and thus
vulnerable to political gamesmanship and diplomatic struggles among nations. Id.
at 2003 n.455 (citing Schleyer, supra note 175, at 2276).
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which WTO disputes must progress. 8 4  The DSB contains
representatives from all WTO Member countries signed on to each
particular agreement at issue, and, through comprehensive voting
procedures, functions as the final arbiter of dispute rulings. 1
85
At the outset, the DSU requires a complaining party to consult in
good faith with the challenged party or parties prior to formally
initiating a dispute.'86 These consultations are important because they
clarify the specific issues in dispute,' 87 and because a complaining
party is not generally allowed to modify its claims following the
conclusion of consultations.'88 If disputing parties fail to reach a
settlement within sixty days, the complaining party can request that
184. See DSU, supra note 34, arts. 2.1, 2.4 (identifying the DSB as the exclusive
body overseeing all WTO disputes).
185. See id. (detailing the makeup and procedures of the DSB); see also Cheng,
supra note 183, at 2003, 2003 n.456 (citing DSU, supra note 34, arts. 2.1, 2.4)
(reporting that the DSU creates a single body to govern all disputes, which include
the authority to "establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports,
maintain surveillance of implementation, and authorize suspension of concessions
in cases of non-implementation of recommendations").
186. See DSU, supra note 34, art. 4, at 1228 (relaying the procedures that the
DSU requires).
187. See id. art. 4.4 (establishing that a consultation must explain the reasons for
the request, identifying the issues, including any legal bases). Consultations may
also play an important role in easing China's overall acquiescence to the WTO
dispute settlement system. See Hoogmartens, supra note 153, at 533 (stating that
Chinese society has long favored mediation to other modes of dispute settlement).
In fact, many Chinese courts are still very cautious regarding the use of coercion in
enforcing their judgments. See also Lubman, supra note 11, at 387 (explaining
how Chinese courts, which were "formerly scorned as rightist institutions at the
end of the 1950s and as bourgeois during the Cultural Revolution," have only
recently become used as forums in which to assert and protect legal rights). Even
on the verge of WTO accession, most Chinese continue to prefer non-judicial
solutions to disagreements that will "maintain or restore harmonious relations
between the parties and also by a lack of judicial sophistication and experience."
Id. at 388.
188. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 397 (describing how Chinese government
"undervalues the finality of judgments" and judges often prefer mediation because
they lack judicial sophistication). As a result, Chinese trade negotiators at the
WTO, who may be apprehensive toward judicial processes, will have incentives to
resolve trade disputes at the consultations level so as to avoid the formal
adjudication mechanics characteristic of the WTO DSB. Id.
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the DSB convene a Panel to determine compliance.'89 The Panel is
then composed within either a thirty- or sixty-day window and the
parties issue their briefs. 9° Next, the Panel has six months' 91 to
investigate the case and deliberate before it must submit a written
decision to the DSB. 92 As noted above, Panel decisions are
essentially adopted automatically. 93 Automatic adoption will not
occur only if either all the Member nations agree by consensus not to
adopt the decision or if one of the parties requests an appeal of the
decision.' 94 If a party files an appeal, the Appellate Body 9 reviews
189. See DSU supra note 34, art. 4.7 (explaining the reasons to convene a
panel); see also id. art. 6.1 (stating that panel establishment is done by request,
unless the DSB decides by consensus against the establishment); Interview with C.
Christopher Parlin, U.S. Trade Representative's Office ("USTR"), Negotiator
during the Uruguay Round, and Legal representative during many WTO disputes
(Oct. 23, 2001) (discussing how the request for a panel ("Panel Request") is the
single-most important document in DSB process). Mr. Parlin explained that the
Panel Request constricts Panel's terms of reference by specifying the precise
measure at issue. Id. As a result, the Panel will forever look only at the specific
measures listed and review only the specific issues mentioned in the Panel
Request. Id. Thus, in order to avoid unfortunate legal occurrences, the Panel
Request should be as comprehensive as possible. Id.
190. See DSU, supra note 34, art. 8.1-8.7 (providing the process to determine
the composition of the panel members). The process includes the following rules:
(1) no panel member may be from any country involved directly in the dispute; (2)
the Secretariat proposes nominations from a list of individuals; (3) parties may not
oppose the nomination without compelling reasons; (4) if the parties are unable to
agree on a panel within twenty days, the Director-General appoints the panelists
upon request from either party. Id.
191. See id. art. 12.8 (issuing the allotted time a panel has to conduct an
examination); id. art. 12.9 (noting that the deadline may be extended to nine
months in exceptional circumstances).
192. See id. art. 12.7 (describing the composition of the parties' reports).
193. See id. art. 16.4 (explaining the requirements in adopting the panel report).
194. See id.; see also id. art. 19.1 (providing that both the panel and Appellate
Body reports issue recommendations for Members to bring any offending measure
into conformity with that Member's WTO obligations); infra Part V (discussing in
greater detail the potential role of Article 19.1 in aiding China's compliance with
DSB decisions).
195. See DSU, supra note 34, art. 17.1 (stating that the Appellate Body is
composed of seven members, three of whom will be chosen to adjudicate an
individual dispute); see also id. art. 17.2 (adding that those appointed by the DSB
serve a four-year term and may be reappointed once). See generally id. art. 8
(explaining the process of selecting panelists). Since the GATT did not have an
appellate structure, the creation of the DSB Appellate Body is an inherent
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the Panel decision for adherence to WTO rules and proper legal
interpretation.'96 Acceptance of Appellate Body decisions is also
virtually automatic because, like Panel reports, they can only be
rejected if a consensus of all DSB members vote against them.'97
C. COMPLIANCE WITH DSB DECISIONS
1. Basic Principles
A DSB ruling leads to three basic scenarios.'98 One scenario is that
the losing party simply complies with the DSB decision by either
withdrawing or modifying the offending measure.' 99 A second
scenario is that the violating Member decides not to comply or
cannot comply with the DSB decision within a "reasonable period of
time."200 Under this scenario, the complaining party may request
negotiations to establish compensation in lieu of withdrawal of the
measure.20 A third scenario occurs where the losing Member fails to
effectively comply with the DSB decision and negotiations do not
lead to an agreed amount of compensation.202 Here, the complaining
Member can request that the DSB suspend concessions or other
improvement on the effectiveness and legitimacy of the WTO's legal discourse,
and the new WTO system as a superior tool for dispute resolution than the GATT
system. Schleyer, supra note 175, at 2286.
196. See DSU, supra note 34, art. 17.6, 17.12 (outlining the Appellate Body's
procedure of addressing the issues of law and legal interpretations raised by the
appeal); see also id. art. 17.13 (providing the Appellate Body's procedure of
review and noting that they "may uphold, modify, or reverse the legal findings and
conclusions of the panel").
197. See id. art. 17.14 (providing the method of DSB adoption of Appellate
Body reports).
198. See Cheng, supra note 183, at 2003 (illustrating three options contracting
parties have in reaction to a violation of international trade rules); see also Judith
Hipper Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 AM.
J. INT'L L. 416, 417 (1996) (explaining the three actions members can take when
their law is successfully challenged).
199. See Cheng, supra note 183, at 2003 (discussing DSU art. 21.3).
200. See id. (discussing DSU art. 21.3(a)-(c)).
201. See DSU art. 22 (describing the procedures for compensation and
suspension of concessions).
202. See Cheng, supra note 183, at 2003 (discussing DSU arts. 22.3(a)-(d)).
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WTO privileges of the losing Member." 3 These scenarios reflect the
strength of the DSB's enforcement mechanism and demonstrate the
WTO's firm proclivity toward effective implementation of DSB
rulings.
Although Members have generally accepted the DSU's rules on
compliance as a major improvement over the GATT mechanism,
there are three procedural areas of the rules that still raise concerns
and may have important implications for China's compliance with
DSB decisions.2 °4 One area of concern relates to whether the
guidelines clearly establish a compliance deadline by setting
standards for a "reasonable period of time" in which to implement a
DSB decision. 05 Another area of concern relates to "compliance
review" procedures when there is a dispute over whether the losing
member has complied with a DSB ruling.0 6 A third area of concern
focuses on available remedies for non-compliance, especially those
procedures used in suspending concessions if a losing member fails
to effectively implement WTO rulings, or fails to conform by its
compliance deadline.20 7
203. See DSU, supra note 34, art. 22 (explaining the proper avenue to take when
a Member does not follow a DSB decision); see also id. arts. 22.5-22.6 (stressing
that authorization for suspension is automatic unless there is a consensus to deny
the request or an agreement prohibiting the suspension); id. art. 22.2 (emphasizing
that there are numerous principles that must be applied in order to determine
suspension of concessions); id. art. 22.6 (adding that the concerned Member may
ask that the matter be referred to an arbitrator for further review); Cheng, supra
note 183, at 2003 n.469 (citing DSU art. 22(3)(a)-(d), explaining the order of
concessions: "first, in the same sector in which the violation by the other party
occurred, second, in different sectors covered by the same agreement, or third in
areas covered by other agreements").
204. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 713 (emphasizing the problems
not corrected by the implementation of the DSU).
205. See id. (describing the compliance deadline).
206. See id. (explaining the "compliance review" procedures).
207. See id. (indicating that an available remedy for non-compliance is
suspension of concessions).
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2. Compliance Procedures That Have Raised Concern
a. Compliance Deadline: "Reasonable Period of Time"
Losing parties must comply with DSB decisions within a time
frame set by the Panel. 2°18 Article 21 of the DSU requires that
members promptly comply with DSB recommendations and
rulings.2 °9 When it is difficult to meet the terms of the Panel or
Appellate Body Report, the affected member may have a "reasonable
period of time" to comply with the order.2"' The "reasonable period
of time" is not to exceed fifteen months from the adoption of the
order, unless the parties otherwise agree.2 ' The DSU requires the
208. See id. at 714 (emphasizing that the DSU alleviates the open-ended time
frame previously permitted to a losing party under the GATT).
209. See DSU, supra note 34, art. 2 1(1) (articulating that timely compliance is
necessary for resolving disputes).
210. See id. art. 21.3 (describing the DSB meeting that is held 30 days after the
order takes effect). Without expressly defining what constitutes a "reasonable
period of time," Article 21.3 describes it as either: (1) a period of time proposed by
the Member concerned and approved by the DSB; or when there is a lack of
approval; (2) a period of time mutually agreed upon by the concerned parties
within forty-five days of panel or appellate body report adoption; or (3) a time-
frame determined in binding arbitration within ninety days of panel or appellate
body report adoption. Id. In the case of an arbitration determination, Article 21.3(c)
provides arbitrators with the guideline that a "reasonable period of time" should
not exceed fifteen months. See id. art. 21.3(c); Gleason & Walther, supra note 169,
at 718 (detailing the initial fear that Article 21.3 automatically provided losing
parties with an unintended, and, often unnecessary fifteen month grace period for
compliance). In spite of several early WTO decisions embracing the fifteen month
standard, there is a recent trend toward using the "shortest possible period"
standard. Id.; see also WTO Status Report, United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Status Report by the United States,
WT/DS2/10 (Jan. 10, 1997) (following the early fifteen month grace period); WTO
Award of Arbitrator, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), Arbitration under Article 21.3 of the Understanding on Rules
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WT/DS26/15 & WT/DS48/13 (May 29,
1998) (emphasizing a shift away from the fifteen month grace period).
211. See DSU, supra note 34, art. 21.4 (explaining that when the Panel or
Appellate Body acts to extend the time for providing their reports, that time should
be added to the fifteen months, and the new time limit should not exceed eighteen
months unless the parties agree that there are "exceptional circumstances"); see
also id. art. 21.3(c) (acknowledging that the reasonable period of time depends on
the particular circumstances, and, therefore, may vary from the standard of fifteen
months).
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DSB to keep "under surveillance the implementation of adopted
recommendations or rulings." '212 The DSB then requires the losing
party to submit status reports prior to the DSB's mandatory review of
the losing party, which is six months into the implementation
period.2"3
The DSB's fifteen-month maximum and the trend towards
requiring shorter time periods for compliance present significant
challenges to China's effective implementation of DSB decisions.2 14
The relatively long time periods between NPC sessions, the
instability and disorder of the law-making and rule-making systems,
and the potential unwillingness of various administrative entities to
take mandated action make China's capacity to take prompt,
effective action improbable in either the legislative or the
administrative sphere.2"5 China will likely find itself in a desperate
struggle between the practical need for at least fifteen months to
comply and the idealistic desire to "save face" within the WTO by
making sincere efforts to implement quickly.2 16 The inclusion of a
broad mandate within DSU Article 21 that developed countries pay
"particular attention" to the interests of developing countries that are
subject to compliance with a DSB decision does little to remedy such
an elemental quandary. 17
212. Id. art. 21.6 (requiring also that the issue of implementation be placed on
the agenda of a meeting six months after the establishment of the "reasonable
period of time").
213. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 719 (stating that such reports
can be "as specific or vague as the losing Member elects to make [them]." These
status reports are the only thing that may be required of the losing Member during
its compliance period. Id.
214. See discussion supra note 210 (explaining that the DSB has recently begun
to shift towards a shorter compliance period).
215. See id. (indicating the change in the compliance standard and some of the
challenges posed by a shorter compliance period).
216. See id. (noting the possible result of the change in the compliance period).
217. See DSU, supra note 34, art. 21.2 (emphasizing that extra attention is due
to the interests of those countries "which have been subject to dispute settlement").
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b. "Compliance Review": The Conflict Between Article 21.5 and
Article 22
Tensions exist within the DSU's own provisions as well.21s In
creating a mechanism for review of the compliance process, the
DSU's drafters failed to remedy a fundamental conflict between the
allowance of judicial recourse through Article 21.5 and the
allowance of remedial procedures pursuant to Article 22.219 The
WTO has not corrected the apparent conflict.220
Article 21.5 provides that where there is a disagreement between
parties concerning the efficacy of compliance measures, the parties
may take recourse through the DSB, and to the original panel itself if
possible.22' DSU Article 22 stipulates the consequences of
noncompliance or failure to provide compensation within twenty
days after the "reasonable period" of time expires.222 Specifically,
DSU Article 22.6 allows the DSB to grant authorization to suspend
concessions or other obligations within thirty days of the expiration
of the "reasonable period," unless there is either a consensus among
the DSB, or the losing party refers the requested suspension amount
to arbitration. 223 Arbitration, preferably conducted by the original
218. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 721 (noting the debate over
DSU Articles 21.5 and 22 in late 1998).
219. See id. (analyzing the two possible approaches the DSU allows for non-
compliance). The DSU also "fails to specify the relationship between Article 21.5
and Article 22." Id.
220. See id. at 722-23 ("Hence, as written, Article 22 makes allowance for the
'negative consensus' rule only in accordance with a specifically delineated
timetable. How the DSU drafters intended that timetable to be reconciled with the
timetable of a potentially protracted compliance review pursuant to Article 21.5 is
not clarified in the text.").
221. See DSU, supra note 34, art. 21.5 (stating that "[w]here there is
disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of
measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings such dispute shall
be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, including
wherever possible resort to the original panel"); see also Gleason & Walther, supra
note 169, at 723 (explaining that Article 21.5 leaves unclear precisely what
procedures can be invoked and when they can be invoked).
222. DSU, supra note 34, art. 22.
223. See id. art. 22.6 (describing the way in which concessions are suspended
under the DSU); see also id. art. 22.7 (explaining that the arbitrator must decide
2002]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
panel, must conclude within sixty days of the expiration of the
"reasonable period," and the DSB must, upon request, authorize a
suspension of concessions in accordance with the arbitrator's
determination.224  Thus, it is possible for dispute resolution
concerning the effectiveness of implementation measures, and for
arbitration over the amount of concessions to be suspended, to be
occurring simultaneously.225 Moreover, it is also possible for the
authorization of retaliatory measures to occur prior to the completion
of a Panel or Appellate Body disposition on compliance efforts.
Although this conflict applies to all Members, China, as a Member
whose compliance capabilities are expectantly poor, is likely to be
especially affected and may face harsh remedial measures.226
c. Retaliation: Suspension of Concessions
The specific remedies authorized under DSU Article 22 are
compensation and the suspension of trade concessions. 22  The
suspension of trade concessions has traditionally been of great
importance, both because international trade compensation figures
are difficult to calculate and because of the positive correlation
between retaliatory trade measures and compliance with mandated
trade policies.2 8 For this reason, this article will only focus on the
suspension of trade concessions.
whether the requested amount is "equivalent to the level or nullification or
impairment").
224. See id. art. 22.6-22.7 (providing the background information regarding
arbitration).
225. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 727 (discussing WTO
Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, Australia-Measures Affecting
the 'Importation of Salmon, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada,
WT/DS18/17 (Dec. 13, 1999), a situation where "parties agreed to initiate
concurrent procedures under Article 21.5 and Article 22.6"). Here, faced with
conflicting timetables, Canada accepts "a delay in its right to suspend concessions
well beyond the time table" currently provided in Article 22. Id.
226. See id. at 729 (noting that, "China, in particular, with its sprawling,
developing economy and a long tradition of non-transparent trade regulations, will
be a special challenge for the system").
227. See DSU, supra note 34, art. 22 (explaining the remedies that are available
if the rulings are not implemented within the "reasonable period of time").
228. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,
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DSU Article 22 provides several procedures and principles
regarding the suspension of trade concessions. These include a
procedure for deciding the priority of different types of
concessions 229 and the principle that the level of suspended
concessions "be equivalent to the level of the nullification or
impairment. '230 Additionally, the suspension of concessions is
temporary and should be removed once the Member alleviates the
problem.2 1' Although there are noticeable advantages to allowing the
suspension of trade concessions (i.e. forcing compliance), the
severity of suspension raises concerns about the appropriateness of
applying this remedy to a country like China, which has weak
implementation capacities.232 For example, systematic governmental
limitations may mask China's genuine efforts to comply with a DSB
decision.233 In such a case, the imposition of brutal retaliatory trade
sanctions is not sensible. If the continued accession of countries like
Supp. No. 10, at 131 (Ch. III), U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996) (stating that
compensation and trade concession suspension are two among several types of
remedies for international misbehavior), available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/archives/statfra.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2002).
Starting from the least effacing and progressing toward the harshest remedial
measure, these include: restitution, compensation, satisfaction, and assurances of
non-repetition (including suspension of trade concessions). Id. Thus, the
suspension of trade concessions ranks among the harshest of remedial measures.
Id. It is for this reason that it is the last resort under the DSU. See Andrew S.
Bishop, The Second Legal Revolution in International Trade Law: Ecuador Goes
Ape in Banana Trade War with European Union, 12 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 1, 11
(2001/2002) (explaining that the suspension of trade concessions serves "not to
punish the offending nation, but merely to further the goals of the WTO by
balancing the trade rights and obligations between nations involved in a dispute").
229. See discussion, supra note 203 (explaining the way suspended concessions
are prioritized under DSU art. 22.3(a)-(d)).
230. DSU, supra note 34, art. 22.4.
231. See id. art. 22.8 (stating that concessions "shall only be applied until such
time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been
removed, or the Member that must implement recommendations or rulings
provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually
satisfactory solution is reached").
232. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (noting that China is especially
susceptible to harsh remedial measures, as its compliance capabilities are relatively
poor).
233. See id. (implying that certain remedies may not help, but rather, hinder
China's efforts to comply with a DSB decision).
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China is to occur, perhaps it is time for the WTO to consider the
inclusion of alternate remedies, such as administrative sanctions,234
reports, publication,2 35 and the informal utilization of media
resources.
3. Necessity of Compliance with DSB Decisions
a. Integrity of the WTO
The powerful compliance obligations of the WTO DSU have
found legitimacy in the theory that Member states must treat WTO
DSB decisions equally to their own domestic law adjudication, or
risk weakening the WTO and signaling its legal failure and practical
impotency.23 6 This theory highlights one of the main dilemmas
concerning China's accession and protection of the WTO's integrity
through its dispute settlement system.237 Indeed, "[c]ompliance with
[WTO] rulings is heavily influenced by the domestic rules operating
within the Member countries." '238 Under this framework, in which
compliance with dispute settlement decisions is not only an
important and beneficial aspect of the WTO, but is also essential to
maintaining organizational integrity, the present state of China's
234. See generally discussion supra note 203 (indicating that a losing Member
risks having its concessions suspended until it complies).
235. See Karl Jonathan Liwo, Note, The Continuing Significance of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora During the 1990's, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 122 (1991) (expressing
how "the success of CITES ultimately depends upon the adequacy of domestic
legislative enactments and the extent of enforcement efforts conducted by the
individual party states"). See generally, Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, Mar. 3, 1973, art. 11(1), 12 I.L.M.
1055, 993 U.N.T.S. 234 (entered into force July 1, 1975) [hereinafter CITES].
236. See Yee, supra note 67, at 611 (explaining the pressure on Members to
accept DSB decisions); see also ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM
AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 50 (1990) (stating the reasons why Member
countries were compelled to accept GATT panel decisions).
237. See Yee, supra note 67, at 633 noting the difficultly in enforcing GATT
rulings in Hong Kong and China due to the influence of domestic policy within
these countries).
238. Id.
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legal structure threatens to impose serious negative effects on the
WTO's overall subsistence.239
b. Present Level of WTO DSB Compliance
Due to the relative infancy of the WTO DSB, its "dispute
settlement implementation procedures are still being tested and
debated. '240 One may fairly say, however, that the WTO DSB system
has functioned well overall, and that implementation to date has not
presented a major problem. 24 As of July 24, 2001, only fifty-one 242
of the 234243 complaints notifying the WTO have resulted in Panel or
Appellate Body Reports where the WTO DSB implicated
implementation procedures. 244 Only six 245 of the adopted Panel or
Appellate Body Reports have related to the implementation of WTO
239. Interview with Professor Edith Brown Weiss, Professor, Georgetown
University Law Center (Oct. 19, 2001) [hereinafter Weiss Interview] (on file with
author) (providing distinctions with regards to general compliance with
international agreements). Here, compliance is separated into three levels, each
with its own distinctive sphere of influence. Id. The first level is implementation,
which includes the structural bodies through which legislation and administrative
regulation are made to conform with the relevant agreement. Id. The second level
is actual compliance, which involves the substantive and procedural means through
which domestic law is made to comport with international standards. Id. The third
level is effectiveness, which relates to a measure of the degree with which a
particular obligation is complied. Id. Each level must be approached
independently, and dealt with in its own unique way, to achieve real compliance.
Id.
240. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 709 (reviewing WTO dispute
settlement implementation through 2000).
241. See Park Young Duk, Statistical Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Process, Institute of International Economic Law, Georgetown University Law
Center (Fall 2001) (on file with author) (noting that less than one-fifth of
complaints to the WTO specified implementation procedures).
242. Id. This number does not include reports resulting from proceedings
pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU. Id.
243. Id. This number encompasses all requests for consultations notified to the
WTO, including those requests, which have led to Panel and Appellate Body
review proceedings. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. This number includes reports resulting from proceedings under Article
21.5 of the DSU. Id.
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DSB rulings. 46 Only five247 disputes reached the level where the
WTO DSB authorized a suspension of trade concessions.248
In spite of this success, the accession of China could single-
handedly reverse this trend.2 49 Since China is the WTO's largest
member, it may not receive the lenient treatment afforded other
developing states in terms of receiving WTO complaints.25 ° Unlike
other developing country markets, China's market could negatively
affect the markets of developing countries, as well as provide
significant extrinsic gains.' Moreover, China's potential inability to
comply with a possibly high number of negative DSB decisions
could result in implementation issues never yet dealt with in DSB
jurisprudence.
c. Potential WTO DSB Reforms
Due to the DSB's track record of success, the importance of DSB
reform had not arisen early in its history.2 52 China's accession may
change this perception and the reality upon which it is based.253
246. Duk, supra note 241.
247. Id. This number covers authorizations granted by the WTO pursuant to
Article 22.7 of the DSU and Article 4.10 of the Subsidies Agreement. See id.; see
also Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 1, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, art.
4.1, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 33 I.L.M. 112
(1994) [hereinafter Subsidies Agreement] (providing that the DSB shall authorize
the complainant "to take appropriate countermeasures" upon noncompliance by the
offending party).
248. Duk, supra note 241.
249. See John Jackson, The Institutional Ramifications of China's Accession to
the WTO, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: DEFINING THE PRINCIPLES
OF ENGAGEMENT, 75, 78-79 (Frederick M. Abbott ed., 1998) (discussing the
potential for numerous "non-violation" dispute settlements if the WTO admitted
China before China fully complied with various GATT trade rules).
250. See id. at 78 (commenting on the GATT's toleration of smaller developing
states and their non-market economy systems).
251. See id. (discussing the differing effects China's economic system could
have on world markets).
252. See Gleason & Walter, supra note 169, at 711 (commenting on the
perceived effectiveness of the WTO implementation procedures).
253. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 257 (noting the "potential for disputes
between China and its trading partners to overload the WTO DSB" and stating that
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China's dominant economic role and the potential dire circumstances
of its involvement in DSB proceedings makes it important to
proactively examine possible dispute settlement reforms.254
Even modest procedural changes aimed at discouraging undue
delay and inappropriate use of the "reasonable period" can help
reduce the occurrence and duration of non-compliance.255
Furthermore, reforms to fortify the compliance review process, such
as strengthening the procedural tools for hastening compliance and
clarifying the ambiguities between Articles 21.5 and 22, would
"American policymakers and commentators worry that China's accession will
deprive the U.S. of its leverage over China, exercised through annual review of
China's MFN status"). China's failure to comply with adverse decisions could
affect the integrity of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism and send a message
that the WTO is an ineffectual enforcer. Id.; see also Jackson, supra note 249, 78-
79 (commenting on how China's accession could lead to "non-violation" dispute
settlements which could potentially damage the WTO's credibility); Jackson
Analysis on China PNTR, 18 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14, Apr. 7, 2000, at 8-9
(commenting on the affects of granting China Permanent Normal Trade Relations
("PNTR") status and the potential for China to discriminate against U.S. workers,
farmers, and businesses); U.S. Consideration of Permanent Normal Trade
Relations with China: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 106th Cong.
100-02 (2000) (statement of Dr. Nicholas R. Lardy, Senior Fellow in Foreign
Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution) [hereinafter PNTR Hearings] (providing
three reasons why the United States should grant PNTR to China). First, voting
against PNTR would only disadvantage the economic interests of the United States
and provide advantages to other countries. Id. at 101. Second, voting against PNTR
would undermine the position of reformers inside China and support their
conservative opponents. Id. at 102. Third, voting against PNTR would undermine
the position of U.S. negotiators in the drafting process of China's Protocol of
Accession. Id. at 102. The U.S. decision to grant PNTR allowed the United States
to avoid these pitfalls. However, concerns regarding China's lack of compliance
fail to consider how China will balance its long-term economic interests with
domestic problems that promote the violation of WTO commitments. Blumental,
supra note 18, at 257; see also James V. Feinerman, Chinese Participation in the
International Legal Order: Rogue Elephant or Team Player?, in CHINA'S LEGAL
REFORMS, 186, 186-91 (Stanley B. Lubman ed., 1996) (analyzing China's
international legal behavior post-Mao).
254. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 735-36 (concluding that reforms
of dispute settlement implementation procedures are increasingly important in light
of China's accession into the WTO).
255. See id. at 734-35 (arguing for redefining the fifteen month "reasonable
period" provision as the "shortest possible implementation period," in light of the
"particular circumstances" of the case at hand).
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improve the effectiveness of this somewhat cryptic process."' The
alternative remedies discussed above are also worthy of
consideration.2 57
Not only should developed countries that use the DSB frequently,
like the United States and the countries of the European Union,
prefer such practical implementations, but developing countries like
China would also benefit by gaining enforcement advantages over
their wealthier counterparts.258 These reforms would also reduce
China's risk of sustaining trade sanctions for non-compliance.259 In a
rudimentary sense, the need for dispute settlement reforms stems
from uncertainties over the sustained development of China's legal
system, particularly regarding China's implementation capacity.260
D. WTO REQUIRES STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH DSB RULINGS
The automaticity of the WTO DSB's systemic and procedural
structure grants a recognizable legitimacy not present in the original
GATT dispute settlement system.26' The automatic adoption of DSB
rulings prevents a Member from blocking the dispute settlement
process, thereby creating real interests in a dispute's outcome.2 62
256. See id. at 729 (emphasizing the ineffectiveness of current reasonable
period, compliance review, and concession provisions).
257. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.c (discussing compensation and suspension
of concessions).
258. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 735 (recognizing the
importance of procedural changes in influencing a country's willingness to
comply).
259. See id. (noting that even minor procedural reforms could decrease instances
of non-compliance).
260. See Lubman, supra note l1, at 409 (stipulating that China's immense size
and high levels of regional poverty hinder administrative tasks). Moreover,
"revising the allocations of power within the Chinese bureaucracy and between
government and Party present enormous difficulty." Id. While enhanced economic
activity has lessened the difficulty of such undertakings, currently these troubles
still threaten to hinder Chinese legal development, absent fundamental
governmental changes and a complete withdrawal of CCP control. Id.
261. See GATT Focus, supra note 176, at 14 (stating that prior to the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the inception of the WTO DSU, the "dispute
settlement of the GATT [was] generally considered to be one of the cornerstones
of the multilateral trading order").
262. See id. (detailing the DSU's timeline for adopting panel decisions).
448 [18:399
OUT OF CONFORMITY
DSU Article 21 imposes time restrictions that put a premium on a
country's ability to respond efficiently to a negative DSB decision.263
Finally, the availability of retaliation through suspension of trade
concessions creates genuine incentives for compliance with DSB
decisions.264
The firm compliance requirements of the DSB raise additional
questions regarding China's compliance capacity. China may lack
the ability to implement compliance measures in the face of time
constraints, and the potential for harsh sanctions is unclear. 65
Deficiencies in legislative drafting, a defuse allocation of
bureaucratic power, and the overall involvement of the CCP in
government affairs raise doubt on China's ability to comply with the
requirements of the DSB.266 Reforms to the implementation system
may help eliminate the above problems.2 67 However, the only sure
answer is a reformation of the Chinese legislative and administrative
processes. 268 The Protocol on the Accession of China is a device that
may ensure China's preparedness for WTO membership.269
263. See id. (discussing the DSU's compliance provisions). The parties have
thirty days to accept the Appellate Body's report. Id. If the party cannot
immediately comply with the adopted recommendations, the DSU affords a
"reasonable period of time" to comply. Id. If a party requires the "reasonable
period of time" for compliance, the parties must agree to a compliance deadline
and obtain the approval of the DSB within forty-five days of the adoption, or
ninety days through arbitration. Id.
264. See id. (outlining the provisions on suspension and compensation when
implementation does not occur).
265. See supra note 260 and accompanying text (discussing the problems
presented by China's size and bureaucracy).
266. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 385 (emphasizing that these deficiencies
hinder the government structure's ability to control).
267. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 736 (stating that the WTO
"system will only be as good as the procedures established to enforce them").
268. See discussion supra Part I.C.4 (outlining the deficiencies in the present
legislative and administrative processes).
269. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 257 (opining that China's acceptance of"a
realistic transition program with suitable provisions for mutual adjustment" would
have a positive impact on China's future WTO compliance).
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III.THE PROTOCOL ON THE ACCESSION OF
CHINA TO THE WTO27°
A. THE "ROAD TO ACCESSION"27 '
1. China's Early Withdrawalfrom GATT
China has experienced a long and difficult accession to the
WTO.72 China was a founding Member of GATT in 1947.273 On
October 1, 1949, however, the founding of the People's Republic of
China forced the Nationalist government of Chiang Kaishek to flee
to Taiwan. z74 On March 6, 1950, the U.N. Secretary General received
a communication from Nationalist government officials in Taiwan
270. Just as Part 1, supra, which focused only on China's legislative and
administrative systems, and not on its judicial system, Part III will discuss only the
provisions of the WTO protocol implicating China's legislative and administrative
systems. Each Member's legislative and administrative systems perform the
implementation of DSB decisions. See Timothy M. Reif & Marjorie Florestal,
Revenge of the Push-Me, Pull-You: The Implementation Process Under the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding, 32 INT'L LAW. 755, 769-771 (1998) (discussing
the effect of what is required for implementation of DSB decisions on time
restraints). By contrast, a Member's judicial system serves to safeguard the
integrity of law-making and rule-making activities discharged within these bodies.
Therefore, a thorough examination of how the WTO protocol relates to China's
judicial system is beyond the scope of this article.
271. See Bhala, supra note 120, at 1472-73 (discussing the three steps of the
accession process). The first step involves the applicant's negotiation of bilateral
concession agreements through an "accession Working Party," which includes
each WTO Member requesting such an agreement. Id. at 1472. These
"indispensable" agreements represent the applicant's specific bilateral trade
concessions. Id. at 1472-73. The second step is the contracting parties' decision,
pursuant to GATT Article XXXIII, whether to allow the accession in light of the
applicant's status and commitments. Id. at 1473. If the decision is affirmative, the
third step is the drafting and approval of a protocol of accession. Id.
272. See id. at 1477-81 (outlining the history behind China's accession to the
WTO).
273. See GATT, supra note I (listing the twenty-three founding members of
GATT, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), Canada, Ceylon
(Sri Lanka), Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa,
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Syria, United Kingdom, and the United States).
274. See Bhala, supra note 120, at 1477 (noting that "internal political upheaval
led to [China's] withdrawal" from the GATT).
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"indicating 'China' was withdrawing from the GATT. '' 275 On May 5,
1950, the withdrawal took effect.276 Although the CCP contested this
withdrawal, the GATT membership structure effectuated the
withdrawal for more than twenty years while CCP-controlled China
played almost no role within the GATT.277
2. China's "Open Door" Policy and the Re-Engagement of GATT
The late 1970s marked a reversal in China's inward-looking
economic policies of protectionism and conservatism. 78 Following
CCP Chairman Mao Zedong's death in 1976, the Chinese
government began to look outward and engage the international
community in an attempt to revitalize China's struggling economy
through an infusion of foreign technology and investment.279 In 1978,
China adopted a formal "Open Door" Policy aimed at ending China's
economic isolation and welcoming foreign investment, trade, and the
275. See id. (summarizing the events leading up to the Chinese withdrawal).
276. See id. (providing dates for the withdrawal).
277. See id. at 1477-78 (discussing the opposing arguments on the validity of the
withdrawal). The CCP argued that the PRC should be recognized as the legitimate
successor government in China, making the actions of the Nationalist regime in
Taiwan "null and void." Id. at 1478. However, the Communist government on the
mainland represented a separate sovereign entity, one that never joined GATT and
therefore had no authority to speak for the "China" that signed onto the GATT. See
id. Nevertheless, due in large part to Mao Zedong's personal apathy to the
agreement, PRC China made no attempt to engage in the GATT, which made these
arguments practically moot. See id. China's experience stands in stark contrast to
Cuba's. Id. at 1477. Even after the communist revolution of 1959 led by Fidel
Castro, Cuba remained a part of GATT and subsequently became a founding
member. Id.
278. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 205 (commenting on how "China began to
look outward to the international community" during the late 1970s); see also
Janice Marshall, Current Developments in the People's Republic of China: Has
China Changed?,. 1 TRANSNAT'L LAW 505, 505 n.1 (1988) (discussing China's
adoption of the "Open Door" Policy in 1978).
279. See Marshall supra, note 278, at 509 (stating that Deng Xiaoping, the new
leader of the CCP, expanded the economic development plan of China by
"importing large quantities of foreign technology, encouraging the use of foreign
experts, and sending Chinese students and scholars abroad for training"). This
policy is antithetical to policies of isolation and exclusion promoted under Mao
Zedong's regime. Id. at 508-09.
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transfer of technology, while recognizing the importance of
international trade in realizing these efforts.28°
China took material steps toward implementing the "Open Door"
Policy in 1980 by joining the International Monetary Fund ("IMF")
and World Bank,28' as well as by applying to the GATT Secretariat
in Geneva as a non-voting observer.282 In 1982, the GATT
Contracting Parties granted China's request, allowing China to
"participate regularly as an observer in GATT meetings, including
the Uruguay Round negotiations. 283 Most importantly, China filed
an official GATT membership application in 1986284 and began to
implement the various economic programs necessary for re-entry.285
280. See Cheng, supra note 183, at 1941 (recognizing that the "Open Door"
Policy served as notice to the rest of the world that China was ready to "come
out"). Cheng proposed that China's economic structure had ripened for foreign
investment, as well as acknowledging that the "Open Door" Policy was a policy of
reform geared toward expanding China's economy to the outside world. See id. at
1941 n. 2 (citing Symposium, Opportunities for Foreign Investment and the
Process in Shanghai, Shanghai Foreign Investment Commission (1998)). China
realized the importance of importation of foreign technology, which was
considered vital to China's economic development. See Marshall, supra note 254,
at 509.
281. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 205 (indicating that China's first step
towards a more outward approach to economic reform occurred when it joined
these institutions). Recall that these institutions were originally founded at roughly
the same time as the GATT. See Mary E. Footer, 1996-1997 Symposium-
Institutions for International Economic Integration: The Role of Consensus in
GATT/WTO Decision-Making, 17 Nw.J. INT'L L. & BuS. 653, 662 (1997).
282. See Bhala, supra note 120, at 1478 (noting that China's efforts to join as a
non-voting observer "[coincided] with the post-Mao liberalization period").
283. Id. at 1479. During this time, senior economic officials warned top Beijing
officials against a hastened entry into the WTO. See also Dede Nickerson, Officials
Warn on Fast Entry to WTO, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 15, 1995, at Al
(discussing warnings of WTO entry being too hasty).
284. See Yee, supra note 67, at 612 (commenting that China realized it needed
GATT); see also Bhala, supra note 120, at 1479 (stating that China formally
restored status on July 10, 1986).
285. See Yee, supra note 67, at 612 (citing Former U.S. Trade Representative
Ambassador Clayton Yeutter, Address at the American Chamber of Commerce,
Hong Kong (Feb. 5, 1988)).
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3. China, GATT, and the Return of the "Taiwan Issue"
In response to a certain degree of domestic wariness concerning
China's increasingly global economic policy,286 China clarified and
justified its interests in joining the GATT during the late 1980s and
early 1990s.287 China believes that GATT membership would serve
China's self-interest through practical effects, such as lower tariffs
on Chinese goods.288 China's membership also had an ideological
impact by notifying other countries that the international economic
community must now accept China as an equal partner.28 9 In an effort
to counter opposition, the Chinese government asserted that, in terms
of WTO membership, "the WTO is hardly worthy of its name-the
World Trade Organization-until the world's most populous country
has joined its ranks."2 90
In 1989, Taiwan complicated China's efforts to become a part of
GATT, when it filed its own request for formal accession to the
GATT, as "the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu
(Pescadores), Kinmen and Matsu," together to be known as "Chinese
286. See Nafziger, supra note 10, at 760 (stating that one of China's most
difficult tasks during the accession process was "to reconcile traditional attitudes
of cultural superiority and wariness toward foreigners with the exigencies of
economic development").
287. See, e.g., Blumental, supra note 18, at 201 (explaining that by trying to
meet "the conditions for accession first to GATT, and now to WTO, Chinese
market-oriented reformers have not only promoted domestic economic reform, but
have also overcome political opposition at several crucial junctures during the
1980s and 1990s").
288. See Bhala, supra note 120, at 1479 (explaining that Most Favored Nation
("MFN") status and tariff binding principles of Articles I and II of GATT would
create lower tariffs). A recent slow-down in China's economic growth, coupled
with the tangential effects of the Asian Economic Crisis, resulted in China's
consideration of a "New Growth Paradigm," no matter what it costs in terms of
domestic unemployment. PNTR Hearings, supra note 253, at 182. The Chinese
leadership "sees efficiency gains as stemming in part from reducing the restrictions
that have previously constrained the private sector of the economy and in part from
the increased international competition that will follow from opening up China
more fully to the global economy." Id.
289. See Bhala, supra note 120, at 1480 (asserting that China's entry into the
WTO would lead to the acceptance of China as an equal partner). China's entry,
"in blunt Asian terms," would "give great 'face' to the PRC." Id.
290. Id.
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Taipei."29' Taiwan's action immediately aroused China's continuing
concerns over Taiwanese territorial issues and revived China's anger
over Taiwan's ability to force a Chinese withdrawal from GATT in
1950.292 An apparent "gentlemen's agreement" in GATT, and now in
the WTO, largely defused this situation, whereby China would
accept the name "Chinese Taipei" for Taiwan's representative status,
but China must. first accede to the WTO before Chinese Taipei would
gain admittance.293 However, this issue is moot due to China's, and
subsequently Chinese Taipei's, acceptance into the WTO and formal
and independent admittance into the WTO in December of 2001.294
4. Development of a Protocol on Accession and U.S. Involvement
In 1987, GATT established a "Working Party on China's Status as
a Contracting Party," and renamed it the "WTO Working Party on
the Accession of China" ("Working Party") following the birth of the
WTO. 295 The Working Party had to complete two tasks: (1) compile
a Working Party Report based on its deliberations; and, (2) complete
a Protocol on the Accession of China.296 The United States chaired
the Working Party and played a dominant role in determining the
291. See Andy Y. Sun, From Pirate King to Jungle King: Transformation of
Taiwan's Intellectual Property Protection, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 67, 81 (1998) (noting that Taiwan's belief that WTO participation would
result in more leverage with China largely motivated this action). As a
demonstration of its commitment, Taiwan began actively amending its Intellectual
Property system. Id.
292. See Bhala, supra note 120, at 6 (explaining that the former Republic of
China was an original GATT contracting party, but withdrew from GATT on May
4, 1950, when officials in Taiwan contacted the U.N. Secretary General to inform
him of China's withdrawal).
293. See John Parry, WTO: Taiwan Praised for Efforts in Forwarding Bid to
Join WTO, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), at D5 (Mar. 3, 1997) (stating that although
Taiwan possesses a readiness to conform to WTO rules, it must wait until China
becomes a Member).
294. See China Taipei Approved, supra note 6 (announcing that at the Doha
Ministerial Conference, China's accession signing ceremony immediately followed
formal approval of the membership of Chinese Taipei).
295. See Bhala, supra note 120, at 1481, 1481 n.2 (stating that GATT
established the Working Party to review China's application for entry into the
international agreement).
296. See id. at 1491 (noting that the Working Party met more than twenty times
to deliberate over the terms of the Protocol).
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format and schedule of China's accession.297 The efforts of the
United States towards China's accession to the WTO have focused
on striking a balance between the WTO's goal of promoting the
development and reform of China's economic system and U.S.
concerns about access to China's markets and the growing U.S. trade
deficit with China.298
The United States commenced an in-depth review of China's trade
status in 1991, when the United States Trade Representative.
("USTR") initiated an investigation into Chinese market barriers. 99
The investigation reviewed several restrictive barriers, including:
import licensing requirements; quantitative restrictions; and the
"failure to publish trade-related laws, regulations, judicial decisions,
and administrative rulings."3 ° In 1992, China and the United States
resolved the investigation by signing a bilateral Memorandum of
Understanding ("U.S.-China MOU").30 China agreed to eliminate
particular market access barriers over a five-year period, if the
United States both liberalized certain U.S. export controls on goods
for China and supported China's WTO membership.30 2
By 1994, however, the USTR still expressed numerous concerns
about China's international trade law regime, including transparency,
subsidies, and intellectual property ("IP") rights.30 By the end of
1998, it did not appear that either a bilateral concession agreement or
297. See Yee, supra note 67, at 612 (commenting that the United States was
primarily concerned with "China's commitment to a free trade market").
298. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 203 (describing the key issues in
negotiating China's accession protocol); see also Yee, supra note 67, at 612-13
(revealing the U.S. position that China falls short of meeting the minimum
standards demanded of GATT members).
299. See Bhala, supra note 120, at 1485 (explaining that Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended, authorized the USTR's investigation).
300. Id.
301. See id. (indicating that it took the U.S. and China one year to negotiate the
U.S.-China MOU).
302. See id. (explaining that China's implementation of its U.S.-China MOU
commitments would serve as a key indication of China's ability and willingness to
undertake WTO obligations).
303. See id. at 1485-86 (outlining the USTR's concerns on transparency, tariffs,
non-tariff barriers, subsidies, and intellectual property rights).
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a WTO protocol on accession were likely.30 4 However, the
development of a mutually agreeable WTO Basic
Telecommunication Agreement eliminated a major stumbling block
to negotiations. 35 On November 15, 1999,306 the United States and
China finally agreed on China's accession ("China-U.S. Accession
Agreement"). 307 This agreement stemmed partly from the unique
political situations of the two countries' respective leaders.308 The
United States then granted China Permanent Normal Trade Relations
("PNTR"), setting the stage for a final draft of the Protocol on the
Accession of China to the WTO. 309
5. Finalization of the Protocol: Present and Future Concerns
As the Working Party on Accession moved to finalize a protocol
on accession that would be in line with the bilateral accession
agreements of concerned Members, including the United States and
304. See Bhala, supra note 120, at 1497 (commenting that the Chinese believed
the "Americans were pushing too hard," while the United States believed "the
Chinese approach was desultory").
305. See id. at 1515-16 (suggesting that the U.S. telecommunications lobby
made telecommunications a major point of departure during U.S.-China accession
negotiations). China's ultimate decision to abide by the WTO Basic
Telecommunications Agreement, as well as forgo its equity investment and
geographic telecommunications restrictions, made U.S. support of Chinese
accession finally possible. See id.
306. See id. at 1511 (outlining the time frame of the U.S. and China's agreement
on China's accession); see also Moore Welcomes China-U.S. Agreement on
Chinese Accession, supra note 30 (recounting WTO Director-General Mike
Moore's reaction to the announcement of the U.S.-China agreement).
307. See WTO Ministerial Conference Approve China's Accession, supra note 6
(explaining that the actual Accession Agreement encompasses three separate
documents); see also Working Party Report, supra note 3; Protocol, supra note 4
[hereinafter, in the aggregate, China-U.S. Accession Agreement].
308. See Bhala, supra note 120, at 1511 (suggesting that both Chinese President
Jiang and U.S. President Clinton wanted to secure a place in history by completing
China's accession). At the time of the negotiations concerning China's accession,
in contrast with Deng Xiaoping and his "open-door policy," President Jiang had no
"defining moment to his tenure." Id. President Clinton was trying to recover from
the "Monica Lewinsky scandal" and to redeem himself after previous foreign
relations' failures involving China. Id.
309. Normal Trade Relations for the People's Republic of China, Pub. L. No.
106-286, §§ 102-104, 114 Stat. 880 (2000) (authorizing the extension of normal
trade relations treatment to China).
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the European Union, three important issues surfaced regarding the
benefits of WTO membership that colored its progress. One issue
concerned the real significance of China in terms of world trade. 10
Although China's market size and economic growth had recently
expanded,3 1 China still commanded only a minor share of global
gross national product.31 2 This realization was a factor during
protocol negotiations because trading power is an inherent and
inseparable component of WTO bargaining power.3"3 A second issue
was the precise effect of WTO membership on China's economic
development. Since the WTO would help to accelerate China's
economic development3"4  and boost China's commitment to
international trading norms, such as IP protection,3"5 China's
accession would likely provide a common benefit to both China and
WTO Members.3"6 A third issue concerns the crux of the debate over
China's accession. China's willingness to comply with general WTO
310. See Lardy, supra note 11 (acknowledging that no other country has
expanded its role in the global economy like China).
311. See id. (asserting that in the 1980s and 1990s, "China emerged as a major
player in the global economy"). China's foreign trade increased over $450 billion
from the late 1970s to 2000. Id. For most of the 1990s, China was second to only
the United States with respect to its receipt of foreign direct investment. Id.
Chinese firms are also a major economic presence abroad. Id.
312. See Bhala, supra note 120, at 1471 (stating that in 1997, China accounted
for only 3.5 percent of world GNP, ranking right behind Papua New Guinea at
eighty-one with its global per capita GDP). In contrast, the United States, the
WTO's most powerful Member, controlled 25.6 percent of world GNP and ranked
number one in terms of per capita GDP. Id. China's present world GNP
percentage, while small for its size, is still a vast improvement over its Mao-
influenced 1977 figure of just 0.6 percent. Id.
313. See Lardy, supra note II (explaining that China was the largest trading
country not participating in the WTO).
314. See id. (asserting that Chinese leaders were aware that becoming a Member
of the WTO would increase the competition of its domestic market); see also Hong
Kong Officials Concerned over Growing U.S.-China Tensions, Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA), at A26 (Feb. 8, 1995), available at LEXIS, Legnew Library,
Curnws File (stating that in 1995, Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce
President, Ian Christie, estimated that GATT membership was worth
approximately forty billion dollars to China).
315. See Lardy, supra note 11 (indicating that the protocol commits China to
protecting intellectual property).
316. See Cheng, supra note 183, at 2013 (stating that a comprehensive
intellectual property system would "benefit many of its Western trade partners").
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obligations, specifically with WTO DSB decisions, presents a major
concern for the WTO.31 7 While some members of the Working Party
questioned China's commitment to international dispute
resolution,3 most members agreed that China's need for the
economic benefits of WTO membership will guarantee that China
will make a strong effort to adhere to WTO principles and WTO
DSB rulings.319
The Working Party on Accession called for recognition of the
unique problems associated with China's compliance capacity and
required a unique response for its terms of accession.32° China's
paradoxical "market socialism" economic hybrid makes rote
application of strict principles difficult.32" ' The inefficient legislative
and administrative systems that China must use to implement WTO
DSB decisions makes the blind dispensation of juridical
requirements inadvisable.322 Since the WTO's integrity is inherently
tied to China's WTO compliance record, the protocol of accession
devised by the Working Party needed to balance realistic objectives
3 17. See Yee, supra note 67, at 636 (explaining that the question remains
whether China will recognize the new WTO dispute system).
318. See id. at 635-36 (predicting that China will claim that the WTO lacks the
authority to adjudicate a dispute or enforce a settlement between Member
countries). China currently refuses to recognize the jurisdiction of the International
Court in the Hague and some fear that China will also refuse to recognize the
power of the.WTO DSB, causing disastrous results for the DSB. Id.
319. See id. (stating that China's need for membership will ensure an attempt to
adhere to WTO rulings); see also Lardy, supra note II (explaining that there is
nearly an unanimous view in the upper levels of Chinese leadership that economic
growth is sine qua non for staying in power, and, in the wake of the Asian crisis,
leaders feel that participation in the WTO is the only alternative for maintaining
economic growth). Chinese leaders have expressed their willingness to abide by
WTO rules, even at the great expense, both economically and politically, of severe
job loss and degradation of state-owned enterprises. Id.
320. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 246, 255 (stating that China's accession is
far different from Romania's accession to the GATT in 1971 because of
institutional and circumstantial differences).
321. See id. at 246 (indicating that various factors of China's economy make
application of Article XVII nearly impossible).
322. See id. at 257 (noting that if the Protocol of Accession commits China to a
reasonable transition program than the Chinese government will be unlikely to
permit violations of the GATT by its sub-national governments).
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with the need for adequate conformity in order to be effective.3 23
Whether the Protocol on the Accession of China to the WTO has met
this challenge is still uncertain.3 24
B. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOL ON CHINA'S
ACCESSION TO THE WTO
1. General Considerations
a. Protocols on Accession in General
A protocol of accession represents the basic terms of entry for a
prospective member into the WTO.325 It is a contract between the
acceding country and collective WTO Members.326 The contract also
outlines the applicant's current trade laws and policies, pointing out
any differences between these laws and the minimum GATT and
WTO requirements.327 Most importantly, a protocol explains how
and when the applicant plans to rectify the differences between its
laws and the WTO requirements.3 28 Specifically, a protocol of
accession highlights problem areas and then establishes a plan of
action to address them. 29
323. See id. at 255, 257 (explaining that negotiators should focus on creating
realistic commitments for China because China's failure to adhere to WTO DSB
resolutions will harm the WTO's integrity).
324. See supra Part II.B (discussing the future prospects of the Protocol on
China's Accession to the WTO).
325. See Bhala, supra note 123, at 1473-74 (revealing that accession involves
three steps: bilateral concession agreements, the decision, and the Protocol of
Accession).
326. See id. at 1473-74 (noting that the protocol requires negotiation between
the acceding country and the WTO as a whole).
327. See id. at 1474 (noting that a protocol explains that the applicant must
correct any differences between their laws and the WTO requirements).
328. See id. (explaining that these discrepancies may create a gap between the
applicant's sanitary rules and the SPS agreement).
329. See id. (stating that these problem areas might result from gaps between a
country's copyright laws and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights).
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b. Transparency: A Primer
The Protocol on the Accession of China to the WTO identifies
transparency as China's main problem.33 While the precise meaning
of transparency is unclear even in trade circles,33' the term generally
connotes the level of open and unimpeded access to, surveillance
over, and review of a country's governmental operations by other
countries. 32 The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development ("OECD") stated that governments must ensure
transparency in order "[t]o ensure international market openness,"
because "foreign firms and individuals seeking access to a
market.., must have adequate information on new or revised
regulations so that they can base their decisions on an accurate
assessment of potential costs, risks, and market opportunities." '333 The
330. See Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 12 (1998) (noting that transparency is one of the
largest issues facing China's accession to the WTO). Recent criticism directed at
the WTO DSB for being non-transparent makes it somewhat ironic that China's
ability to fulfill its obligations to the DSB is subject to the same critique. See
Gregory Shaffer, WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics on
Trade-Labor, Trade-Environment Linkages for the WTO's Future, 24 FORDHAM
INT'L L. J. 608, 608 (2000) (stating that many Western commentators criticize the
lack of transparency of WTO dispute settlement hearings).
331. See Ostry, supra note 330, at I (commenting that transparency's "genesis is
obscure, its definition-captured in Article X of the 1947 GATT-is imprecise,
and the extent and nature of its implementation is unknown"). Ostry has jokingly
commented that the term transparency is "the most opaque [word] in the trade
policy lexicon." Id.
332. See William Satire, On Language; Transparency, Totally, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
4, 1998, sec. 6, at 4 (discussing the development of the word transparency to mean
visibility and "openness of the operations"). See generally Ostry, supra note 330,
at 9 (noting that since the establishment of the WTO, transparency has formed a
radically different meaning that now includes publication requirements for laws,
regulations, and the mode of administration in trade services).
333. See Vera Nicholas-Gervais et. al, Background Report on Enhancing Market
Openness Through Regulatory Reform, in OECD REVIEWS OF REGULATORY
REFORM: REGULATORY REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 230 (1999) (explaining
the importance of transparent regulations); cf, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Forum, APEC Government Procurement Experts Group Non-Binding Principles
on Government Procurement (Sept. 2, 1999) (GPEG report on newly developed
requirements) (identifying transparency as one of the new non-binding principles
adopted by Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum "APEC") at
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/committee/gov-nonbinding.html (last visited Oct. 13,
2002); SHERRY M. STEPHENSON & SOONHWA YI, PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY IN
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WTO has specified three reasons for requiring transparency: (1)
WTO Members should have relevant market information, (2) it
facilitates monitoring of WTO obligations compliance, and (3) it
facilitates multilateral trade negotiations. 34 According to the WTO,
transparency improves market efficiency and facilitates compliance
review mechanisms, such as dispute settlement.335
GATT Article X contains the WTO's general transparency
requirements. 3 6 These requirements include: publication of laws,
rules, and administrative regulations, as well as the establishment of
adjudicative means to review and correct matters relating to customs
regulations. 37 The Protocol on the Accession of China into the WTO
clarifies the categories of transparency and expands the
requirements, thus raising the burden of transparency acquiescence
SERVICES SECTOR I (Rev. ed., 2001) (paper for APEC Group on Services meeting
in Beijing, China) (explaining that transparency is critical to the facilitation of
services trade by making discriminatory elements in market places visible to
foreign businesses), at http://www.apecsec.org.sg (last visited June 17, 2002). A
complete discussion of transparency's effect on curbing governmental corruption
is beyond the scope of this article. For more information on this subject, please
visit Transparency International's website at http://www.transparency.org.
334. See Roy A. Schotland, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center, Tracking Transparency: An American Administrative Lawyer Stumbles
into WTO-land, Speech in Shanghai, China (Feb. 2001) (explaining that those
accessing a market should have legal information in order to assess their
commercial risks). See generally WTO SECRETARIAT, WTO WORK ON
TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT (Presentation at 9th International Anti-
Corruption Conference) (explaining the importance of the transparency
requirement in providing stability and predictability in the international trade
arena), at
http://www.transparency.org/iacc/9th-iacc/papers/day2/ws2/d2ws2_wto.html (last
visited June 14, 2002).
335. See Schotland, supra note 334 (stating that transparency is necessary to
provide stability, predictability, and the exchange of information in a rules-based
trade regime and that transparency of the WTO dispute settlement procedure is an
important issue).
336. See GATT, supra note 1, art. X (establishing the WTO's publication and
administration of trade regulations requirements).
337. See id. (explaining that member countries must publish laws, rules, judicial
decisions, and other administrative regulations, and that each member country shall
maintain adjudicative processes to ensure review and correction of issues relating
to customs matters).
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and improving the visibility of Chinese laws. 338 The Protocol extends
transparency coverage "over goods, services, [Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property ("TRIPs")], or control of foreign
exchange,' 3 9 and it supplements WTO requirements concerning: (1)
publication, requiring publication before implementation, and
enforcement only of published laws and regulations; 340 (2) an enquiry
point, including a time limit for response;34' and, (3) a right to
comment,342 which requires a notification and consultation phase.
343
These three categories represent the transparency requirements that
Members demanded of China prior to its accession to the WTO.344
These Protocol provisions are also the only provisions that
specifically implicate China's capacity to comply -with WTO DSB
decisions.345
338. See Ostry, supra note 330, at 12 (explaining that the new transparency
requirements supplement the prior requirements under the GATT Article X); see
also Schotland, supra note 334 (stating that the Protocol "goes a bit beyond"
regular WTO transparency requirements by creating a greater burden for China
than for other WTO Members, thus leading one disenchanted Chinese government
official to term the requirements "WTO-plus").
339. See Protocol, supra note 4, pt. 1.2(c)(1) (extending transparency coverage
beyond the requirements of Article X of the GATT).
340. See id. (restricting China's ability to enforce "only those laws, regulations
and other measures.. .that are published and readily available to other WTO
Members").
341. See id. pt. 1.2(c)(3) (establishing an official enquiry point where WTO
Members may obtain any information China must publish under the Protocol
requirements).
342. See id. pt. 1.2(c)(2) (requiring China to create an "official journal dedicated
to the publication of all laws, regulations, and other measures" and provide a
reasonable period for comment prior to implementation of such measures); see
also Ostry, supra note 330, at 12 (noting that the creation of an enquiry is not
included in Article VIII of the GATT).
343. See Ostry, supra note 330, at 12 (stating that the Protocol modeled the right
to comment and time limit after the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")).
The APA requires the country to grant a consultation phase. Id.
344. See id. at 11-12 (indicating that "the draft Protocol of Accession
encompasses the accession requirements for new membership" into the WTO).
345. See id. at 12 (stating that the new transparency requirements present
difficult challenges for the Chinese legal system).
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2. Transparency Requirements of the Protocol
a. Publication
GATT Article X states that WTO Members must ensure the
publication and uniform application of all foreign trade laws and
regulations.346 Although the word transparency does not appear in the
text,347 Article X imitates most of the U.S. views of transparent
government practices.348 The Protocol expands Article X publication
requirements to include all laws or regulations falling within the
WTO's mandate and details China's individual obligations through
two specific undertakings.349
First, China may only enforce laws, regulations, or other measures
that it has actually published. 50 Second, if other WTO Members
request information, then China must make all laws, regulations, and
other measures falling within the WTO's mandate readily
available.3 1' These requirements, while seemingly simple, may
346. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 234 (explaining that the purpose of Article
X is to require member countries to publish and uniformly apply all laws and
regulations related to foreign trade).
347. See GATT, supra note 1, art. X(3)(b) (requiring publication of laws and
regulations without using the term transparency in the publication requirements);
cf, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
I C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
81, art. 63 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement] (underlining the transparency
issue by explicitly using the word as the heading for Article 63); Ostry, supra note
330, at 10 (noting that the TRIPs Agreement subjects member countries to a new,
quasi-judicial process that will adjudicate disputes as well as provide notification
of all regulations and administrative arrangements).
348. See Ostry, supra note 330, at 5 (stating that Article X articulates the rules
for publication and administration of laws in accordance with the U.S. approach).
349. See id. at 12 (discussing the additional requirements contained in the
Protocol that supplement Article X); compare Protocol, supra note 4, pt. 1.2(c)(1)
(requiring publication of all laws pertaining to or affecting "trade in goods,
services, TRIPs, or control of foreign exchange"), with GATT, supra note 1, art. X
(requiring only publication of trade regulations).
350. See Protocol, supra note 4, pt. 1.2(c)(1) (allowing China to only enforce
those laws, regulations, and rules that the government has published).
351. See id. (requiring China to provide, upon request by WTO Members, "all
laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods,
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present a problem for China. Unlike developed countries such as the
United States, whose democratic ideals have resulted in a long track
record of widespread publication," 2 Chinese administrative practice
involves the frequent use of unpublished informal regulatory
documents.35 3 Although not specifically required by the Protocol,
China could use the Internet, similar to recent U.S. Internet resource
options,354 as a means to assemble all government information at a
single point to increase transparency of Chinese laws and regulations
and create a single enquiry point.355
b. Enquiry Point
The Protocol mandates that China must establish a single enquiry
point, where any "individual, enterprise or WTO Member" may
request all information concerning Chinese law, regulations, and
other measures covered by the WTO.356 China must provide
services, TRIPS or the control of foreign exchange before such measures are
implemented or enforced"). In emergency situations, China may delay publication
until implementation or enforcement. Id.
352. See Schotland, supra note 334 (stating that "the U.S. does very well in
publishing and making information readily available to the public generally").
Some note that the publication requirement has been in the "backwater, drab
comer" of U.S. law. See JAMES O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE,
115, 116-17 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining that since 1966, U.S. courts have litigated
only one hundred twenty cases involving the statutory right of availability
publication requirement).
353. See Ostry, supra note 330, at 13 (noting that local administrative bodies use
informal rules, "normative documents," that exist below the formal system of laws
and regulations, despite the fact that these rules are not published); see also Come,
supra note 41, at 250 (stating that administrative rules and circulars issued by an
implementing authority are "not necessarily published and are inherently
changeable, subject to the whims of agency officials").
354. See Schotland, supra note 334 (stating that in 1996, Congress amended the
publication laws and required every U.S. administrative agency to maintain an
"electronic reading room"); see also Electronic Freedom of Information
Improvement Act, S. 1090, 104th Cong. §552 (1996) (amending section 552 of
title 5).
355. See WTO Ministerial Conference, Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3, pt. VII.3 (Nov. 10, 2001) (stating that
Member countries noted the use of the Internet and other means to ensure a central
assembly and enquiry point).
356. See Protocol, supra note 4, pt. 1.2(c)(3) (requiring China to establish a
single enquiry point).
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responses to requests within thirty days of receiving the request, or in
exceptional circumstances, within forty-five days.357 Requests
directed to WTO Members must be "complete" and "represent the
authoritative view of the Chinese government." '358 Requests directed
toward individuals and enterprises must contain "accurate and
reliable information." '359 The enquiry point requirement thus serves to
both expedite compliance review by other Members and ensure that
respondents base market decisions on factual economic data.3 6
0
China's ability to fulfill the Protocol's enquiry point requirement
is presently in doubt because China currently does not possess any
"single enquiry point" that provides a comprehensive account of all
Chinese legislation and regulation. 61 However, since many WTO
Members do not maintain single enquiry points for information, the
enquiry point requirement appears dubious, unnecessary, and
excessive. Some scholars believe that while enquiry points are
essential to the distribution'of relevant information, the WTO "must
be realistic about how much or little authority [their responses] can
have,' ' 361 especially when poor governmental and legal structures
plague a country such as China.363
c. Right to Comment
The most intricate and intrusive of China's transparency
responsibilities that the Protocol demands is the notice and comment
357. See id. (stating that China must provide, in writing, notice of any delay in
responding, and the reasons for the delay, to the interested party).
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See WTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 355, pt. VII.3 (providing the
emphasis of Members on the timely review of Chinese laws and regulations and on
creating predictable trade relations).
361. See Ostry, supra note 330, at 13 (noting that China still did not possess an
enquiry point); see also Keller, supra note 55, at 711 (stating that "in their
disarray, the sources of Chinese law seem barely capable of providing the basic
point of reference which all complex systems of law require").
362. Schotland, supra note 334.
363. See Keller, supra note 55, at 711-12 (noting that China's administrative and
legal culture, along with the disarray of Chinese laws, create an environment
"which work[s] against the uniform application of legal rules").
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requirement. The Protocol requires China to establish an "official
journal" dedicated to the publication of laws, regulations, and other
measures falling within WTO mandate.364 Following circulation of
the journal,365 China must provide a "reasonable time for comment to
the appropriate authorities" prior to the implementation of laws,
regulations, and other measures.366 The Protocol allows an exception
for laws, regulations, and other measures involving national security,
specific foreign exchange rate-setting policies, other important
monetary policies, and other measures the publication of which
would impede law enforcement.367
The Protocol's notice and comment requirement is modeled on the
U.S. Administrative Procedure Act,368 which U.S. scholars describe
as "one of the most important advances in modem democracy,"
resulting from the requirement's positive impact on the promulgation
of comprehensive laws and regulations.3 69 However, the Protocol's
right to comment requirement is highly problematic for China.37° The
central problem is that "[n]o Chinese legislation at either the highest
level or the local level incorporates a mandatory requirement for
consultation with either the general public or foreigners. 37'
Although some consultation-even with foreigners-does occur
during the legislative drafting process, Chinese legislation,
specifically at the lower levels, does not involve consultation while
364. See Protocol, supra note 4, pt. 1.2(c)(2) (requiring China to establish an
official journal for the purpose of publishing all laws and regulations related to
trade).
365. See id. (forcing China to publish the journal regularly and make copies
available to individuals and enterprises).
366. See id. (mandating that China must reserve a reasonable time for comment
before implementation of the laws and regulations in the journal).
367. See id. (providing for an exception to the publication and comment period).
368. See discussion supra note 344 (explaining transparency requirements in the
WTO).
369. See Schotland, supra note 334 (noting that scholars admire the positive
impact of the notice and comment requirements on laws and regulations).
370. See Ostry, supra note 330, at 14 (explaining that the right to comment rule
is one of the many impediments to China's successful accession to the WTO).
371. Id.
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drafting implementing regulations.372 Cooperation with foreigners
during the drafting process is itself a "foreign concept" in China,
making the immediate establishment of the Protocol's U.S. model
extremely unlikely.373
3. China and the Protocol: Future Prospects
The Protocol functioned under two pragmatic limitations which
now affect its future usefulness in setting a model of governmental
practice for China. First, the Protocol had to define the basic
processes necessary for WTO conformity that was realistically
possible for China to achieve.374 The Protocol answered this
limitation by using lofty, general descriptions of governmental
"transparency." '375 Second, the Protocol had to set a reasonable
timetable for China's compliance in light of China's operational
constrictions.37 6 To this end, the Protocol instituted phase-in periods,
typically of up to five years, which are designed to ease the
integration process by preventing China's non-compliance from
372. See id. (stating that local protectionism and lack of publication of many
laws will impede China's accession to the WTO).
373. See David Hsieh, China's Entry Into WTO: Protectionists at Home 'the
Main Stumbling Block,' STRAITS TIMES, (Singapore) Sept. 20, 2001, at A3 (noting
that regional protectionism in China threatens to become a stumbling block despite
promises to "level the playing field" for foreigners).
374. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 262 (suggesting that China should be held
to realistic commitments supported by mutual adjustment of all WTO Members in
order to avoid major disruptions in the international trade arena); see also Weiss
Interview, supra note 239 (listing five basic categories that Weiss believes are
necessary for compliance with international agreements such as the WTO). These
five categories were: (1) a strong judiciary, (2) federalized decentralization, (3) the
involvement of non-governmental organizations, (4) democracy, and (5) the
inclusion of a major global power such as the United States. Id. Although all of
these categories may not applicable or possible in China, China's participation in
the WTO includes only one of the categories: the inclusion of world powers within
the WTO, Id.
375. See Protocol, supra note 4, pt. 1.2(a)-(c) (listing general transparency
requirements and procedures for China).
376. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 257 (calling for a clear, realistic timetable
of phased opening in the Protocol so that China will have enough time to make the
necessary adjustments to its domestic economic structure and thereby avoid non-
compliance).
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being disputed by other Members.377 In addition, the Protocol
established a Transitional Policy Review Mechanism ("TPRM") 378
through which, one year after the entry into force of the Protocol,"'
the various WTO councils and committees will begin conducting
annual reviews of China's implementation of Protocol
requirements.38 °
A Member's use of transparency guidelines to outline proper
governmental practice is appropriate in a general sense because
transparency's core definition "goes to the heart of a country's legal
infrastructure, and more precisely to the nature and enforcement of
377. See David Murphy, Riding the Tiger of Trade, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov.
22, 2001, at 38 (explaining that there are many problems ahead for China, despite
the time allotted in the phase-in periods); Hsieh, supra note 373, at A3 (noting that
phase-in periods range from two to six years depending on the industrial sector
involved). However, since China agreed to no phase-in period for intellectual
property protections guaranteed under the TRIPs agreement, China may
theoretically be brought before the DSB immediately. See WTO Ministerial
Conference, supra note 355, pt. V.A1, Table B (listing the dates for
implementation in China of the various IP agreements); see also Wang, supra note
14 (stating that although many of the WTO commitments provide transition
periods, there still may be dispute cases involving China). Part of the WTO
agreements, the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), also has
obligations, including those related to telecommunications and banking services,
which carry a phase in period up to five years for open market access. General
Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex l B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
GATS]. See generally Trade in Services: The People's Republic of China-
Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/135, pt. 11.2(c), 11.8(b) (Feb. 14,
2002) (specifying China's commitments to the WTO in various sectors of their
economy), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/SCHD/GATS-
SC/SC135.doc (last visited Nov. 17, 2002).
378. See Protocol, supra note 4, pt. 1.18 (discussing that the General Counsel
will review implementation by China of policies required by the WTO and the
Protocol).
379. See id. pt. 111.2 (stating that the Protocol was set to enter into force thirty
days after its acceptance, making the exact date of entry into force December 10,
2001); see also Chinese Taipei Approval, supra note 6 (announcing that the WTO
approved the text of the Protocol on November 10, 2001).
380. See Protocol, supra note 4, pt. 1.18 (specifying that the Transitional Policy
Review Mechanism involves a unique ten year period of annual reviews that
allows the WTO to keep China's progress in all areas of WTO compliance under
close scrutiny).
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its administrative law regime." '' China's use of transparency
principles in the Protocol, however, is inappropriate because current
Chinese legislative and administrative legal infrastructure developed
without regard to such principles.38 2 As a result, in spite of the
tangible negative effects that non-transparent structures may have on
China's economic development,3"3 China's governmental bodies
may, without more detailed guidance, resist the Protocol's call for
general transparency.38 4 This resistance, stemming from both
systematic inadequacies"' and individual fears, relates to a loss of
control.3"6 It is unlikely that China will overcome these internal
challenges to meet the Protocol's minimum standards within one
year.38 7 This leaves open the possibility for protracted post-accession
compliance negotiations through the Protocol's TPRM.388 Inadequate
381. Ostry, supra note 330, at 2.
382. See id. at 4-5 (stating that a country's administrative legal system directly
affects the legal infrastructure).
383. See Yee, supra note 67, at 606, 606 n. 111-14 (citing Anne Carver,
Inventing a Legal Tradition, in ADVANCES IN CHINESE INDUSTRIAL STUDIES 31
(Sally Stewart ed., 1995) (noting that without set rules, foreign businesses and
individual investors will be hesitant to invest, short- or long-term, in China)); see
also W.F. JENNER, THE TYRANNY OF HISTORY: THE ROOTS OF CHINA'S CRISIS
147-49 (1992) (explaining that modem theories of economic development rest on
the premise that as successful market "must be controlled through known and
impersonal rules that can be enforced").
384. See Yee, supra note 67, at 636 (indicating that China may be reluctant to
implement transparent policies).
385. See Ostry, supra note 330, at 12 (stating that "the multi-layered complexity
of the evolving Chinese legal system makes this apparently simple and
straightforward requirement impossible to implement at present"). The recent
passage of administrative procedural laws affected only the top level of the
legislative system, leaving the legislative and administrative action at the local
level to operate with very limited supervision and virtually no transparency. Id. at
12-13. This effect resulted in the problem of "local protectionism" that concerns
most foreign investors. Id. at 12.
386. See Yee, supra note 67, at 636 (explaining that the WTO's expansive
transparency of making trade rules publicly available to all Member countries may
cause Chinese government officials to sway on the issue of transparency because it
is, for these officials, equivalent to a loss of control).
387. See Ostry, supra note 330, at 13 (discussing substantial obstacles that may
prevent China's timely implementation of the minimum transparent standards).
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levels of Chinese governmental transformation even at this level
could seriously damage the WTO in the long term.3"9
China's potential inability to abide by Protocol transparency
requirements has spawned further criticism that the Protocol's
emphasis on transparency is misguided. 390 Noting the inherent
structural problems in the Chinese legal and political system, such
critics claim that the mere commitment of the Chinese central
government to the Protocol is ineffectual.39' They argue that the
Protocol should have instead required more substantive changes,
such as the enactment of rules to govern administrative procedures
and the standards of evidence that support administrative agencies'
decisions, and addressed the deficiencies in existing legislation that
prevent challenges to administrative rules and discretion.3 9 Although
one critic has claimed that the absence of such provisions was due to
a general lack of appreciation for the importance of the Protocol by
WTO Members,393 Working Party reports from as late as September
2000 acknowledge the concern of some Working Party members
over China's institutional trade dispute compliance mechanisms.394
388. See Protocol, supra note 4, pt. 1. 18 (indicating that the General Council will
review China's implementation of provisions of the Protocol and the WTO
Agreement, and may make recommendations pursuant to their review).
389. See id. at 2 (discussing the effect of China's integration).
390. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 234 (discussing the need to restructure the
Chinese legal and political system to effectively comply with WTO standards).
391. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 416 (requiring China to undergo massive
transformations to effectively integrate into the WTO).
392. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 347 (detailing the Protocol's
effectiveness in promoting China's capacity to comply with WTO DSB decisions
and suggesting that the WTO need only look to its own actions in dictating the
protection of intellectual property for a more promising model); see also Ostry,
supra note 330, at 9-10 (explaining that in devising the TRIPs Agreement, and
largely due to U.S. concerns about enforcement, the WTO augmented transparency
considerations with the inclusion of a detailed enforcement procedure, which
mirrored the administrative and judicial mechanisms in the United States, and a
domestic challenge procedure, which created an avenue for extensive domestic
litigation).
393. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 415 (noting that the perceived importance of
Sino-American negotiations meant that Members paid less attention to drafting the
Protocol).
394. See WTO, Draft Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China to
the WTO, WT/ACC/SPEC/CHN/l/Rev.3, para. 72 (Sept. 11, 2000) (stating some
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C. THE PROTOCOL DOES NOT ENSURE CHINA'S CAPACITY TO
COMPLY WITH ALL WTO DSB DECISIONS
The Protocol's reliance on broad transparency standards and
failure to include more detailed substantive guidance on
governmental practice mean that the Protocol will most likely fall
short of its goal to assure Chinese governmental readiness.3 95 This is
unfortunate because, although many WTO Members likely do not
meet the Protocol's high standards, the Protocol presented an
opportunity to "impart needed momentum to Chinese reform
efforts." '396 As it stands, however, other WTO Members "should
entertain clear and realistic expectations about the limited results
China can attain by even the most energetic and sincere efforts to
create and operate the institutions required by GATT after China
becomes a Member of the WTO," including a dispute settlement
decision implementation regime.397
The Protocol still leaves open the potential for confusion within
China regarding practical matters, such as which governmental body
must withdraw or modify an offending law or regulation, how to
modify such an offending law or regulation, and whether such a
withdrawal or modification falls within DSB time limits. 398 The
Protocol also leaves unresolved China's systemic administrative
deficiencies, which may inhibit effective implementation due to the
overall lack of political will or non-cooperation at local levels.399 To
be fair, in light of China's present governmental structure, the pre-
accession resolution of these issues through a single document was
members of the Working Party expressed concern that China needed to improve its
institutions and procedures for the prompt review of disputes over trade-related
matters in China, in particular with respect to the independence of the
administrative and judicial authorities for reviewing measures), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/ACCSPEC/CHN1R3.doc (last
visited Nov. 17, 2002).
395. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 416 (elaborating on the Protocol's
ineffectiveness in readying China for entry into the WTO).
396. Id.
397. Id. at 418.
398. See id. (discussing the fact that very few high level officials realized the
complex legal implications necessary for accession).
399. See id. (noting that local officials also did not realize that accession would
affect local law as well as national law).
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an impossible task. That does not change the likelihood, however,
that the failure of the Protocol to ensure China's capacity for
compliance with DSB decisions leaves China unprepared to
effectively deal with the number and variety of WTO disputes that it
will doubtlessly face in the near future.4 °°
IV. CHINA'S POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION
PROBLEM AREAS
A. RECENT CONCERNS ABOUT WTO DSB JURISPRUDENCE
Several recent DSB decisions, which have resulted in formal non-
compliance, have cast doubt on the resiliency of the WTO dispute
settlement system. 40 These recent disputes, which include EC-
Bananas,0 EC-Beef Hormones,03 Australia-Salmon,4 4 Canada-
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,40 5 and U.S.-
400. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 418 (remarking that change in Chinese law
to meet Protocol requirements will only occur over an extended period of time,
leaving China vulnerable to DSB actions).
401. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 712 (commenting that the DSU
contains errors that need correction and is ambiguous at times).
402. See WTO Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R (May 22, 1997)
[hereinafter EC-Bananas] (finding that the EC import licensing was inconsistent
with GATT obligations).
403. See WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R &
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC-Beef Hormones] (finding that
the European Communities must conform disputed measures with the Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures).
404. See WTO Panel Report, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of
Salmon, WT/DSI8/R (June 12, 1998) [hereinafter Australia-Salmon]
(recommending that Australia come into compliance with the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures); see also WTO Appellate
Body Report, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DSI8/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) (further recommending that Australia comply
with its obligations).
405. See WTO Panel Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of
Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R (Apr. 14, 1999) (recommending that Canada
withdraw its subsidies); see also WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures
Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) (stating
that Canada needs to withdraw its subsidies according to its obligations).
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Foreign Sales Corporations,0 6 have raised doubt because their
complexity and contentiousness has required intensified usage of
WTO implementation procedures, and not always with satisfying
results.407 These cases highlight the fact that the DSU text on
implementation contains "obvious ambiguities and drafting
oversights" that need revisions in accordance with the objective of
"prompt compliance" under strong sanctions. 40 The gridlock present
in discussions over WTO dispute settlement reforms, however,
means that specific DSB decisions themselves, not the textual
revisions, must deal with new implementation issues.40 9
B. PROBLEMS RELATED TO CHINA'S INABILITY TO IMPLEMENT
DSB DECISIONS
1. General Issues Related to China's Involvement in the DSB
Recently, some trade law circles have pronounced that China's
failure to meet its WTO obligations, "no matter how it is expressed,
could well engender a considerable number of disputes" within the
WTO DSB.4 1° Some commentators claim that the vast amount of
new, increasingly westernized legislation that China has produced
over the last fifteen years could present fodder for the pursuit of
claims. 411  Others suggest that the minimum phase-in period
406. See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Tax Treatment for
"Foreign Sales Corporations," Recourse to Article 21.5 by the European
Communities, WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002) [hereinafter U.S.-Foreign
Sales Corporations] (holding that the U.S. tax exemptions are prohibited export
subsidies).
407. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 712 (demonstrating the need for
different implementation procedures than those currently offered by the WTO).
408. See id. (pointing out that some commentators called for increased sanctions
and a more limited timetable in order to strengthen the overall compliance regime).
Such actions, however, may only serve to frustrate China's efforts at
implementation by imposing blindly punitive remedies and raising standards to
impossible levels. Id.
409. See id. at 729 (discussing the need to implement and apply specific WTO
decisions in a uniform manner to all Members).
410. Lubman, supra note 11, at 418.
411. See Come, supra note 41, at 247 (stating that this legislation and
subsequent regulation, created in a "conveyor-belt fashion," will leave Chinese
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subscribed to under the Protocol will "cause friction between China
and its major trading partners," leading to a profusion of disputes.412
Whatever the reason for such a phenomenon, however, most
commentators agree that a sudden influx of DSB litigation would
cause harm to China and possibly overload the DSB.1 3
A related issue concerns whether DSB decisions alone should be
the chief means by which to induce China's compliance.4 4 On one
hand, the WTO should limit the use of dispute settlement procedures
to enforce China's adherence to WTO obligations, because excessive
use will result in an overload of the DSB.41 5 On the other hand, the
use of DSB decisions to promote China's compliance will generally
help to "ease the pressure on China's entry into the WTO" by
providing a structured, cooperative process for devising an
implementation strategy. 41 6 This issue also touches on the corollary
issue concerning the extent to which the WTO dispute settlement
process could serve to achieve other individual goals of complaining
Members besides mere WTO compliance, such as the withdrawal of
a separate WTO complaint or a change in domestic foreign relations
officials mired in a political framework based on antithetical socialist principles,
unable to effectively respond).
412. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 254 (elaborating that such friction will
"overload" the WTO's'DSB).
413. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 418 (detailing that frequent non-compliance
threatens to significantly increase the time period necessary in order to obtain and
implement a DSB decision). See generally, Terence P. Stewart & Mara M. Burr,
The WTO Panel Process. An Evaluation of the First Three Years, 32 INT'L LAW.
709, 721 (1998) (commenting that cases often last four to five years in the dispute
settlement system before a country is brought into compliance).
414. See Stewart & Burr, supra note 413, at 721 (relating the problems with
ineffective implementation of changes and inevitable delays).
415. See supra note 413 and accompanying text (explaining that frequent use of
the DSB may significantly lengthen the time required to bring a country into
compliance).
416. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 243 (reiterating the fact that, under the
DSU, China's compliance must only be "mutually satisfactory," requiring parties
to "work together to manage the challenges of international economic
integration"); see also Samuel Berger, U.S. Policy in East Asia: Trade Relations
with China, Remarks at the East Asian Institute, Columbia University (May 2,
2000) (stating that economic factors support giving China permanent normal trade
relations, as well as not granting the relations would be risky), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/berg0502.htm .(last visited Oct. 17,
2002).
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policy by the responding Member. The issue of the use of DSB
complaints as a "sword" for achieving alternate goals, while
admittedly somewhat cynical, was implicated during the recent
U.S.-Foreign Sales Corporation case. 417 For China, whose immense
importance in global politics makes it a potentially abundant source
for such alternate political exactions, the allowance of such a practice
by the WTO should be of genuine concern.
2. Specific Implementation Problems for China
China's dispute settlement problems do not end with the potential
pitfalls caused by the over-zealousness of its fellow members. 18
Rather, the majority of China's compliance problems are likely to
stem from internal Chinese sources. As noted earlier in this article,
China's laws and regulations lack sufficient clarity and unity to serve
all of the functional needs of a modern economic state.419 Not
surprisingly, however, it is the legislative and administrative bodies
that created these laws and regulations that present the most serious
difficulties to compliance. 420 These problems include questions
concerning: (1) determining the appropriate governmental body to
implement a particular compliance program, (2) whether the political
will exists to allow necessary implementation actions, (3) how to
modify an offending law or regulation in order to comply with a
DSB decision, (4) whether implemented compliance programs will
fit within DSU time limits, and (5) whether an implementation
program will find the necessary force at local government levels.
417. See U.S.-Foreign Sales Corporations, supra note 406 (discussing how the
European Union knew the United States would not comply with regulations and
used its challenge to U.S. Foreign Sales Corporations law to gain leverage over its
own compliance in EC-Bananas); see also EC-Bananas, supra note 402
(describing how the U.S. ultimately conceded in EC-Bananas, agreeing to settle
the dispute independent of DSB enforcement mechanisms).
418. See Keller, supra note 117, at 711 (noting that internal conflicts between
legal authorities and social rules present another problem in China's integration
into the WTO).
419. See id. (describing China's legal sources as a "disparate mass of laws and
regulations").
420. See id. (explaining that "[l]awyers and officials in China engage in a daily
struggle to make sense of vague, inconsistent laws of often questionable legislative
authority").
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a. Identification of the Appropriate Governmental Body
As noted earlier in this article, China is a unitary state in which,
theoretically, "power flows downward from the central power
organs. ' 42' In reality, however, "governmental lawmaking power in
China is diffuse. 422 While the 1982 Constitution grants the NPC,
SCNPC, and local congresses the exclusive power to draft and
promulgate law, the State Council and its various lesser
administrative bodies are left free to specialize and interpret these
laws how they see fit.423 Chinese regulatory agencies also have the
power to produce informal rules and regulations, which are often
more potent than central government laws.42 4
This distribution of power has resulted in a "legal fragmentation"
within China.425 Under this governmental framework of legislative
and regulatory fragmentation, it would seem that no legal institution
in China has the ability to impose order.426 Unfortunately, the
Chinese government requires such an ability in order to determine
which governmental body should respond to the particular
compliance requirements demanded by a DSB decision. For
example, in the DSB Appellate Body decision U.S.-Shrimp, the
Appellate Body found a U.S. environmental law valid "on its face,"
but discriminatory as it was "applied" by administrative bodies.427
421. La Kritz, supra note 59, at 269.
422. Id.
423. XIANFA arts. 62-63 (1982); see also Come, supra note 41, at 263
(explaining the flexibility of the Chinese Constitution in allowing government
authorities to interpret and apply rules and regulations in a flexible manner).
424. See La Kritz, supra note 59, at 269 (affirming the broad authority of
government agencies to implement the law).
425. See Anthony Dicks, Compartmentalized Law and Judicial Restraint: An
Inductive View of Some Jurisdictional Barriers to Reform, in CHINA'S LEGAL
REFORMS 82, 108 (Stanley Lubman, ed., 1996) (describing the traditional limits on
power with China's legal system and the conflicts and contradictions that stem
from implementation of such a system).
426. See Keller, supra note 117, at 734 (clarifying the problem of China's
incoherent legislative order where the problem lies in determining what regulations
preempt other laws).
427. See WTO Panel Report, U.S.-Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter U.S.-Shrimp Panel]
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Here, the DSB needed only to take administrative action in order to
implement the decision, because the law itself did not violate WTO
obligations.
Such a scenario may present problems in light of China's
ambiguous law-making and rule-making divisions.428 Because all
central government law must theoretically come from either the NPC
or SCNPC, these bodies may wish to devise a legislative solution. In
spite of its broad powers, the State Council may attempt to avoid
responsibility by deferring to these legislative bodies. 429 Ultimately,
it is likely that, faced with the same situation as the United States in
U.S.-Shrimp Recourse, neither body acts effectively, and
implementation of the DSB decision fails to proceed.
b. Political Will
A lack of political will within China is another reason that a
compliance program may not pass its initial stages. In general,
although countries are responsive to outside pressure to make
changes, domestic pressure usually prevails in the end. 3°
Notwithstanding China's commitment to economic reform and WTO
membership, Chinese leaders have made it clear that their primary
goal is the maintenance of domestic stability. 43' In light of the fact
that the often conservative-minded CCP essentially runs the Chinese
government,432 and that the Chinese populace is largely unfamiliar
(finding that the U.S. restrictions on shrimp imports do not comply with WTO art.
XX).
428. See Come, supra note 41, at 269 (noting the broad powers of the
administrative agencies to undermine China's ability to create a consistent and
effective system of laws).
429. See id. (explaining the process that state council departments use to specify
ambiguous laws).
430. See Sun, supra note 291, at 168 (stating that "[a]n unequivocal
commitment from the political leadership is perhaps the single most critical
element to further momentum for reform").
431. See, e.g., Chan Yee Hon, Premier Li Signals Caution on Reforms, S. CHINA
MORN. POST, Feb. 5, 1998, at 7 (paraphrasing the prime minister as saying "efforts
would be made according to the situation in China and not according to Western
values").
432. See Yee, supra note 67, at 624 (mandating the CCP to guide the state's
leaders in accord with China's Constitution (Xianfa)).
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and suspicious of domestic, much less international, legal, and
judicial action,433 there will be a questionable level of political will in
China for WTO DSB compliance.
This potential problem is made more acute by the reality that some
of China's administrative officials, who possess the broad, quasi-
legislative interpretation and enforcement powers necessary to
ensure compliance with many DSB decisions, 43 4 have been resistant
to WTO membership. 435 These officials often carry personal and
professional vices that may be antithetical to DSB decision
implementation. 436 Among the substantive areas where political will
may prevent compliance are subsidies restrictions 437 and quota
limits, 438 both of which Chinese officials fear would greatly damage
China's State Owned Enterprises ("SOEs") and undermine the
system of patronage upon which many officials base their
livelihood.439 China's likely inability to use any of the GATT Article
433. See Come, supra note 41, at 262-63 (detailing the flexibility of Chinese
laws to be interpreted by high government officials).
434. See La Kritz, supra note 59, at 269 (relating the extensive powers of
administrative officials).
435. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 235 (suggesting that China's State
Planning Commission and Ministry of Machine Building Industry both
"recalcitrant in adhering to transparent sets of rules and in eliminating... non-tariff
barriers," continually restrained the efforts of China's Ministry of Foreign Trade
Investment to negotiate WTO membership).
436. See Wang, supra note 14 (relating that observing WTO rules will serve to
weaken the relative power of elite officials over intervention and economic
regulation). When threatened with the loss of the fruits of authoritarian communist
rule, these officials are likely to seize on any incident of social unrest in order to
undermine reformers and prevent WTO compliance. Id.
437. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 203, 211 (determining the political risk in
reducing subsidies to state owned enterprises ("SOEs") is three-fold with large
scale unemployment among the populace leading to political agitation, the possible
insolvency of SOEs, and the tremendous pressure such insolvency could put on the
banks and other financial institutions that formerly supported SOEs under the
belief that their connection with the government would prevent such an
occurrence).
438. See id. at 242 (explaining the GATT prohibition on quantitative
restrictions).
439. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 38-39 (conveying the interlocking interests
of domestic lobbyists and party bureaucrats, and the continued power and
influence of the Communist party).
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XX 440 exceptions to legitimize such trade protections may further
lessen the political will to implement. 44' Finally, Chinese officials
have warned that if large WTO Members such as the European
Union countries and the United States decide not to implement DSB
decisions, the Chinese government will be unable to generate enough
domestic support to comply either.442
c. Modifying an Offending Measure
Even if China were to decide on the appropriate governmental
body for implementing a DSB decision and generate enough political
will to initiate such a task, it is uncertain whether Chinese legislative
and administrative systems have the capacity to comply in the
manner suggested by the decision.443 Chinese attempts to formulate
market socialism, while simultaneously maintaining control over
China's vast territory, have led Chinese lawmakers to create "laws
that are inherently flexible so that they may be adjusted according to
the vagaries of human behavior. '444 This has led to not only a set of
laws and regulations that are inconsistent with each other, but
inconsistent legislative and administrative practices as well.445 Such
inconsistencies may inhibit China's ability to devise a compliance
440. GATT Article XX allows general exceptions in order to protect certain
areas of importance, such as public morals, human life, national treasures, etc.
441. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 241 (explaining China's rampant use of
local protectionism).
442. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 729 (reciting a Chinese
diplomat's statement that if the WTO did not force the European Union to change
its banana import laws, China would be unable to generate enough domestic
resolve to comply itself); see also Bhushan Bahree, Integrating China's Economy
is Complex Task, WALL ST. J. EUR., Nov. 17, 1999, at 2 (reiterating that ineffective
pressure from the WTO will cause conflict with China's domestic laws and
interests).
443. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 729 (stating that China's current
position will not allow for successful compliance with WTO regulations, as they
now stand).
444. CORNE, supra note 102, at 93.
445. See supra notes 425-29 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties
of implementation stemming from the Chinese organization of laws).
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program that reflects the directive stated in a particular DSB
decision.446
Nowhere are China's inadequacies at producing legislation that
satisfies a stated goal more obvious than in its attempts to protect IP
rights.447 In spite of China's recognition that IP protection plays a
dominant role in the proper functioning of its social-market
economy,448 Chinese IP reforms have failed, resulting in a further
proliferation of IP piracy in China.449 Moreover, China's three main
IP laws, the Trademark Law of 1982,450 the Patent Law of 1984,451
446. See CORNE, supra note 102, at 93 (describing how vague laws can change
according to societal changes).
447. See Andrew J. McCall, Copyright and Trademark Enforcement in China, 9
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 587, 594 (1996) (attributing continued intellectual property
violations in part to China's inadequate and inconsistent enforcement of
intellectual property laws).
448. See Cheng, supra note 183, at 1943 (citing Rouse & Co., Hong Kong, PRC:
Eleven Intellectual Property Decisions, in IP ASIA 9 (Oct. 31, 1994)).
449. See McCall, supra note 447, at 594-95 (finding that despite China's
adoption of additional intellectual property laws, U.S. industries in China suffered
increasing losses due to copyright infringements); see also Marcus W. Brauchli,
China Could Face U.S. Trade Sanctions of over $2 Billion Due to Piracy Loses,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1996, at A9 (estimating U.S. losses in 1995 of $1.84 billion
due to Chinese piracy, not including business software); Sun, supra note 291, at 70
(noting that the United States lost $669 million in 1992 due to intellectual property
violations in Taiwan). Taiwan's intellectual property abuses over the past two
decades have led some in the U.S. industry to dub Taiwan the "pirate kingdom of
the counterfeit world." Id.
450. Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China (1982) (codified as
amended by Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress on Revising the Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China)
(1993), translated in LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF THE STANDING
COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1993, at 56 (Science
Press, I st ed. 1995) [hereinafter Trademark Law].
451. Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (1984) (codified as amended
by Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on
Amending the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China) (1992), translated in
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE
NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE LAWS
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1990-1992, at 505 (Science Press, 1st ed.,
1993) [hereinafter Patent Law]. Although China recently amended the Patent Law
to comport with TRIPs, the changes made, which went into force on July 1, 2001,
still do not bring China into compliance with TRIPs. See Thomas T. Moga, China
Changes Patent Law to Comply with TRIPS: Law's 2001 Amendments Are
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and the Copyright Law of 1992,452 have not eliminated unnecessary
and costly differences in IP protection between Chinese citizens and
foreigners.453
This last deficiency is important because it is a central requirement
within TRIPs-the WTO's agreement on IP protection.454 Complex
litigation involving TRIPs could inhibit effective compliance in the
event of a TRIPs violation by China.455 In contrast, spumed by
having to respond to a large number of TRIPs disputes, China could
attempt to use the DSU's retaliation or cross-retaliation enforcement
mechanisms to legitimize its own non-compliance in the event that
Specifically Focused on the Trade Agreement, NAT'L L.J., July 23, 2001, at C15-
16 (indicating that noncompliance is apparently still a concern in the areas of
patent right entitlement limits, compulsory licensing, and enforcement).
452. Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, translated in
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE
NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE LAWS
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1990-1992, at 77 (Science Press, 1st ed.
1993) [hereinafter Copyright Law].
453. See Nafziger, supra note 10, at 760 (observing China's difficulty in
adopting a system of rights that uniformly benefits both citizens and aliens).
454. See Cheng, supra note 183, at 1948 (noting that TRIPs, concluded at the
Uruguay Round in 1994, resulted from developed countries' efforts to create
unified standards for international intellectual property protection and the
countries' dissatisfaction with existing intellectual property conventions). The
developed countries wanted to strengthen the treaties with amendments to provide
more effective enforcement of intellectual property laws and to utilize formal
dispute mechanisms to assure compliance. Id. Unsuccessful in their attempts to
strengthen present international intellectual property conventions, the delegates to
the Uruguay Round negotiations made trade-related intellectual property a priority,
and the negotiations concluded with the WTO's TRIPs Agreement in 1994. Id. at
1948-49. Recall as well that China has no phase-in period in its obligations under
TRIPs. Id.
455. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 410 (describing ideological and institutional
challenges to future Chinese reform). One example may occur in the area of
disclosure, as the decision to disclose intellectual property during the application
process is a fundamental decision based on competing policy considerations, and a
lack of knowledge in this area would prevent rational decision-making, which
could then lead to a WTO dispute. See Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring
Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources and Prior Informed Consent in
Patent Applications Without Infringing the TRIPS Agreement: The Problem and
The Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 371, 380 (2000) (discussing the disclosure
conditions contained in Article 29 of the TRIPs Agreement).
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China successfully challenges another Member. 456 This possibility is
clearly not in the best long-term interests of either China or the
WTO.
d. DSU Time Limits
The novelty and complexity of WTO disputes may hinder China's
ability to achieve "prompt compliance" as well.457 Faced with a
negative DSB decision dealing with complicated subject-matter, it is
uncertain whether China's legislative and administrative bodies can
mold an effective implementation package within the roughly fifteen
months allotted in Article 21 of the DSU.458 China's executive
branch has expressed restraint in the past to applying even the
decisions of its own courts.459
Furthermore, China lacks a legal tradition in non-government
influences playing a role in the formation of law or regulation, and
China's compliance with DSB decisions is likely to be slow and
tedious. 460 Thus, China may be subject to DSB reproach even where
the DSB has legitimately sought implementation of a decision.46'
e. Local Government Congruence
Assuming that an effective compliance program is put in place
within DSU time limits, however, there still exists the strong
possibility in China that successful implementation will not occur.
This possibility exists because one of the more pernicious aspects of
456. See DSU, supra note 34, art. 21.3 (stating that a Member must inform the
DSB within thirty days of a recommendation or ruling of how the Member intends
to come into compliance); see also Murphy, supra note 377 (stating that China is
preparing for potential trade fights by developing anti-dumping cases against
foreign firms).
457. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 391 (commenting on the disorder and
arbitrariness of the Chinese bureaucracy).
458. DSU, supra note 34, art. 21.
459. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 390 (maintaining that "governmental
agencies are not unified in their outlook toward rules or their application").
460. See id. at 410 (discussing the Chinese government's reluctance to adopt
Western-style legal reforms).
461. See DSU, supra note 34, arts. 21-22 (detailing the period of time for
compliance and the penalties for noncompliance with DSB decisions).
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China's law- and rule-making system is the ability of local-level
intransigence to disrupt and constrain even the most well-meaning
central government compliance programs.462 Three main causes
explain this phenomenon.463
One root cause of this local-level disconnect is the traditional
vagueness of Chinese laws, which has fostered a persistent tendency
among administrators to interpret and apply new Chinese laws in the
same manner as the discontinued policies that the new laws
replace.464 Another factor affecting whether local levels give full
effect to a Chinese law or regulation depends on whether lawmakers
formally issued the law to the public, signaling greater local
congruence, or simply announced it in an internal circular or
document series, where local discretion dictates.4 65 A third factor
includes the problems of local protectionism, irregularities, and
inconsistencies in the law-making system, all of which have arisen in
large part due to increased local autonomy and the development of
local economies.466  The present trend of governmental
462. See Murphy, supra note 377 ("Beijing's [biggest] difficulty is whether it
can ensure provincial and local government adherence to the pact that it made to
the outside world."). This challenge is foreboding, especially when one considers
that while WTO negotiations took fifteen years for a team of highly skilled
negotiators to complete, WTO compliance must be implemented at every port and
at every market by local officials and common citizens. See id. (noting that WTO
enforcement in China, even with support from Beijing, will be a struggle). In
particular, the relative freedom given to coastal cities in the south and east to
experiment with new market reforms may ironically result in their present
resistance to central government legislation that they perceive as a threat to their
recent success. See Wang, supra note 14 (discussing the potential reluctance of
local authorities to comply with WTO requirements).
463. See infra text accompanying notes 464-466.
464. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 391 ("[Chinese] bureaucrats may have
difficulty distinguishing the current proliferation of normative documents from
policy documents, a distinction that did not exist before reform.").
465. See La Kritz, supra note 59, at 270 (noting the possibility that Chinese
administrative enactments may not have a binding effect).
466. See Li, supra note 62, at 124 (discussing some of the results of
decentralization in China). One example of this protectionism is the 1999 "Battle
of Cars" (qiche dazhan) in which provinces and cities passed discriminatory local
regulations against automobile imports into their locality. Id.; see also Zha
Quingjiu, Market Economy Refuses "Dukes Separatism, " LEGAL DAILY, Dec. 13,
1999. Some analysts predict that regional protectionism may inhibit China's record
of WTO DSB compliance in spite of sincere efforts by the Chinese leadership in
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decentralization has weakened the "Leninist structure" of the party-
state, making the above-mentioned causes more acute. 46 This
decentralization has caused many local governments to ignore central
directives and exhortations, 468 deviate from central government
policies without being checked,4 69 and undermine overall state
power.
Even without knowing the root cause of local legal discord in
China, such practice is nevertheless of genuine concern in terms of
China's compliance with DSB decisions.470 One noted authority
suggests that the Chinese government enforces only twenty percent
of all laws passed in China.47' Similar to the potential problems
relating China formulating a compliant response and doing so within
relevant WTO time limits, the largest degree of local irreverence
occurs, and will likely continue to occur, in the area of IP
Beijing to implement DSB decisions. See Hseih, supra note 373 (predicting that
local governments and ministries may use loopholes to defy new rules or "drag
their feet" on implementation of national legislation, and may lobby hard for
longer grace periods). Although the State council has promised to set up agencies
to enforce compliance with WTO rules, most analysts agree that "local
protectionism will remain a fact of life for a long time." Id.
467. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 402 (discussing several factors that have led
to the decline and decentralization of Chinese state authority). China's leadership
probably never dreamed that by granting more power to local authorities to
promote economic reform, they would unknowingly cause a diffusion of economic
decision-making to local authorities and concentrate less political power in
Beijing. Merle Goldman & Roderick MacFarquhar, Dynamic Economy, Declining
Party-State, Introduction to THE PARADOX OF CHINA'S POST-MAO REFORMS 3, 25
(Merle Goldman & Roderick MacFarquhar eds., 1999).
468. See Goldman & MacFarquhar, supra note 467, at 26 (describing threats to
the Chinese party-state). Chinese governmental agencies do not yet view their
interpretation of laws and implementation of regulations as founded on a coherent
understanding of the role of law in the governance of China. Lubman, supra note
11, at 385.
469. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 402 (discussing the decline of central party-
state power under decentralization).
470. See id. (noting that such localism has negative consequences on legal
development because non-uniformity in the application of legal rules inhibits the
grow of a national legal system based on the rule of law).
471. CORNE, supra note 102, at 190.
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protection.472 Undoubtedly, IP protection is one of China's weakest
areas of regulation, and Chinese expertise in IP should be augmented
through better education and easing restrictions on foreign joint
ventures.473 If China is to avoid serious reproach by the WTO DSB
for its failure to remedy local-level violations, especially those
related to IP protection, 47 4 it must take affirmative steps to better
define the role of local authorities and provide a check on their now
rampant discretionary power.475
C. CHINA WILL BE UNABLE TO EFFECTIVELY COMPLY WITH
MANY WTO DSB DECISIONS
At accession, serious questions still exist concerning which
governmental body will need to comply with a particular DSB
decision, whether the political will exists to allow compliance to
proceed, how such an implementation should proceed, whether there
will be enough time for China to comply, and whether local
administrative authorities will properly implement Chinese
472. See Cheng, supra note 183, at 1983 (noting that the high degree of power
that local governments now assert over administrative bodies means that local
administrators do not neutrally enforce intellectual property protection laws).
473. See id. at 1988 (highlighting alternative cures to China's copyright
problems aside from trade sanctions, administrative enforcement, and TRIPs).
474. See Wang, supra note 14, at 27 ("[L]ack of compliance at local levels
would expose the central government to the risk of WTO dispute settlement
actions.").
475. See Murphy, supra note 377 (stating that the central government will have
to take steps to ensure local observance of global trading rules). As one Western
diplomat suggests, a key test is whether the central government takes steps to
ensure that the failure of local officials to comply with WTO rules and central
government legislation that seeks to implement those rules will result in discipline
from the CCP's powerful and strident central inspection commission. Id. A
corollary concern is the extent to which unbridled regulatory discretion itself
leaves China open to disputes such as that raised against the United States in
regards to its Special 301 and § 337 laws. Cf Press Release, Trade Policy Review
Body: Review of United States TPRB's Evaluation (Sept. 2001) (indicating that
even though the United States has used its Special 301 investigation provisions
sparingly since 1999, concern still exists about such provisions' compatibility with
WTO regulations), at http://www.wto.org/wto/english/tratop-e/tpr..e/tpl73_e.htm
(last visited June 20, 2002).
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compliance measures.47 6 In light of the likelihood that China will
attract a high number of complaints, China will be forced to respond
frequently and in a variety of ways.47" Given that many disputes are
likely to arise under the TRIPs agreement, and to a lesser extent in
subsidies and quotas, China must press forward in developing a
greater expertise in IP protection and other relevant trade rules that
the WTO embraces. 8
This will be difficult for China. In truth, China, at accession, lacks
many of the prerequisites necessary for effective operation within the
WTO DSB-most notably its own discordant legal system. 9 WTO
Members knew that China's legislative and administrative systems
did not comport with DSB standards prior to China's accession.
However, the Protocol of Accession drafted by the Working Party
does not ensure .that China's ability to comply with DSB decisions
will be satisfactory anytime in the near future.480 As a result, the
potential problem areas listed above are distinct realities.
Working from the relatively secure premises that China cannot
remedy their legislative and administrative abnormalities in the near
term, and that the WTO is likely to modify the DSU due to
organizational gridlock, the responsibility for ensuring that China's
experience in the dispute settlement system does not become a global
debacle lies firmly in the hands of the DSB. Only the DSB has the
authority and ability to control China's fate. Although options are
relatively few, they do exist.
476. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing China's specific
implementation problems).
477. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 14 (anticipating that China will face numerous
cases).
478. See supra text accompanying notes 472-73 (discussing local
implementation of WTO intellectual property rules).
479. See discussion supra Part I1.C (discussing the requirements for compliance
with DSB decisions).
480. See discussion supra Part lII.C (discussing China's impact on the WTO).
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V. REALISTIC SOLUTIONS
A. CHINA IN THE WTO
1. China's Accession is a Positive Step
Most commentators agree that China's accession into the WTO
was ultimately inevitable and that China's inclusion will likely
enable the global community to reap political, economic, and social
rewards for years to come.48 However, some debate still exists
concerning the timing of China's accession to membership and, more
specifically, regarding China's preparedness to comply with WTO
rules and procedures. Either the WTO should have forced China to
substantially comply with key WTO obligations prior to accession or
China's WTO membership itself is the most effective means to foster
such compliance.
a. The Exclusionary Approach Is Misguided
Gregory Mastel, Vice President of the Economic Strategy Institute
in Washington, D.C., has most convincingly argued the theory that
the WTO should have forced China to fully comply with WTO rules
prior to accession.482 Mastel has argued that China's poor record of
enforcing bilateral agreements with the United States regarding IP
and market access make China's potential enforcement of the broad
481. See supra text accompanying notes 316, 319 (discussing ways in which
other Members would benefit from China's WTO membership).
482. See Greg Mastel, Clinton-Jiang Summit, Round Two, J. COM., Dec. 3,
1997, at 7A (arguing that it is a mistake to admit China for membership in the
WTO due to its failure to meet the qualifications for membership); see also
China's WTO Bid/Amplifer -3: Transition Key Question, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS
SERV., Apr. 23, 1997 (quoting Mastel's opinion), available at 4/23/97 DJINS
07:3 1:00. Mastel stated as follows:
It would be a grave mistake to admit China to the WTO when it is unable to
deliver on the commitments it makes because of the remnants of communist
economics and the lack of a reliable rule of law ... [e]ven if WTO accession
negotiations take several more years, China cannot afford to abandon the
process.
Id.
4872002]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
WTO regime extremely dubious. 83 The crux of Mastel's position is
that "the rule of law in China .. 'must precede WTO
membership'."484 A number of factors, however, limit the potency of
Mastel's arguments. 45 For one, Mastel seemingly misinterpreted the
meaning of several official Chinese statements, which served as the
premise of his position. 6 In addition, China's actual accession on
November 11, 2001 and the initiation of China's membership on
December 11, 2001 make Mastel's arguments somewhat moot. 487
Perhaps most damaging, however, is the likelihood that Mastel was
simply incorrect, as demonstrated by the wealth of commentary
suggesting that WTO membership itself, rather than exclusion, is the
best way to solve China's most troubling problems. 88
b. Membership Has Its Privileges ... and Its Obligations
In contrast to Mastel's opinion, the current popular belief is that a
multilateral framework, such as that of the WTO, is the most
effective mechanism to enforce international commitments, because
such frameworks provide a forum for the "cooperation and constant
communication necessary to achieve such a common strategy. 489
Multilateral organizations should function more as "teams," in which
the good of the whole rises with the enhanced production of
individual members, than as "clubs," in which members only admit
others that have already met success.4 9 Supporters claim that while
483. See Mastel, supra note 482 (noting the increase in piracy in China, despite
a bilateral agreement to end intellectual property violations).
484. Blumental, supra note 18, at 252 (citing and quoting Gregory Mastel, Is
WTO Ready for China?, May 8, 1997, FAR E. ECON. REV., at 29).
485. See infra text accompanying notes 486-508.
486. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 252 n.220 (noting Mastel's
misapprehension of a statement by former NPC Chairman Qiao Shi).
487. See New Requests and Completed Accessions 2001-2002 (confirming
December 11, 2001 as China's date of membership to the WTO), available at
http://www.wto.org/wto/english/thewto-e/acce/newrequest-e.htm (last visited
June 20, 2002).
488. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 256-57 ("[WTO] membership will
promote China's compliance with international norms and do so far more
effectively than have bilateral agreements or threats of retaliation.").
489. See id. at 256 (discussing the advantages of a multilateral institution).
490. Id.
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legal policy must remain under sovereign state control, multilateral
interaction through international institutions can have a positive
influence on domestic legal development on these states. 91
Commentators have demonstrated that even prior to the initiation of
the WTO, China's participation in the global community, while
perfunctory, still heavily influenced Chinese governmental
institutions.492
The provision allowing full rights and privileges of WTO
membership should accelerate China's domestic adjustment to WTO
principles in the long-term. 493 In the short-term, however, China
faces tremendous pressure from the WTO's central players-the
United States and the countries of the European Union-to exercise
the same balanced responsibility and temperance that have made it a
valued Member of the World Bank and IMF.494 As with' any'
multilateral interaction, China's rewards come with significant
international expectations.495
This international pressure may be the greatest in terms of
compliance with DSB decisions, where failure is tantamount to
491. See id. at 237-38 (stating that, although development of a legal system is a
state matter, international institutions can have a significant impact on domestic
reform).
492. See HAROLD K. JACOBSON & MICHEL OKSENBERG, CHINA'S
PARTICIPATION IN THE IMF, WORLD BANK, AND GATT: TOWARD A GLOBAL
ECONOMIC ORDER 146 (Univ. of Mich. Press 1990) (commenting on the effect of
international organizations on China's institutional design); see also Blumental,
supra note 18, at 237 (discussing China's issuance of vast amounts of legislation
concerning foreign trade and investment as being a result of international
institution influence).
493. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 257-58 (discussing steps that major
trading states are taking in order to ensure China's commitment to the WTO).
494. See id. at 258 (discussing China, and its membership to international
institutions, as a source of economic stability in Asia); see also Gary Hufbauer,
China as an Economic Actor on the World Stage: An Overview, in CHINA IN THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: DEFINING THE PRINCIPLES OF ENGAGEMENT 47, 48
(Frederick M. Abbott ed., 1998) (showing how China's efforts to maintain
currency values against fluctuation had helped to stabilize the region during the
Asian financial crisis).
495. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 258-59 (analyzing the benefits and
responsibilities China faces as they enter the WTO).
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directly harming other Members. 96 Although China's leadership
should expect proactive cooperation and flexibility in the dispute
settlement process from other powerful WTO Members4 97 and may
gain leverage over regional insurgents through certain WTO
sanctions,498 WTO Members will not tolerate Chinese disaffection in
the implementation of DSB decisions. 49 9 Thus, while China's
membership in the WTO can have positive benefits for all, Members
cannot truly realize those benefits absent the complete devotion of all
parties involved. 00
In .spite of these challenges, China's ultimate accession has put to
rest the hard-line view held by Mastel and others.50 Any desired
attempt to further conduct global economic affairs in the absence of
the world's largest trading partner is at the very least disingenuous,
and at most maleficent. 02 Moreover, China's ability to independently
achieve a high level of economic compliance while operating
entirely outside of the WTO's strong system of international rules
and obligations would be extremely tenuous. 03 China's progression
toward the rule of law and resultant WTO compliance is sure to be a
496. See id. at 254 (looking at the problems that may arise when trying to
enforce DSB decisions against China and the effects that it might have on other
Members of the WTO).
497. See id. at 259 ("The WTO, the U.S., and the E.U. must work together with
China prospectively to create a mechanism for mutual adjustment.").
498. See id. ("The important sanctions that GATT and other WTO agreements
provide may give the central government leverage in recalibrating the imbalance of
power between the center and the regions.").
499. See id. at 258 (observing the potential for conflict between the policies of a
Member state and international norms when the Member state is integrated prior to
its complete implementation of GATT premises).
500. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 259 ("A proactive approach that
encourages engagement and mutual adjustment is the key to systemic reform,
greater transparency and more even enforcement of the laws.").
501. See id. at 260 (concluding that those who argued against China's
membership were inaccurate and that China and the WTO have both benefited
from China becoming a Member).
502. See id. (noting the short-sightedness of marginalizing or trying to contain
China by blocking its membership in the WTO).
503. See id. at 262 (stating that the major trading states of the WTO would not
consider China ready to join them if it were not for the system of international
rules).
490 [18:399
OUT OF CONFORMITY
long and gradual process. 04 It is, however, a development that the
WTO may heavily influence 05 and will benefit WTO Members
greatly. 06 As a result, efforts of resistance should be at a minimum,
while offers of assistance should be many. 50 7
2. China's Compliance with DSB Decisions
a. China Will Attempt to Comply
There is every indication that Chinese leadership will fully attempt
to implement WTO DSB decisions that are decided against China's
favor.50 8 Chinese leadership is fully committed to economic progress
through WTO membership, as demonstrated by the expansive
amount of trade and investment-related legislation that China has
promulgated in order to assure accession 509 and China's willingness
to endure the domestic perils of liberal trade. 10 In addition, "as a
developing country, China is more likely to choose to comply with
the dispute settlement rulings because not doing so will inflict
damage to its economic interests through compensation or
504. See id. at 238 (discussing the many steps that China needs to take in order
to comply with the rules of the WTO).
505. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 237-38 (commenting on the international
community's ability to influence domestic policy through international
institutions).
506. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 183, at 2012 (stating that China's entrance into
the WTO will help improve China's copyright system by allowing the international
community to enforce copyright protection in China).
507. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 262 (discussing that even though China's
entrance into the WTO may cause some disruption, the Members' ability to fairly
resolve issues and disputes, as well as mutually adjust, should make the transition
easier).
508. See infra text accompanying notes 509-512.
509. See Cheng, supra note 183, at 2006 (showing how China's desire to enter
the WTO motivated the country to adopt a set of laws bringing its intellectual
property system into compliance with TRIPs); see also Nafziger, supra note 10, at
776 (showing that due to economic development requirements, China has taken on
a more cooperative role in global society in comparison to its traditional views of
foreign exclusion).
510. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 217 (noting that in a fragile domestic
situation perils may include the closing of SOEs and the loss of Chinese jobs).
2002]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
retaliation."' Another reason for China's expected commitment to
compliance with DSB decisions is the benefit China receives by
belonging to a strong dispute system, especially the ability to force
other Members to discontinue harmful trade practices against
China.5"2
b. China Lacks the Capacity to Comply
As concluded above in this article, several factors still exist at
China's accession that will inhibit its ability to comply with DSB
decisions, including the identification of the complying
governmental body, political will, the form of implementation
programs, time limitations, and local intransigence 1 3 Although the
Chinese leadership has demonstrated its interest and desire to comply
with DSB decisions, China's capacity to realize these intentions
remains considerably low. 51 4 As a result, "[e]xpectations in the
United States [and other WTO Member states] about the effects of
China's accession would benefit from realistic perspectives on
current Chinese conditions,"5 5 and Members should restrain hope for
genuine change in China's political and legislative landscape. 1
6
Instead, Members should devise and examine realistic solutions, in
an effort to minimize the risks of China's activity in the WTO
dispute settlement system, without limiting the benefits to China and
511. Cheng, supra note 183, at 2012. If China is unable to block requests for
retaliation by complainants because of the Rule of Reverse Consensus, China may
face severe economic penalties, threatening international cooperation with China
on other issues. Id.
512. See, cf, U.S.-Shrimp Recourse, supra note 40 (showing how the United
States willingly complied with the dispute settlement system). The United States
made great effort to comply with the U.S.-Shrimp decision because of the
benefits that they gain from the WTO even though the compliance was costly and
questionable. China, as another powerful actor in the global economy, should
operate under the same principle in order to protect its long-term interest.
513. See supra text accompanying notes 496-512 (explaining why multilateral
pressure would be effective to induce China's compliance).
514. See Weiss Interview, supra note 239 (discussing an interest/capacity graph,
which shows that China has high interest/low capacity).
515. Lubman, supra note 11, at 415.
516. See id. (referring to how China had to meet certain conditions before
becoming a WTO Member).
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all WTO Members that stem from China's inclusion in the global
economic order.51 7
B. REALISTIC SOLUTIONS
1. Other WTO Members. Greater Emphasis on Restraint and
Consultations
a. Possible Proliferation of WTO Cases Against China
In spite of the various phase-in periods that accompany China's
commitments for accession into the WTO, many dispute settlement
cases involving China may arise.518 China's large and growing
economy, increasing global presence, and lack of compliance with
many WTO rules ensure that there will be no shortage of potential
trade disputes with other WTO Members. 19 Although such an
eventuality may not prove ruinous to either the WTO DSB or China,
it could result in a fair degree of harm and inhibit the development of
WTO-compliant processes."'
517. See Cheng, supra note 183, at 2013 ("As a developing country, China
should not be alone in its effort to establish a comprehensive intellectual property
system, because such a system would benefit many of its Western trade partners.").
518. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 14 (stating that reform is necessary for the
already over-burdened dispute settlement system to be able to handle cases
involving China).
519. See Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protection in the New Millennium: The
Ascendancy of Antidumping Measures, 18 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 49, 58 (1997)
(noting that China is the most frequent victim of antidumping actions). Many
WTO Members may be anxious to have finally obtained a powerful, multilateral
device for combating what they perceive to be predatory trade tactics by China,
where smaller Members may have felt powerless in the past because unilateral
actions on their part proved either ineffective or disastrous in light of China's size
and power. Id. at 98. "Antidumping duties ... are necessary to counteract
predatory price discrimination by exporters." Id.
520. Contra Wang, supra note 14 (arguing that, absent reform, a possible flood
of cases involving China threatens to "break" the WTO DSB). Wang's opinion,
however, seems a bit extreme. The WTO dispute settlement system has shown
resiliency in the past, and there appears no substantial reason, at present, to believe
that a proliferation of disputes will have such a major negative impact. See
Murphy, supra note 377 (stating that although China will likely "jostle" with other
Members, most conflicts can be resolved before they reach the dispute-resolution
procedure). An example of this is China's adoption and amendment of trade-
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Some WTO policies, such as the rules contained in the
Antidumping Agreement,52" ' have resulted in a proliferation of
disputes because they offer a potent means of protecting domestic
industry from dumping practices. 2 Developing countries, including
China, have increasingly pursued international and domestic
antidumping actions in the hopes of maintaining domestic industrial
power." 3 Despite China's growing use of antidumping legislation as
a tool of domestic protection, China is likely to face the other end of
the "antidumping sword" upon accession and may not be equipped to
related laws as an indication of its preparation to join the WTO. Id. China,
presumably, has fully prepared itself for WTO entry such that an early demise of
China's membership is also unlikely. Id.
521. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter Antidumping Agreement] (replacing
the 1979 GATT Code and setting forth the current international precepts that WTO
Members must implement and obey). Although the WTO limits the mechanisms
that Member countries may employ to restrict imports, it allows for the protection
of imports through antidumping legislation. [d. The Antidumping Agreement sets
forth the rules under which each Member country may impose antidumping duties
on imports of "unfairly" priced targeted merchandise. Id.
522. See Corr, supra note 519, at 109 (observing that the WTO, while calling for
a significant reduction in tariffs and proscribing or limiting other import
protections, also requires Members to ratify legislation in line with the
Antidumping Agreement such that they acquire the dumping weapon, a powerful
tool for import protection). "The result, an increase in antidumping actions, is
manifest." Id.
523. See id. at 57 (stating that China drafted antidumping legislation and
initiated its first antidumping case in 1997). "In 1990, developing countries
accounted for less than ten percent of antidumping cases initiated, but by 1995 they
accounted for forty-three percent." Id. at 56. As of 1997, China was the most
frequent victim of antidumping actions. Id. at 57; see Press Release, WTO,
Overview of Developments in International Trade and the Profiting System:
Annual Report by the Commander-in-Chief, WT/TPR/OV/1, app., tbl. 6 (Dec. 1,
1995) (showing that exports from China were the targets in twenty percent of all
cases in 1994) available at
http://www.wto.org/wto/english/news-e/pres95_e/ov 1 .htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2002); WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ANNUAL REPORT 1996, at 105, tbl.
V.5 (1996) (showing that exports from China were the targets in fifteen percent of
all cases in 1995). China initiated its first antidumping case based on the
aforementioned regulations in December of 1997. See EU Adjusts Antidumping
Law for Chinese, Russian Industries, 15 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 51, Dec. 19, 1997, at 8
(stating that China initiated the case against newsprint from the United States,
Korea, and Canada on December 12, 1997).
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deal with a negative ruling by the DSB.524 Antidumping and
subsidies rulings, in particular, may be difficult for China to
implement because the WTO may demand more than simply
modifying a particular law.525
b. Restraint
China's likely failure to implement DSB decisions such as those in
an antidumping context should cause other Members to think twice
about pursuing disputes in which China's structural deficiencies limit
its capacity to comply. 26 Because overt legislative or administrative
inadequacy of fellow Members does not aid any one Member, the
Members should weigh potential disputes for their importance to the
potential complainant and their relevance to key issues of WTO
policy.5 27 WTO Members should not pursue baseless claims against
China, which would initiate a quasi-legal process whereby real
success is virtually impossible.528 Such temperance on litigation
would serve as a mutually beneficial method by which to informally,
and thus non-publicly, grant China a temporary reprieve from the
tedious necessities of the WTO dispute settlement process, allowing
the country to divert more effort at proactive compliance.
There are, in turn, indications that the WTO's most powerful
Members have decided to pay heed to this logic and embrace
restraint.5 29 One European diplomat has confirmed that "the EU and
524. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 14 ("Although many of the WTO commitments
provide for transition periods, there are bound to be many dispute cases involving
China.").
525. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 521, arts. 7-9 (discussing possible
measures that the WTO can take pursuant to an investigation, such as asking China
to revoke an order to reimburse duties, which leaders may not be able to
accomplish).
526. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 254 (stating that issues may arise when
Members try to enforce DSB decisions in China).
527. See infra text accompanying notes 518-519 (looking at the dispute
resolution system and the role it plays in effecting Members of the WTO).
528. See Blumental, supra note 18, at 259 (discussing the importance of WTO
Members working with China to facilitate China's accession into the WTO).
529. See Murphy supra note 377, at 44 (resolving trade disputes quietly with
China through diplomatic means may be preferable to utilizing WTO dispute
settlement procedures).
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U.S. are not lining up to put China's house in order. 5 30 These
countries, the diplomat said, acknowledge that China will need time
to adjust to WTO rules and practices.13' Beliefs such as these make
clear that, as China enters the WTO, " nobody is spoiling for a trade
fight."532
c. Consultations
There are also indications that, should the DSB deem a dispute
important enough to pursue, WTO Members may decide to
emphasize consultations with China as opposed to formal DSB
panels.533 As discussed above in this article, DSU Article 4 mandates
a minimum level of consultations prior to the initiation of formal
DSB procedures.5 34 In addition, China's traditional preference for
mediation over other modes of dispute settlement may make China
more amenable to early settlement of what could become a
potentially divisive trade dispute.535
Not only are consultations likely favored by the Chinese, but they
are also less expensive and require less specialized expertise than do
formal DSB procedures.5 36 Informal discussions, therefore, would
both lower China's political defenses to compromise and ease the
strain on China's scant and rudimentary resources. Experience has
demonstrated that WTO Members seek to guard their national
530. Id.
531. See id. (stating that European Union and United States are aware that China
needs time to adjust to the WTO).
532. See id. at 40-41 (suggesting foreign companies prefer to try quiet resolution
of problems with China before pressuring the government to take action).
533. See id. at 41 (explaining that Pat Powers, the director of the U.S.-China
Business Council in Beijing, has indicated that "[m]ost conflicts ... can be
resolved before they reach the cumbersome dispute-resolution procedure in
Geneva").
534. See DSU, supra note 34, art. 4 (delineating consultation procedures and
guidelines).
535. See Murphy, supra note 321, at 44 (suggesting that "[u]ntil China's legal
system matures . . ., seeking quiet resolution through high level contacts ... could
be the surest way to achieve WTO compliance").
536. See supra text accompanying notes 533-535 (discussing consultation
procedures and why China favors consultations).
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interest most often through negotiations.537 China's accession, and its
accompanying need to avoid protracted litigation in the WTO,
necessitate the DSB to continue and expand this practice to include
all disputes, without regard to individual Member importance.
2. WTO DSB: Greater Specificity on Methods of Implementation
a. China Should Not Receive Special Compliance Preferences
As discussed above, China's Accession Agreement provides
certain Substantive preferences through the allowance of phase-in
periods for some of China's WTO obligations. 38 The GATT itself,
however, also allows inherent means of exemption from WTO
obligations to which perhaps Members should give China
preferential access. The two means that are most applicable to China
are the Article XIX "escape clause" '539 and the developing country
preferences described in GATT Part IV.540 Neither of these methods,
however, appears to be particularly useful in light of China's unique
national circumstances.
GATT Article XIX authorizes temporary emergency relief
measures on imports of particular products and describes the
requirements needed to invoke this escape clause. The Uruguay
Round Agreement on Safeguards5 4' details the specific measures that
China may take once it properly invokes the escape clause. 4
537. See Esther Lam, China Near Success in Trade Grail, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Sept. 17, 2001, at Business News 2 (explaining the negotiations leading up
to the Protocol and accession agreements).
538. See discussion supra note 30 (giving a summary of the accession
agreement with the United States).
539. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XIX (allowing for emergency action when
large quantities of goods are suddenly imported).
540. See id. arts. XXXVI-XXXVIII (explaining the section entitled, "Trade and
Development").
541. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 1, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 33 I.L.M. 112 [hereinafter Safeguards
Agreement] (expounding on how and when the safeguard measures provided for in
GATT art. XIX can be imposed).
542. See id. art. 6 (stating that tariff increases would be a proper provisional
safeguard); see also Blumental, supra note 18, at 248 (indicating that the precise
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Although the GATT only allows such relief on a temporary, limited
basis, and only "to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious
injury and to facilitate adjustment," China's preferential access to
such a tool could prove dangerous.5 4 Allowing China an opportunity
to argue that it has met the "escape clause" requirements would
promote needless argumentation, serve to undermine China's strong
commitment to full WTO compliance, and raise the ire of other
Members. China's preferential use of safeguards would doubtlessly
add an additional level of conflict to any dispute settlement process
and would frustrate settlement consultations by providing Chinese
negotiators an "out." Employment of the Article XIX "escape
clause" has been rare in the past and it should remain so, even in
light of China's probable deficiencies in compliance. Instead,
Members should urge China, as a full WTO Member, to achieve the
same level of high compliance as all other Members.
Another means by which China could receive special preference is
through the language contained in GATT Part IV.544 GATT Part IV
delineates "nonbinding commitments on trade and development and
offers preferences for developing countries, which allow them to
preserve their balance of payments and encourage infant industries
through import substitution. 5 45  Although China's uneven
development and acute concentration of wealth make it a perfect
candidate for such relief,5 46 China's notable trade surplus and
sustained economic growth make it unlike the "developing"
countries contemplated in GATT Part IV.547 The WTO Decision on
measures allowed most commonly include a suspension of GATT obligations and
the modification of a concession).
543. See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 541, art. 5 (allowing for quota
restrictions if necessary).
544. See GATT, supra note 1, arts. XXXVI-XXXVIII (addressing exceptions
for trade and development).
545. Blumental, supra note 18, at 249 (discussing GATT Part IV, Articles
XXXVI-XXXVIII).
546. See id. at 250 (noting the discrepancy in wealth and growth between coastal
regions and inland provinces).
547. See id. (discussing U.S. and EU opposition to China's use of GATT Part
IV). The United States and European Community have vehemently argued that
GATT Part IV is meant to cover those countries that actually rely on such
assistance in order to continue to function. Id. China, in contrast, is in no danger of
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Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns,54 recently spelled out
in the work program created at the Doha Ministerial, 49 clarifies the
question of interpretation by emphasizing the use of preferences to
overcome the "resource constraints" of developing countries.5 0
However, the decision also highlighted the importance of providing
assistance to fulfill WTO obligations, such as implementing DSB
decisions rather than providing the means to avoid such
responsibilities.' While China needs support to comply with its
WTO commitments, China does not need the same exemptions as
many of the WTO's least developed Members. As such, special
developing country preferences are largely inapplicable to China,
and Members should discourage China's use of such relief as an
improper allocation of WTO resources.
b. WTO DSB Should Take a Flexible Approach
Although substantive preferences are not appropriate for China, it
is clear that Members must assist China to implement WTO DSB
decisions since China does not have the capacity to comply with
them. China must take some alternate steps to enhance its
compliance capacity in order to avoid damage to the WTO dispute
settlement system and other Members. Because WTO Members
economic collapse and rather is a rising competitor to these global economic
powers.
548. WTO Ministerial Conference, Implementation-Related Issues and
Concerns, WT/MIN(01)/W/10 (Nov. 14, 2001) (draft decision).
549. See Press Release, WTO, Conference Ends with Agreement on New
Programme, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Summary of 14 November (Nov. 14,
2001) [hereinafter Conference Ends with Agreement], at
http://www.docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/wt/PRESS/225.doc (last visited
Oct. 15, 2002).
550. See WTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 548 (opening with language
that the Ministerial Conference is "[d]etermined to take concrete action to address
issues and concerns that have been raised by many developing-country Members
regarding the implementation of some WTO Agreements and Decisions, including
the difficulties and resource constraints that have been encountered in the
implementation of obligations in various areas"); Conference Ends with
Agreement on New Programme, supra note 549 (spelling out the work program
created at the Doha Ministerial).
551. See WTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 548 (requesting that technical
assistance be focused on aiding developing countries to implement existing
obligations).
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allowed China to join the WTO in spite of its inability to successfully
perform this most central aspect of WTO participation, 52 it should be
the WTO itself, and specifically the DSB, that takes positive action
to foster more effective implementation of DSB rulings by China. 53
The WTO must take a flexible, proactive approach to dealing with
this issue. Overall, "the WTO should seek to develop a common
strategy that both anticipates the international consequences of
China's admission while also giving China's reformers the ability to
continue domestic reforms and gradually ensure compliance with
WTO norms." '554 More specifically, the DSB should show ingenuity
and forethought in drafting decisions that go against China, because
the only way to effectively deal with China's fluid and uncertain
ability to act within the legal process is to employ a legal process that
is similarly flexible.55 However, easing China's obligations through
less strident decision-making would further lessen the legitimacy of
China's membership. Rather, the DSB should effectively respond to
China's limitations in implementing decisions with clearer and more
detailed descriptions of what specific rulings require. The goal
should not be to provide a different and less stringent result, but
simply to make the same result more attainable.
c. Specific Suggestions on Methods of Compliance
One way for the DSB to make China's compliance with rulings
more attainable is to provide a specific suggestion on a method of
compliance within the Panel or Appellate Body decision. Although
the DSB rarely includes such suggestions in their decisions, the DSU
openly acknowledges them in the second sentence of Article 19,
Paragraph 1, which states, "[i]n addition to its recommendations, the
552. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 38 (discussing how China's rudimentary
legal system is still highly politicized and subject to the influence of local
officials).
553. While the WTO should take responsibility for the fallout of including a
Member that is not fully prepared to participate, it should also be agreed that
China's accession is doubtlessly a positive step for both the WTO and China.
554. Blumental, supra note 18, at 204.
555. See Come, supra note 41, at 299 (encouraging foreigners not to take the
letter of Chinese higher law for granted, but to reinterpret laws within the context
of national and local policy shifts).
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panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member
concerned could implement the recommendation. 56  Specific
suggestions on compliance would result in more effective
implementation because, as a rule, the implementation of legal
decisions, just as with the implementation of laws themselves,
becomes easier as the decision becomes more precise. 57
Panels and the Appellate Body may have failed to include specific
suggestions in the past in an effort to avoid offending traditional
notions of state sovereignty. 58 The idea that individual members
receive great liberty to devise their methods of compliance has
received little attack over the course of the development of the
GATT and WTO dispute settlement systems.559 More recently, some
scholars have noted, however, that this arrangement has created an
incentive for WTO Members to interpret recommendations in ways
that favor the continuation of measures that, in reality, Members
should best discard. 60 China will be under great domestic pressure to
embrace this incentive through the continuation of what are
tantamount to WTO-illegal laws. Moreover, such suggestions would
serve not as the only method of compliance, but simply as an
example of how Members are certain to achieve compliance, thereby
leaving the door open to the continued and non-infringed exhibition
of national sovereignty. As a result, at least for China, Panels and the
Appellate Body should abandon their laissez-faire approach to
556. See DSU, supra note 34, art. 19.1 ("In addition to its recommendations, the
panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could
implement the recommendation.").
557. See Come, supra note 41, at 250 (stating that precise laws are easier to
implement than ambiguous laws).
558. See Bello, supra note 198, at 417 (discussing how the GATT/WTO system
strives to accommodate the national exercise of sovereignty).
559. See Chi Carmody, Remedies under the WTO Agreement 5-6 (2001)
(unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Georgetown University) (on file with the Georgetown
University Law Center) (explaining that while the DSU calls for Members to bring
measures into conformity as a remedy, the more express recommendations now
permitted prevent the Panel or Appellate Body from undermining a contracting
party's rights under the covered agreements).
560. See Reif & Florestal, supra note 270, at 786-87 (noting the efficacy of
implementing DSB decisions with respect to the losing party's discretion in
interpreting the rulings).
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implementation and include more specific suggestions on methods to
comply with their rulings that are allowed in DSU Article 19.
Although the WTO only requires Panel and Appellate Body
decisions to include recommendations of conformity when the DSB
finds a violation, Panels have employed several methods to qualify
their final conclusions. 6 ' Several recent decisions exhibit this
apparent trend towards greater specificity in decision-making. 62
However, the U.S.-Shrimp Recourse decision demonstrates the
Appellate Body's continuing hesitance to suggest a detailed method
561. See Carmody, supra note 559, at 5-6 (describing how the DSB has
provided case specific recommendations of conformity in spite of DSU language
that appears to mandate uniform relief).
562. See, e.g., WTO Panel Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) (holding the United States
in violation of GATT Article 111:4 by imposing minimum quality standards on the
gasoline imported into the United States); WTO Panel Report, Japan-Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R (July 11, 1996) (finding Japan in violation of
GATT Article 111:2 by discriminately taxing imported alcohol); WTO Panel
Report, United States-Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses From India, WT/DS33/R (Jan. 6, 1997) [hereinafter U.S.-Wool Shirts]
(declaring that the United States violated provisions of the Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing by restricting Indian imports of textiles in an effort to prevent the
disruption of U.S. domestic industry); WTO Panel Report, India-Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R
(Sep. 5, 1997) (requesting that India seasonably implement procedures.that would
preserve the integrity of product patents); WTO Panel Report, European
Communities-Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment,
WT/DS62/R (Feb. 5, 1998) (finding that the European Communities acted
inconsistently with GATT Article 11:1 by disfavoring local area network equipment
imports from the United States); WTO Panel Report, European Communities-
Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/R
(Mar. 12, 1998) (holding the European Communities in violation of the Agreement
on Agriculture by disfavoring poultry product imports); U.S.-Shrimp Panel, supra
note 427 (finding the United States in violation of GATT Article XI:I for
restricting the importation of shrimp and shrimp products that were not harvested
using methods consistent with United States conservation regulations); WTO Panel
Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory
Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above From Korea, WT/DS99/R
(Jan. 29, 1999) (determining that the United States unfairly restricted the import of
Korean DRAMS, and acknowledging the Panel's ability to suggest methods of
implementing their recommendations).
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of implementation in spite of the obvious desires and potential need
to do SO. 563
One instance in which a Member requested but did not receive a
suggestion on implementation from a DSB panel was in U.S.-Wool
Shirts.564 In that dispute, India requested that the Panel suggest to the
United States a specific method of implementation, namely
withdrawal of the measure in question. In answering the U.S.
challenge that such action was outside the Panel's authority, India
stressed that its request was made under the second sentence of DSU
Article 19, Paragraph 1, and stated further:
The rationale of the second sentence of Article 19.1 of the DSU was
procedural economy; it was designed to reduce the likelihood of a second
proceeding about the implementation of the results of the first. It would
thus be perfectly consistent not only with the wording but also the spirit
of that provision if the Panel were to find that there were no alternatives
to withdrawal in the present case and to suggest, therefore, that the United
States implement the Panel's recommendation by withdrawing the
measure.
566
563. Compare U.S.-Shrimp Panel, supra note 427 (concluding that the parties
to the dispute should agree upon joint conservation strategies without providing an
express means to achieve these ends), with Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea Forabosco,
Are States Relinquishing Their Sovereign Rights? The GATT Dispute Settlement
Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161, 187-188
(1996) (noting the need for dispute resolution to become independent from
diplomatic arrangements), and Spierer, supra note 37, at 101 (discussing how
decisions that withstand scrutiny can change the dynamics of the international
system). But see Carmody, supra note 559, at 7 (arguing'that in the U.S.-Shrimp
Panel and the U.S.-Shrimp Recourse, the Panel and Appellate Body may have
been motivated by a desire to comment in a helpful manner, rather than a formal
suggestion, while also not suggesting that an alternative would fall under the WTO
agreements).
564. See U.S.-Wool Shirts, supra note 562 (encouraging the disputing parties to
reach an agreement, but failing to demarcate parameters of the agreement).
565. Id. para. 3.1.
566. See id. para 3.4 (arguing that to find that "there were no alternatives to
withdrawal in the present case" and to suggest that "the United States implement
the Panel's recommendation by withdrawing the measure" would be consistent
with both the wording and the spirit of the provision). The purpose of this
provision was to reduce the chance of additional proceedings to review the
implementation of the holding of the original proceeding. Id.
5032002]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
In spite of India's request, the Panel once again refused to issue a
specific suggestion and, in January of 1997, issued a final report
recomnending that the DSB merely rule in favor of India.567
The best example of where the Panel issued a suggestion on a
method of implementing a ruling was in U.S.-Cotton Underwear.5 68
In that dispute, Costa Rica contended that the measure at issue was
so clearly impermissible under the WTO that withdrawal should be
expressly mandated. 69 Unlike in the U.S.-Wool Shirts dispute, the
Panel here agreed and recommended in its decision:
We, consequently, recommend that the Dispute Settlement Body request
the United States to bring the measure challenged into compliance with
U.S. obligations under the ATC. We find that such compliance can best
be achieved and further nullification and impairment of benefits to Costa
Rica under the ATC best be avoided by prompt removal of the measure
inconsistent with the obligations of the United States. We further suggest
that the United States bring the measure challenged by Costa Rica into
compliance with U.S. obligations under the ATC by immediately
withdrawing the restriction imposed by the measure.
570
Although the United States complied with the suggestion and
immediately removed the measure, it is unclear how whether the
suggestion made in this dispute will serve as a useful model for
future claims against China. For one, the respondent was the United
States, a country that, unlike China, has an undeniable capacity to
implement virtually all DSB decisions. 7' In addition, the offending
measure in U.S.-Cotton Underwear was so clearly in violation of
WTO obligations that withdrawal was the only and obvious
567. See id. para. 8.1 (concluding in India's favor). It is also possible that the
panel felt no suggestion was needed because the measure at issue had already
lapsed, although the end result is that no suggestion was issued.
568. See WTO Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton
and Man-Made Fiber Underwear, WT/DS24/R (Nov. 8, 1996) (recommending that
the United States "immediately withdraw[] the restriction[s] imposed" by the
challenged measure limiting Costa Rican textile imports into the United States).
569. See id. para. 3.2 (arguing that compliance would be best served by
immediate withdrawal of the measure).
570. Id. para. 8.3.
571. See Gleason & Walther, supra note 169, at 710 n.4 (noting that the United
States has implemented DSB decisions in all cases against it, with only the U.S.-
Shrimp Recourse case being questioned as insufficient).
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choice.572 Moreover, the suggestion made is that this decision is so
simple that it would likely have failed to avoid the implementation
pitfalls that China, as opposed to the United States, could face. In
any event, the decision provides at least some basis for the provision
of specific suggestions by Panels and the Appellate Body as to how
Members can achieve compliance.
Individualized allowance of specific suggestions on compliance
methods for China would be both extremely novel and potentially
divisive. 73 However, if Members do not allow China this flexibility,
the WTO's most populous Member would be unable to comply with
most DSB rulings. It would appear that in relation to China, the
DSB's continued use of bare commands to bring an offending
measure "into conformity" will only result in China's recurring
inability to implement decisions, leaving China ironically "out of
conformity" and the WTO, as a whole, out of luck.
C. CONCLUSION: CHINA'S IMPACT ON THE WTO
China's accession into the WTO is a monumental event. China
was far and away the largest economic power in the world that did
not belong to the WTO.574 The inclusion of China enhances the
WTO's global legitimacy and has the potential to transform China's
economy, improve its relations with other countries, and foster a
more democratic political system. 75 For the first time, modem China
will function under an agreed set of international economic rules,
and, for the first time, those rules govern all of the major economic
572. See Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO
Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 43 (noting
that the case was an easy victory for Costa Rica because the Untied States provided
flawed information, and the little information that existed to support the U.S.
claims was weak).
573. See supra notes 543-567 and accompanying text (discussing why
individualized allowance of specific suggestions on compliance methods would be
both novel and potentially divisive).
574. See Lardy, supra note 11 (describing the economic power China
accumulated over the past twenty years).
575. See id. (explaining that China's WTO accession will be mutually
advantageous for both WTO Member nations and China).
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actors in the world. 76 China has made the landmark decision to forgo
a certain amount of its sovereign control, which it has guarded so
vehemently since the dawn of the Chinese Empire, and bind itself to
the wide-ranging systematic changes necessary in order to meet
WTO commitments. 77
At the outset, however, China's accession presents more
challenges than it does rewards. China's lack of capacity to
implement all WTO DSB decisions is a substantial problem, and one
that deserves a' large amount of examination and discussion.
Solutions such as those presented in this article are easy enough to
put forth in print, but a sustained effort must be made to test them in
a practical ehvironment and enforce their usage should they be
recognized as valid. Thus, one should temper elation over China's
entiy into the WTb by a realistic acceptance of the formidable tasks
that lie ahead.
Nevertheless, China's accession is an important step in China's
continuing journey toward greater involvement in the global
community.5 78 Although, other WTO Members and foreign business
interests are wise to remember that China's competing political,
economic, and social forces will likely constrain true rule of law for
a time, they should not underestimate the magnitude of China's
effort nor the incredible opportunities that it is sure to deliver in the
years to come.5 79 A full appreciation of both the achievement of
accession but also its commensurate challenges, especially those in
the dispute settlement context, is the only means through which the
WTO and China can mutually realize their intertwined potentials.
Through patience, creativity and diligence, the day will soon arrive
when China will truly come "into conformity."
576. See id. (stating the benefits of China's greater involvement on the world
stage under a standard set of rules).
577. See id.
578. See Lubman, supra note 11, at 423 (noting that accession more deeply
engages both China and its legal institutions with other nations and citizens).
579. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 40 (emphasizing the tremendous prospects
for foreign investment in China resulting from China's accession to the WTO); see
also Lubman, supra note 11, at 419 (noting that "the absence of a unifying concept
of law" in China will partially stunt the country's substantial economic growth
potential).
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